Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research by Reichman, J. H.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1989 Article 1 
4-1989 
Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: 
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized 
University Research 
J. H. Reichman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright 
Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 639 (1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 42 APRIL 1989 NUMBER 3
Computer Programs As Applied
Scientific Know-How: Implications
of Copyright Protection for
Commercialized University
Research
J. H. Reichman*
I. OVERVIEW ............................................ 641
II. COMMERCIALIZED UNIVERSITY RESEARCH IN A PROMISCUOUS
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT .................................. 643
* Copyright J. H. Reichman, 1988. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; B.A., University
of Chicago, 1955; J.D., Yale University, 1979.
This Article is based on a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), National
Law Center, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., on July 25, 1988. An expanded
version of that paper was also circulated to the Conferees at the LaST Frontier Conference on
Copyright Protection of Computer Software, held at the Center for the Study of Law, Science and
Technology, Arizona State University College of Law, on February 13 and 14, 1989. The final prod-
uct has greatly benefited from the papers presented to that Conference and from the deliberations
of the Conferees. It has also benefited from the advice and encouragement of my mentor, Ralph S.
Brown, and of Martin Adelman, Guido Calabresi, James W. Ely, Paul Goldstein, Russell Hansen,
Denis Karjala, Igor Kavass, Jack Kernochan, Pamela Samuelson, Glen Weston, and Nicholas
Zeppos.
The research for this Article was part of a larger project supported by grants from the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, the Intellectual Property Fund at Vanderbilt University
School of Law, and summer research assistance provided by Dean John J. Costonis. The Author
gratefully acknowledges this support. The Senior Research Assistant on this project was Brian
Trubitt, whose invaluable contributions are deeply appreciated. Additional research assistance was
provided by Lynn Hinrichs, Kendrick Royer, Chad Wachter, and other students in the intellectual
property program at Vanderbilt University School of Law. Their cheerful and helpful collaboration
has left an indelible mark on the writing and the writer.
639
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. The Minimalist Putsch at Pajaro Dunes ........... 643
B. New Directions in Legal Protection of Industrial
K now-H ow ...................................... 648
1. Inventions or Artistic Works-The Historical
M odels ..................................... 648
2. New Technologies Without the Inventive Step . 652
3. Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on
Its Face .................................... 656
4. Breakdown of the World's Intellectual Property
System ................ ................ 662
C. A Maximalist Response to the Challenge of New
Technologies .................................... 667
1. Expanding Opportunities for Legal Protection of
University Research ......................... 667
2. Birth of the Spin-Off Mentality ............... 669
III. BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES OF FUNCTIONAL COPYRIGHTS IN THE
RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT .................................. 671
A. Ownership and Authorship of the Software Enter-
p rise ........................................... 673
1. Academics as Employee Authors .............. 673
2. Pitfalls of the Collective Endeavor ............ 679
B. Eligibility and the Scope of Protection for Industrial
L iterature ....................................... 681
1. "Originality" and the Burdens of Overlapping
Claim s ..................................... 683
2. Uncertain Efficacy of the Traditional Defenses. 689
a. Aberrations of the "Unity of Literature"
Approach .............................. 690
b. Too Much Protection for Too Many
Software Designs.................... 696
C. Distribution Without Dissemination ............... 700
1. Dual Protection of Source Codes as Trade
Secrets ................................ 700
a. Nondisclosure as a Business Imperative.. 701
b. Ethics of Nondisclosure in the Business of
B lab .................................. 704
2. Licensing, Servicing, and the Spin-Off Corpora-
tions ....................................... 706
IV. TECHNOPOLIS AND THE IMPENDING CONSECRATION OF MAXI-
MALIST LOGIC........................................... 710
A. Temptations of the Minimalist Holdouts .......... 710
1. Indirect Benefits of Gearing Up .............. 710
2. The Hidden Costs of High-Mindedness ........ 712
[Vol. 42:639640
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
B. Redefining the Public Interest .................... 714
C. The University of Technopolis .................... 718
I. OVERVIEW
The extent to which universities should seek to profit from com-
mercial exploitation of their research output became a controversial is-
sue in the 1980s even with regard to technologies that intellectual
property law had traditionally been willing to protect.' During this
same period, university scientists and engineers have made extraordi-
nary progress in non-traditional technologies that deviate from estab-
lished patterns of academic research and that fall outside the basic
subdivisions of the world's intellectual property system.2
The bulk of today's most valuable innovations flow from incremen-
tal improvements in applied scientific know-how. Products of new tech-
nologies that embody this know-how seldom behave in a manner
consistent with the standard assumptions underlying the international
patent and copyright systems.3 Legislative and judicial efforts to adapt
domestic intellectual property laws to accommodate these new technol-
ogies have led to a proliferation of ad hoc protective solutions in all
industrialized countries.' However, these attempts to stimulate invest-
ment in innovative industries by tinkering with traditional intellectual
property laws are shortsighted and they tend to substitute problems of
chronic overprotection for those of chronic underprotection. In the long
run, the cumulative disadvantages of these responses threaten to inhibit
the very forms of innovation they are meant to promote.5
1. See, e.g., D. NELKIN, SCIENCE AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: WHO CONTROLS RESEARCH? 1-8
(1984); B. REAMS, UNIVERsrrY-INDusTRY RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS--THE MAJOR LEGAL ISSUS IN RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 3-19 (1986); TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE '80s, at 6-7
(J. Coles ed. 1983). Patents and copyrights are the traditional modes of protecting intellectual
property of primary interest to universities. See infra text accompanying notes 41-51.
2. Because of rapid scientific breakthroughs in biotechnology research sponsored by universi-
ties, the field of biotechnology has triggered the most intense pressure for cooperation between
universities and private industries. See, e.g., D. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that "much of
the discussion about intellectual property has come to focus on the commercialization of biomedi-
cal research"); B. REAMS, supra note 1, at ix-x. But biotechnology is just one entry in a growing list
of both old and new technologies that are served inadequately by patent and copyright laws as
historically conceived and applied. Prominent on this list are computer technologies, data bases,
industrial designs, pharmaceuticals, and methods of medical treatment. See, e.g., K. HODKiNSON,
PROTECTING AND EXPLOITING NEW TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGNS 72-100, 121-47 (1987); see infra text
accompanying notes 84-114.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 61-116.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 116-49, 236-311.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 59-116, 390-411; see also Reichman, Design Protection
and the New Technologies: Meaning of The United States Experience, Paper presented at the
International Conference on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design (Disegno Industriale e la
Communitfi Europeo), Treviso, Italy (Oct. 11-13, 1988) (forthcoming in INDUS. PROP.).
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Meanwhile, a proliferation of protective legal devices has created
unprecedented opportunities for universities to commercialize their col-
lective research agenda. Current methods of combining copyright, pa-
tent, and trade secret laws to protect computer programs, for example,
illustrate legal strategies that university administrators can apply to a
broadening range of innovative techniques. Reliance on these same
strategies to protect faculty-generated software, however, can embroil
administrators in thorny disputes concerning ownership of the research
product7 and the scope of protection that their proprietary rights
should command.' Administrators may also require strict internal and
external arrangements to prevent theft of trade secrets, and they may
need to participate in spin-off corporations in order to maximize re-
turns from derivative works." Universities that systematically seek to
commercialize applications of scientific know-how will thus need to de-
velop a rather different set of practices and procedures from those cus-
tomarily employed to protect either patented research or copyrighted
works of a more traditional character.
A university that uses copyright law to protect its contributions to
technological innovation will find that the tension between this mode of
protection and traditional academic values is far more subtle and com-
plex than in the past. The growing propensity of universities to exploit
proprietary rights in new technologies, moreover, is leading to closer co-
operation with industry than was thought suitable in the past.10 Many
faculties and administrators have consequently jettisoned the set of ba-
sic restraints and guidelines that a group of leading university presi-
dents had tried to affirm as late as 1982.11
This Article surveys the problems that university administrators
face when seeking to exploit proprietary rights in new technologies,
with particular regard to computer software. In so doing, it explores
larger questions about the proper role of intellectual property laws in
protecting applied scientific know-how and the proper role of universi-
ties in exploiting the opportunities that such laws increasingly make
6. See infra text accompanying notes 170-368.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 181-223.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 224-313.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 314-68.
10. See, e.g., Brooks, The Research University: Doing Good, and Doing it Better, IssuEs Sc.
& TECH., Winter 1988, at 49, 50-51. See generally PARTNERS IN THE RESEARCH ENTER-
PRISE-UNIVERSITY-CORPORATE RELATIONS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (T. Langfitt, S. Hackney, A.
Fishman & A. Glowasky eds. 1983) [hereinafter PARTNERS IN RESEARCH].
11. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Re-
search, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 177-80 (1987); Korn, Patent and Trade Secret Protection In University-
Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 201-08 (1987); see
infra text accompanying notes 30-40 (discussing the Pajaro Dunes Conference).
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II. COMMERCIALIZED UNIVERSITY RESEARCH IN A PROMISCUOUS LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT
A. The Minimalist Putsch at Pajaro Dunes
Since the mid-1970s, public opinion in the United States and most
other industrialized countries has regarded the temporary monopolies
of patent and copyright law more favorably than during the previous
two decades.12 This improved climate soon began to affect the way uni-
12. See, e.g., Adelman, The New World Of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. JL. REF. 979, 979-82 (1987) (stating that "[tihe patent system, ...
relegated to an obscure corner by many opinion makers, [has] made a startling comeback"). Com-
pare, e.g., Beier, The Significance of the Patent System for Technical, Economic and Social Pro-
gress, 11 INT'L REV. INDus. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (UC) 563 (1980) [hereinafter Beier, Patent
System] and Kitch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) with
STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDI-
CIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958)
(authored by F. Machlup) [hereinafter F. Machlup] (noting that "[i]f we did not have a patent
system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic conse-
quences, to recommend instituting one").
According to Professor Kitch, whose reorientation in 1977 spearheaded this shift, the patent
law with its prospecting function actually provided a structural and organizational foundation for
the efficient allocation of resources in the research and development environment. Kitch, supra, at
276-81. What Professor Beier calls the "close and quite startling correlation between economic
freedom, industrialization and patent protection" was thus rediscovered, perhaps because of com-
petition from Japan, which had operated within the confines of a patent system. Beier, Govern-
ment Promotion of Innovation and the Patent System, 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
(IIC) 545, 547 (1982) [hereinafter Beier, Government Promotion]; see also Brooks, supra note 10,
at 54. This rediscovery produced a growing conviction that the patent system inherently promotes
the public interest, as the United States Constitution implies, and does not merely interfere with
free competition through the creation of monopolies. See, e.g., R. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-IsSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 17-19 (1987); H. ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PAT-
ENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS: SHOULD AN INVENTIVE STEP ADVANCE THE ART? 101-05, 111-
13 (1977); Adelman, supra, at 980-81; Beier, Government Promotion, supra, at 546-51.
Recent attempts to justify the intellectual property system under conservative economic the-
ory have elicited a surprisingly protectionist literature from circles that were historically opposed
to any such derogations from the norms of free competition. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis] (forthcoming); Lehman, The Theory of Property Rights and the Protection of
Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 525 (1985);
Lunn, The Roles of Property Rights and Market Power in Appropriating Innovative Output, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 423 (1985); see also Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987). Nevertheless, attacks on the intellectual property system as a whole or its
constituent parts recur at frequent intervals. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1970);
Mandeville & Macdonald, Innovation Protection Viewed from an Information Perspective, in Di-
RECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 157 (W. Kingston ed. 1987) [hereinafter DIRECT PROTECTION] (ar-
guing that innovation as such should not be protected and that "the patent system works only
because it does not work: ... its very weakness is its real strength"); Oddi, The International
Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831; see also R.
BENKO, supra, at 19-25 (noting the views of those hostile to intellectual property protection); Adel-
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versities viewed intellectual property.1 3 Historically, academic investiga-
tors had disdained the patenting of research results on the ground that
they were paid to disseminate knowledge to the public.14 By the 1980s,
however, as the magnitude of government support diminished in re-
sponse to changed economic conditions and the value of endowments in
real dollars continued to shrink, university administrators found it in-
creasingly difficult to fund research by traditional means.1 5 The patent-
ing of research results afforded universities a self-help opportunity to
share in the profits that industry reaped from the work of their facul-
ties and staffs16 -sometimes with spectacular results1 - while contrib-
uting to a nationwide drive for greater competitiveness on international
markets. 8
Once the universities began to re-evaluate the impact of patents on
their educational mission, they discovered that tensions between the
dissemination of basic research and the protection of applied technical
ideas were not unmanageable. This was especially true under United
States patent law, which provides a one-year novelty grace period that
enables investigators both to publish and to patent their research re-
sults 9 with careful timing. 0
man, supra, at 979-80 n.1 (citing recent articles critical of patent system).
13. See Pajaro Dunes Conference, Draft Statement, 9 J.C. & U.L. 533, 536 (1983) [hereinafter
Pajaro Dunes Statement].
14. See D. DICKSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE 89-90 (1984); B. REAMS, supra note 1, at
23-24; Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 267 (1973). For
recent criticism of the trend toward more aggressive university patenting policies, see Weiner, Pat-
enting and Academic Research, 12 SCL TECH. & HUM. VALUES 50-62 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Lesser, Financing University Research Through Patenting and Licensing: Re-
cent Policies and Practices at Cornell University as an Example, 18 INr'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 360 (1987) (observing that economic shocks, recession, budget deficits, and the
trade imbalance reduced government support of university research in the 1980s).
16. See, e.g., id. (noting that universities in search of replacement funds turned inward and
examined the commercial potential of inventions by faculty and staff). Participation in the fruits
of that research may be the surest way, in the long run, to offset the loss of big donations from
large sources of capital that become harder to find under the new income tax laws.
17. Consider, for example, the University of Wisconsin's patent on the process for activating
Vitamin D; Indiana University and stannous flouride (Crest toothpaste); and the University of
Florida and Gatorade. D. DICKSON, supra note 14, at 90-91. Dickson observes, however, that 12 of
35 universities polled by the Association of American Universities reported actual losses on patent-
licensing operations. Id. at 91.
18. See, e.g., D. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 2; Brooks, supra note 10, at 52-53.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see, e.g., Kitch, supra note 12, at 287 (suggesting that disclo-
sure is actually encouraged, as a way to attract licensees); Lesser, supra note 15, at 360-61 (noting
that the patent system permits academics to reveal invention without fear of copying). Contrast
this regime with the one in the European Community, in which no novelty grace period exists. See
2 D. CmsuM, PATENTS § 6.02 (1988); Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 564-65; see
also Winner, Practical Effects of the Patent Co-operation Treaty and the European Patent Con-
vention on Domestic Technology Management and Patent Practice, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 419
(1980).
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Some commentators also argued persuasively that the patenting of
university inventions advanced the public interest regardless of the aca-
demic scientists' access to public and private funds donated to finance
basic research. 21 As Professor Beier explained in 1982, technical and ec-
onomic progress requires that the research and development phase
should lead to "industrial application and dissemination of new techni-
cal knowledge. '22 Investors, however, will not readily arrange the trans-
fer of new technology from the laboratory to industry without obtaining
exclusive rights23 that prevent competitors who do not share in the
costs of research and development from duplicating patentable inven-
tions. 24 Not taking patents seriously, in other words, may mean that
20. Patenting seemed not to require secrecy so much as a carefully timed disclosure that
exploited this novelty grace period in American law. See, e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 804 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (noting that pioneering studies published more than one year prior to filing provided
virtually all of a biogenetic method to the public and rendered the inventors' later claims obvious);
National Semiconductor Corp. v. Linear Technology Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (holding that the submission of papers preceding a conference was not a general publication
for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), even though some engineers in competing firms had
received it). Even a carefully timed publication, however, can limit the patentee's ability to obtain
future or additional patents on modifications of the initial invention, because the publication will
itself constitute prior art against the patentee, and the patentee may be denied a continuation in
part to this extent. See, e.g., Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1106-
07 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Ruscetta, 255 F.2d 687 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (discussing the "timing of
disclosures").
Patenting also required universities to avoid public use of the claimed invention more than
one year before the filing of a patent application under § 102(b). A researcher's experimental use in
the laboratory, however, may be privileged. See, e.g., TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Posi-
tioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that experimental use did not invalidate the
patent); Moxness Prod., Inc. v. Xomed, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding
that "public use" of an invention at University of Minnesota Health Center violated § 102(b) as a
matter of law and negated patentability); Korn, supra note 11, at 213-16.
The advantage of a patent application is that once filed, exploitation and academic dissemina-
tion can proceed together, arguably with an overall gain in efficiency. Even with this accommoda-
tion, however, some find academic duty irreconcilable with intellectual property protection of any
sort. See N. WADE, THE SCmNcE BusuNEss 27-40, 55-64 (Report of The Twentieth Century Fund:
Task Force on the Commercialization of Scientific Research, background paper 1984); Weiner,
supra note 14.
21. See Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562; see also B. REAMS, supra note
1, at 4; id. at 149 (arguing that "Ujoint research efforts in innovation can, if properly articulated,
accomplish goals of mutual interest to both industry and the university-the improvement of soci-
ety"). See generally D. BoK, BEYOND THE IvORY Towzxs SocuL RESPONSEBILrriEs OF THE MODERN
UNvznsrry 155 (1982) (patenting is consistent with the university mission); H. ULLRICH, supra
note 12, at 105-06.
22. Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562.
23. See, e.g., R. BENKO, supra note 12, at 17-19 (noting that the patent monopoly compen-
sates for market failure and addresses the problem of appropriability).
24. See, e.g., Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562; Cawood, Venture Capital
and the University, Paper Delivered at the Conference on the University Spin-Off Corporation,
Donaldson Brown Center for Continuing Education, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity, Blacksburg, Virginia (April 24-27, 1988) [hereinafter Blacksburg Conference] (to be pub-
lished as The University Spin-Off Corporation: Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (A.
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research results will not benefit the public at all, because dissemination
through publication alone fails to complete the transfer to industry and
will not necessarily elicit the investment needed to perfect it.2"
Prodded by self-interest and this philosophy of convenience,2" uni-
versities began to move toward more systematic commercialization of
their research output.2 7 By 1980, even Harvard University had an-
nounced plans to establish a company to exploit the genetic engineering
advances that one of its own biochemists had pioneered.28 The Harvard
faculty, however, rejected this proposal and its President, in cancelling
the deal, warned about tainting the relationship between universities
and their professors.2 9 As the public grew more concerned about the
ethical consequences of commercialized university research, the presi-
dents of several leading universities"0 decided to exert a restraining in-
fluence on the evolving partnership between industry and the
university.31
Gathered at Pajaro Dunes, California, in 1982, to contemplate the
problems that commercialized discoveries in biotechnology were already
posing for the academic enterprise as a whole, this group of university
Brett, D. Gibson & K. Smilor eds. 1989)) (copy on file at Vanderbilt Law School); see also Morri-
son & Wetzel, Support Network for Faculty Spin-off Companies, in Blacksburg Conference, supra
(advancing the venture capitalist's view that without intellectual property protection investments
in development cannot be justified); Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 536.
25. Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562. Beier stated: "Even though it
would appear to be appropriate to make available R & D results financed by the government to
everyone, by means of scientific publications, special information systems, technology clearing
houses, etc., this approach has not been successful in practice." Id. (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Hackney, Prologue, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at xi-xii (noting
that the realities motivating commercialization of research-that universities cannot do research
without funding and that corporations stay in business by making a profit--"are less likely to be
brought out" than are the advantages of interaction); Lesser, supra note 15, at 370.
27. See, e.g., B. REAMS, supra note 1, at 18-19; Weiner, supra note 14, at 59 (deploring that
"[m]ore and more universities are adopting aggressive patenting policies"). Thus, the premise that
patents promote the public interest in general has been widely interpreted to include university
patents. Major universities expressly justify their increasing use of the patent system by appealing
to their concern about "the public interest in potential new products and processes resulting from
discoveries or inventions made by members of the (u)niversity in connection with ...their
(u)niversity activities." Harvard University, A Statement of Policy in Regard to Patents and Copy-
rights (adopted by the President and Fellows November 3, 1976, amended March 17, 1986) [here-
inafter Harvard Statement].
28. Gosselin, In '80, Harvard Dropped Plan for Genetic Engineering Firm, Boston Globe,
Sept. 11, 1988, at 43, col. 1.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Giamatti, Free Market and Free Inquiry: The University, Industry, and Coop-
erative Research, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 3 (remarks of A. Bartlett Giamatti,
then President of Yale University); Gosselin, supra note 28, at 43 (discussing statements by Derek
Bok, President of Harvard University).
31. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, The Pajaro Dunes Conference, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra
note 10, at 33-37 (discussing the purpose of the Conference).
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presidents issued a now celebrated statement acknowledging that "ap-
plications of present knowledge can be foreseen that are likely to be of
far-reaching benefit to people everywhere."" They nonetheless felt
compelled to stress "the preservation of the independence and integrity
of the university and its faculty," both of which were "faced with un-
precedented financial pressures and complex commercial relation-
ships."3 " Moreover, the presidents found it necessary to reaffirm their
obligation to ensure that universities "remain devoted to their primary
goals of education and research, and that . .. resources be properly
used in the pursuit of these goals." 4 The Pajaro Dunes Statement then
proceeded to sketch a set of guidelines to govern research agreements,
patent licensing, and faculty relations with universities, in each case
emphasizing the primacy of teaching and research responsibilities and
the need to avoid conflicts of interest. 5
What emerged from Pajaro Dunes was the portrait of a university
that feared the contamination of its academic goals through contact
with industry and the introduction of the commercial ethos into the
university environment.38 For present purposes, one may characterize
such a university as "minimalist" in its approach to commercialized re-
search. Minimalist universities do want to share in the proceeds of such
endeavors, but they continue to believe that they are not in the busi-
ness of selling technology for profit. Nor do they wish to become decen-
tralized think tanks within larger corporate chains of production that
reach into the laboratories for new products to be delivered to the con-
suming public. The minimalist approach aims to preserve the freedom
of university professors to publish and dispose of the fruits of their in-
tellectual pursuits as they see fit.37 Whenever a potential conflict arises
between corporate and university values in the commercialization of re-
search results, the spirit of Pajaro Dunes calls for the latter to prevail.3
32. Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 533.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 538.
36. B. REAMS, supra note 1, at 149; Gosselin, In '80, Harvard Dropped Plan for Genetic
Engineering Firm, Boston Globe, Sept. 11, 1988, at 43, col. 1. (discussing statements made by
Derek Bok, President of Harvard University).
37. See, e.g., Giamatti, supra note 30, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 4-7. But
see Rosenzweig, supra note 31, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 37-39 (belittling the
potential corruption of university goals by contact with industry in light of the potential for
greater corruption that has existed since government began to dominate research funding).
38. Giamatti, supra note 30, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 3-9.
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B. New Directions in Legal Protection of Industrial Know-How
The wisdom of hindsight suggests that the Pajaro Dunes State-
ment was inadequate under the best of circumstances. To some, it ap-
peared naive on its face, "a merely pious and platitudinous" declaration
of ideals.8 9 The Statement was also grounded on the false assumption
that universities would continue to be well served by the legal institu-
tions of copyright and patent laws as they had operated in the past.40
1. Inventions or Artistic Works-The Historical Models
Universities customarily retained a proprietary interest in patent-
able discoveries developed on their campuses and with their resources
while relinquishing rights in the copyrightable literary output of their
faculty members.41 Both legal institutions promote dissemination of re-
search in different ways. Because copyright law lacks any novelty re-
quirement, for example, the validity of a copyrighted work is not
compromised by the mere fact of disclosure.42 Moreover, copyright pro-
tection does not obstruct the use of ideas, facts, discoveries, or research
results as such. It pertains only to the form in which these are given
expression,43 it protects expression only against copying, and it cannot
protect against independent creation by another author who happens to
reach the same conclusions. 44 A "fair use" doctrine, codified in the
Copyright Act of 1976, explicitly recognizes the right of later authors to
39. See Rosenzweig, supra note 31, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 37 (attempt-
ing to parry the charge).
40. See, e.g., B. REAMS, supra note 1, at 73-74; Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at
536-37.
41. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. Cm. L.
REv. 590, 597-98 (1987); Muller, Academic Responsibility and Dependencies, 24 IDEA 141, 144
(1983); INDIANA UNIVERsrrY FOUNDATION, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1977); VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY FACULTY MANUAL 56-60 (1987); see also Hays v. Sony
Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (treating the teacher exception to works-made-for-hire
doctrine under 1909 Act as an established presumption).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (stating that copyright "subsists in original works of author-
ship"); 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NimMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01, 2.01[A] (1988).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding research not copyrightable); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972
(2d Cir. 1980). But see Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLU. L. REv. 516 (1981) (identifying and approving sweat-of-the-
brow rationale for the protection of so-called factual works). See generally Ginsburg, Sabotaging
and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of His-
tory After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 647 (1982); Gorman, Fact or
Fancy: The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560 (1982).
44. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 2.01[A]; see also Jones, Is There a Proprie-
tary Interest in Scientific Research Data?, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 453-58 (1986) (arguing that
copyright law does not and should not protect scientific research).
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reproduce even protected portions of a work for scholarly purposes.4 5
The patent approach is also reconcilable with traditional goals of
dissemination, even if it does require enough patent consciousness to
time the filing of claims so as not to exceed the one-year grace period
after initial publication." Indeed, the patent law expressly obliges an
inventor to disclose both the invention and the best known mode of
practicing it, in order to "enable any person skilled in the art. . . to
make and use" the claimed discoveries.47 If the patent then issues with
its key claims more or less intact, the university inventor's reward for
initial deference to legal formality is the right, after filing, to speak
freely about the discovery, without fear that any posterior disclosures
will destroy novelty as to accepted claims.4 8 Even a third party who
independently arrives at the same result cannot thereafter use the pat-
ented invention without authorization.4"
To be sure, the patent law does require academic inventors to
demonstrate the utility of their inventions, and it excludes protection
for scientific principles or ideas. 0 The judicial trend both in this coun-
try and abroad, however, is to take a more relaxed view of the utility
requirement and to move the critical point of patentability forward so
as to include more basic research than was thought possible ten or
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (fair use). See generally Raskind, A Functional Interpretation of
Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 601 (1984). For a recent examination, see Fisher, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1659, 1692-95 (1988) (noting uncertainties that academ-
ics face when invoking this doctrine).
46. See sources cited supra notes 19-20.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982); see, e.g., Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 418-
19 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("enablement" requirement gives the public the patented subject matter in
general; "best mode" doctrine requires disclosure of specific instrumentalities or techniques recog-
nized as the best way of carrying out the invention at the time of filing, and it ensures full disclo-
sure in exchange for monopoly rights).
Failure to disclose the inventor's preferred embodiment of the invention can thus invalidate
the patent. Id. Disclosures that require undue experimentation in order to practice the invention
are similarly liable to invalidation. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 734-36 (Fed. Cir 1988)
(finding that a deposit may satisfy the enablement requirement for inventions pertaining to micro-
organisms or other living cells and that failure to deposit is not fatal if the written description
necessitates some experimentation, such as routine screening, but not undue experimentation).
48. Because, unfortunately, the European Community countries provide no novelty grace pe-
riod, American academics bear a higher burden of secrecy in timing their disclosures when patent-
ing abroad. Proposals to adopt a grace period in foreign law are under consideration. See, e.g.,
Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 564-65. Both in this country and abroad, disclo-
sure prior to final issuance of the patent can cause unprotected release of valuable information if
the patent fails to cover all the original claims. The counterweight is, of course, the absolute need
for academics to publish. See Merton, supra note 14, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCENCE, supra note 14,
at 286, 325-27; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 183.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (b) (1982) (defining infringer as one who "without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention").
50. See, e.g., D. CHIsuM, supra note 19, §§ 1.01, 4.01; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 185-87.
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twenty years ago."1
If the Pajaro Dunes Statement reaffirmed the minimalist univer-
sity's commitment to the traditional uses of these legal institutions,52 it
nonetheless begged a number of important questions. For example, the
Statement glossed over the legal and organizational difficulties of nur-
turing basic research to the point at which it qualified for patenting. 3
The Statement also chose to ignore the post-patenting efforts increas-
ingly required of universities in order to perfect and market success-
fully their research results." Moreover, it downplayed hard questions
about when to make patentability a research goal, when to seek practi-
cal applications of basic research, and when to impose stricter than nor-
mal secrecy standards in the laboratory.5
At a minimalist university, most of these questions will be resolved
in a rather decentralized fashion, but they will not disappear altogether.
Because successful patents are not self-developing, much patentable re-
search will go unrecognized in such an environment or will perish from
a lack of timely nurture. 5 The patents that are developed will not often
lead to the desired licensing and profits because risk capital and devel-
opers are kept at a considerable distance.5 7 But the minimalist univer-
51. See, e.g., Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562-64 (stating that the "trend
toward inclusion of scientific disclosures in patent protection .... especially evident in the pro-
spective fields of biochemical, biological, and chemical-pharmaceutical research, should be fa-
vored"). But see Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 186-87 (implying that the requirement of utility
constrains the patenting of biotechnological discoveries). See generally 1 D. CHisuM, supra note 19,
§ 4.04; H. ULLRICH, supra note 12, at 7-12, 50-59, 98-100.
Practitioners seem to believe that the issue of utility is seldom pressed by either the patent
examiners or the courts, unless the inventor's originality has been challenged in an interference
proceeding. Efforts to disentangle "basic" from "applied" research in actions for patent infringe-
ment are thus rare. In contrast, copyright law's exclusion of unprotectable "ideas" from protect-
able expression at the infringement stage greatly narrows the effective scope of protection. See
sources cited supra note 43.
52. Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 536. The Statement also recognized that
amendments to federal law allowed universities to own and license patents on discoveries made in
the course of research financed by government grants and contracts. Id. See Software Protection
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§
200-211 (1982)) (§ 202 allows universities and small businesses to retain title to patentable inven-
tions developed in the course of government-sponsored research).
53. Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 536.
54. See, e.g., Fusfeld, Overview of University-Industry Research Interactions, in PARTNERS
IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 10, 14 (stating that universities should focus on pragmatic ques-
tions of "what organizational structures are most effective and what impact these have on univer-
sity procedures and objectives"); Low, The Organization of Industrial Relationships in
Universities, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 68, 73 (discussing exchanges of people,
incubators, and research parks).
55. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 178-80, 190-95 (in the context of biotechnology).
56. See, e.g., Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights and the Third World, 5 Eu. INTELL.
PROP. REV. (EIPR) 330, 332 (1983) (discussing gaps in the laboratory).
57. See Cawood, supra note 24, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24; see also D. BOK,
650 [Vol. 42:639
1989] COMPUTER PROGRAMS
sity is, by definition, not overly concerned about these lost
opportunities because, rightly or wrongly, it regards such opportunities
as foreign to its primary mission."'
What more profoundly undermined the minimalist university's
faith in the traditional institutions of intellectual property law was the
inability of this body of law to deal adequately with the new technolo-
gies that seemed to provide academicians with their most exciting com-
mercial opportunities. To some extent this inadequacy stemmed from
the reluctance of courts and legislatures to extend effective patent pro-
tection to fields such as computer software, 59 biotechnology and new
methods of medical treatment,60 or even industrial designs.6 1 A more
pervasive problem, however, stemmed from the patent law's total pre-
occupation with the "inventive step," that is, with the "nonobvious-
ness" requirement under which every patentable innovation must
demonstrate a major advance over the existing state of the art.6 2
supra note 21, at 156 n.9 (stating that "[tihe normal rule of thumb is that it takes one thousand
reported discoveries to produce one hundred patents; it takes one hundred patents to produce ten
licenses; and only one license in ten will yield more than $25,000 per year").
58. See, e.g., N. WADE, supra note 20, at 15 (citing task force recommendation that all
projects involving proprietary information be left solely to industry).
59. See, e.g., Maier, Software Protection Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret
Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 151, 152-59 (1987) (discussing denial and subsequent
recognition of computer software as patentable subject matter); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited:
The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DuKe L.J. 663, 756-60.
60. See, e.g., K. HODKmNSON, supra note 2, at 136-39 (noting that biotechnology seems to
require patent protection, which exists, but is hedged about with qualifications, including special
deposit requirements); Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 187-90. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1980
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), biological materials were thought unpat-
entable under the doctrine that living organisms and cells were ineligible products of nature. Since
Chakrabarty, the Patent and Trademark Office has extended subject matter eligibility to plants
and indicated its willingness to patent "'nonnaturally-occurring non-human multicellular living
organisms, including animals.'" Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 189 (quoting Nonnaturally Occurring
Non-Human Animals Are Patentable Under § 101, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
827, at 664 (Apr. 23, 1987)). "Biotechnology, microbiology, genetic engineering, [and] biological
engineering are all aspects of basically the same scientific field. Biotechnology is the generalized
term for the application in industry of some biological phenomena to a practical end." K HODKIN-
SON, supra note 2, at 134-35. For discussion of "new plant varieties and seeds," "novel chemical
substances and discoveries," and "pharmaceuticals and methods of treatment," all of which strain
the patent paradigm, see id. at 139-45.
61. For evidence that United States intellectual property law was traditionally hostile to the
protection of industrial designs, see Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copy-
right Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143,
1189-90, 1223-24 [hereinafter Reichman, Before the Copyright Act]; and Reichman, Design Pro-
tection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 267, 306-07 (1984) [hereinafter Reichman, After the Copyright Act]. For a
remarkable reversal in the period 1985-1989, see Reichman, supra note 5, part I noting that new
trends show revival of design patent law in the Federal Circuit and expanding protection for de-
signs under Lanham Act § 43(a). See also infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) (stating that "[a] patent may not be obtained ... if the differ-
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2. New Technologies Without the Inventive Step
The substantive requirement of "nonobviousness" can effectively
exclude the bulk of scientific achievement in new technological fields
even after subject matter eligibility becomes established and despite
the intrinsic commercial value such achievement may otherwise pos-
sess.s For example, the amount of time, skill, effort, and money re-
quired to develop a complex computer program bears no necessary
relation to whether the final design is viewed as a major step beyond
the prior art. Even though the patenting of computer programs has be-
come legally feasible and is always an option to be evaluated, 4 the fact
remains that "most programs do not contain unobvious concepts of the
type which are susceptible to patent protection."6 5 Observers describe a
similar situation in biotechnology in which a few pioneer patents may
render the bulk of later applications obvious in the legal sense despite
enormous investment in research and development and despite the im-
pact of innovative end products on the public welfare. 6
ences between the subject matter. . and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains"); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See
generally J. BoCHNovC, THE INvENTvE STE. ITS EVOLUTION IN CANADA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND
THE UNrrED STATES (1982); H. ULLRICH, supra note 12.
63. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has, in recent years, allowed so-called sec-
ondary factors, including commercial success, to play a larger role in cases in which the validity of
a patent is challenged on the grounds of obviousness. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 12, at 989-90;
Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobvi-
ousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C.L. REv. 357 (1987). While the preferred view is that com-
mercial success cannot of itself elevate an obvious claim to the level of patentability, see, e.g., 2 D.
CHISUM, supra note 19, § 5.05[2], this principle is not uniformly respected. See, e.g., Alco Standard
Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1499-1501 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that, while
prior art standing alone indicated obviousness, strong secondary considerations indicating nonob-
viousness should prevail); id. at 1504-11 (Rich, Cir. J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Sumner, Patent Protection-Structure of Program Code, Paper presented to
the LaST Frontier Conference on Software Protection, Center for the Study of Law, Science and
Technology, Arizona State Univ. College of Law (February 13-14, 1989); Sumner & Plunkett,
Copyright, Pqtent, and Trade Secret Protection for Computer Software in Western Europe, 8
COMPUTER L.J. 327 (1988). See generally Maier, supra note 59.
65. Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'y 280, 281 (1969). Galbi added: "The creation of a new program which does not contain
an unobvious concept still involves a substantial amount of investment. The patent system can
adequately protect inventive concepts; however, the patent law does not have any means of pro-
tecting the investment which goes into developing noninventive innovations." Id. The fact that the
PTO currently issues many patents that indirectly protect nonobvious computer programs, see
supra note 64, does not vitiate Galbi's shrewd observation that most computer programs will fail
the nonobviousness test of patentability despite their commercial value.
66. See, e.g., Purvis, Patents and Genetic Engineering-Does a New Problem Need a New
Solution?, 9 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. (EIPR) 347, 347-48 (1987) [hereinafter Purvis, Patents and
Genetic Engineering]; Thurston & Burnett-Hall, Genentech Inc. v. The Wellcome Foundation
Limited: How Important is the Decision for the Biotechnology Industry?, 10 EuR. INTELL. PROP.
REv. (EIPR) 59-62 (1988); see also Korn, supra note 11, at 216-17, 231 (noting problems of the
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Part of the difficulty undoubtedly stems from judicial inexperience
in applying the test of nonobviousness to nascent technologies.6 7 This
inexperience cuts both ways, however, because it induces some courts to
validate unduly broad claims while others tend to narrow claims arbi-
trarily in unfamiliar technical environments. 8 The fundamental prob-
lem remains that of rewarding or simply recompensing large
expenditure for incremental innovations that fall chronically short of
the current legal threshold for patentable inventions.69
novelty, utility, and disclosure requirements in the field of biotechnology); Purvis, Letter, 10 EuR
INTELL. PROP. REV. (EIPR) 95, 95 (1988) (noting that "the possibility must be faced that. . . sci-
ence has outrun the law and that the kinds of claims. . . necessary to provide the incentives that
the genetic engineering industry requires are not permissible under the present law of patents")
[hereinafter Purvis, Letter]. But see K. HODKINSON, supra note 2, at 135-36 (suggesting that the
test of nonobviousness may be less of a problem for the biotechnology industry, which is capital
intensive and relies more on pure research, than for the microelectronics industry, in which low
levels of research investment produce high levels of return); Mellor, Patents and Genetic Engi-
neering-Is It a New Problem?, 10 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. (EIPR) 159-62 (1988) (questioning
whether a new form of protection is required in the field of genetic engineering).
The situation in the United States remains unclear. Support for the fears expressed in the text
may be found in In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applicants' own publication of
pioneering studies rendered their later genetic engineering method obvious despite uncertainty of
success). In an unrelated field, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has just
upheld a broad claim supported by a disclosure that some experts deem trivial. United States Steel
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
67. See generally Adelman, supra note 12, at 991 (predicting that the Federal Circuit will
eventually acquire enough experience to differentiate between new technological areas when apply-
ing the common nonobviousness standard).
68. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd. (U.K. 1988), noted in 37 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) 206 (1988) (holding the bulk of claims to recombinant DNA technol-
ogy both excessively broad and obvious); Purvis, Patents and Genetic Engineering, supra note 66,
at 347 (criticizing this decision); Thurston & Burnett-Hall, supra note 66, at 62 (discussing the
lower court's decision that a biotechnology invention disclosed "a particular route to a known
end"; the court explained that a patent monopoly could hinder discoveries of other possibly better
routes to the same end and thus could stifle research); see also Thurston, The Commercial and
Legal Impact of the Court of Appeals Decision in Genentech v. Wellcome, 11 Eu. INTELL. PROP.
REV. (EIPR) 66, 73 (1989) (noting appellate court's confirmation that diligence and skill are not to
be rewarded by a patent).
69. See, e.g., Purvis, Patents and Genetic Engineering, supra note 66, at 348 (noting that
biotechnological industries and the research area are "threatened by the inability of... patent
law to grant any meaningful protection to valuable research"); Thurston & Burnett-Hall, supra
note 66, at,02 (arguing that investment in information establishing molecular structure of matter
deserves "some form of protection" if compared to functional designs, to "'look and feel'" of
computer software, and to semiconductor chip topographies). But see Mellor, supra note 66, at
161-62 (equating genetic engineering, protein engineering, hybridoma technology, and transgenic
animals to semiconductor chip designs because all require the expenditure of time, effort, and
money; but rejecting the view that patent law is inadequate or that special protection should be
extended to these or other nonpatentable technologies on the basis of a lower standard of
eligibility).
The exclusionary power of the nonobviousness requirement is naturally weaker when applied
to pioneer achievements. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that a judicially liberal view of both claim
interpretation and equivalency is accorded a "pioneer" invention, which is characterized as "a dis-
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The current importance of this phenomenon was foreshadowed by
the difficulties that beset the quest for adequate legal protection of in-
dustrial designs during the last century and a half. In the United
States, for example, where industrial designs have long been eligible for
full protection in patent law,70 relatively few designs ever satisfied the
statutory requirement of nonobviousness. 1 Innovation in ornamental
designs of useful articles normally reflects only small variations on es-
tablished themes rather than major advances in a designer's chosen
field of endeavor. Most of these variations are "obvious" in the patent
sense even when novel and attractive to consumers.72 Yet, these innova-
tions are as vulnerable to instant appropriation by competitors as any
successful painting or novel would be if copyright law did not intervene
on behalf of "authors and artists. '7 3
tinct step in the progress of the art" rather than a mere improvement; this view "flows directly
from the relative sparseness of prior art in nascent fields of technology"). Even in new fields, how-
ever, this exclusionary power inevitably grows more pronounced over time as the accumulated dis-
closures produce a denser field and elevate the level of routine skill in the pertinent arts. See, e.g.,
Korn, supra note 11, at 217 (stating that "[a]s the number of advances, publications, and skilled
researchers in biotechnology increases, the amount of scientific knowledge considered prior art will
increase as well, and more of the potential inventions will be deemed obvious"); see also Texas
Instruments, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888 (holding that notwithstanding the judicially liberal view
of pioneer inventions, the standard of infringement remains unchanged); Texas Instruments, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (apparently nar-
rowing the doctrine of equivalents for broad-based pioneer claims of means-plus-function variety
in order to expand the range of posterior noninfringing improvements in rapidly moving technol-
ogy); Becker, Texas Instruments v. ITC: Insight or Aberration?, 8 COMPUTER L.J. 43 (1987) (criti-
cizing this decision).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982). The Design Patent Statute was enacted in 1842. See, e.g., Hud-
son, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United States, 30 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 380 (1948).
71. The nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) is incorporated by reference
into § 171, which governs ornamental designs. For a discussion of the federal appellate courts'
tendency to invalidate virtually all design patents challenged for nonobviousness prior to the es-
tablishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, see Reichman, Before the
Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1190-1245; and Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 710 (1983). For evi-
dence that the new court will allow more designs to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement than
the federal appellate courts allowed in the past, see generally Reichman, supra note 5, part I. See
infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
72. Compare, e.g., Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (holding that design of athletic shoe was not obvious) with Unette Corp. v. Unit Park
Co., 785 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding design patent invalid for obviousness) and Lytton
System, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding design patent inva-
lid for obviousness).
73. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (1886 as
amended through 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in UNITED NATIONS EDUCA-
TIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) & WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR-
GANIZATION (WIPO), COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT
LAWS]. Industrial designs, however, did not appreciably benefit from the protection accorded other
artists under the Convention. See, e.g., S. RicKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
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For a while, this experience induced some European governments
to admit industrial designs into their domestic copyright laws even
though such designs only rarely compete on the market for artistic
works as such. Over time, however, full copyright protection of commer-
cial designs appeared to interfere with free competition on markets for
the underlying products, and this experiment was abandoned every-
where except in France.74 Foreign experts began instead to view indus-
trial design as a legal hybrid falling in between the patent and
copyright systems, and the search for an appropriate sui generis legal
solution gathered considerable momentum beginning in the 1950s. 71
Most commentators on industrial property law are still inclined to
dismiss commercial design as a marginal case that does not challenge
the general soundness of the overall intellectual property framework.76
In retrospect, however, it appears more accurate to view industrial de-
sign as a precursor of the many legal hybrids that intellectual property
law would strain to accommodate in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.77 Recent technologies such as computer software and chip designs
or even genetic engineering share two things in common with industrial
design: One is a proclivity to yield extravagant financial rewards from
incremental improvements in know-how that require considerable capi-
tal and effort to develop; and the other is a vulnerability to rapid dupli-
cation by competitors who bear no part of the development
expenditure. 78
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 267-82 (1987).
74. See Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1153-64 (discussing the
"Unity of Art" thesis in France and elsewhere); infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
75. The first work to identify the hybrid character of industrial designs through comparative
analysis was M. PEROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES DE PROTECTION DES DEsSINS ET MODELES DANS LES
PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN 16 (1968). For a lucid clarification of the theoretical problems posed by
this identification, see F. PERRr. L'AUTONOMIE DU REGIME DE PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET
MODELES (1974). See also Reichman, supra note 5, part H.
76. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION 1617 (1975) (expressing traditional view of industrial design as the poor rela-
tion of an industrial property law that is otherwise soundly conceived).
77. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, part II (entitled: "Premises for International Ac-
tion to Harness a Disruptive Legal Hybrid").
78. Compare, e.g., id. part II (problems of industrial design viewed as one of several "Inter-
mediate Technologies Between Art and Invention") with Purvis, Patents and Genetic Engineer-
ing, supra note 66, at 342. The latter article observes:
[K]nowing the sequence, it is simple to deduce myriad other routes by which to make it. Once
this is done, perhaps in a matter of weeks or even days, competitors are in a position to
produce the substance on a large scale, and, with no research and development costs to
recoup, can undercut the discoverer of the sequence easily.., and deprive.. . [the innova-
tor] of any reward at all.
Id.; see also Galbi, supra note 65, at 281-82 (same phenomenon in regard to computer programs);
infra text accompanying notes 96-114.
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3. Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face
Broadly conceived, know-how encompasses the "totality of unpat-
ented knowledge utilized in industry. 1 79 It is not concerned with major
principles or inventive ideas, but rather with "detailed innovation in
industrial techniques" of a practical nature that is often the "fruit of
... experience and trial and error."80 The value of know-how is thus
measured in terms of commercial superiority and marketing advan-
tages.8" It typically accrues from incremental improvements on some as-
pect of the existing state of an art and not from creative activity that
raises the level of an art as a whole.82 Because know-how includes
"techniques that are still at an experimental stage," as Professor
Magnin astutely observed in 1974, it links the kinds of basic and ap-
plied research normally carried out in academic and other nonindustrial
institutions with industrial research and development.8 " For this reason,
"know-how plays a considerable role in modern industry, whose activi-
ties are essentially based upon innovation."8 4
79. F. DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNow-How IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 11 (2d rev. ed. 1976); see also J. JEHL, LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL DE LA TECHNOLOGIE
APPROCHE JURMIQUE 109 (1985) (treating know-how as nonpatentable techniques). But see F.
MAGNIN, KNow-How ET PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 14-22, 93-94, 381-88 (1974) (emphasizing the dis-
tinctive phenomenology of know-how as a basis for its positive recognition in international indus-
trial property law).
80. 3 S. LADAS, supra note 76, at 1617.
81. See, e.g., Troller, The Legal Protection of Know-How: General Report, in THE PROTEC-
TION OF KNOw-How IN 13 COUNTRIES 149, 150, 152 (H. Cohen Jehoram ed. 1971) [hereinafter
Troller]. (reports to the Eighth International Congress of Comparative Law Research, Italy, 1970).
According to Ladas, know-how is the "knowledge of how to organize a certain production in the
most efficient and competitively advantageous manner." 3 S. LADAS, supra note 76, at 1617 (em-
phasis in original). He adds that know-how is "essentially a fund of technical knowledge and expe-
rience acquired by an enterprise in the use and application of an industrial technique." Id.
Professor Magnin, instead, stresses that know-how is not an isolated technique or formula, but
rather "tout l'ensemble d'une fabrication," that is, "the entire industrial process from the choice
of raw materials right up to the modalities of distributing the end products." F. MAGNIN, supra
note 79, at 114 (J. Reichman trans.). Hence, for him, know-how is a "manufacturing art" (un art
de fabrication). Id.
Professor Dessemontet, after reviewing and rejecting all the definitions of know-how, con-
cluded that the "[c]onfusion is ... hopeless." F. DESSEMONTEr, supra note 79, at 16. He believed
that the "heterogeneous nature of all knowledge and techniques ... labelled as know-how...
prevents us from recognizing in the term. . . a precise. . . pragmatic or legal notion similar. . .to
[that of] the patentable invention." Id. at 16-17. Hence, "[c]autious commentators . . . abstain
from defining know-how precisely. So the eminent Ladas needs no less than some twenty lines to
enunciate all that is known under this term." Id. at 16.
82. See, e.g., Kingston, The "Thesis" Chapters [hereinafter Kingston], in DIRECT PROTEC-
TION, supra note 12, at 1, 2-3, 31-34; Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants [hereinafter
Innovation Patents and Warrants], in PATENTS IN PERSPECTIVE 68, 75, 78, 79-80 (J. Phillips ed.
1985); Kronz, Patent Protection for Innovations: A Model (pt. 1), 7 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
(E.I.P.R.) 178, 180 (1983).
83. F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 114 (trans. J.H.R.).
84. Id.
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Unlike patents for invention, which tend to convey descriptive in-
formation,8" industrial know-how is manifested in tangible, working em-
bodiments of information that function in the external environment.8 6
In theory, control over the tangible vehicle of communication provides
effective control over know-how,8 7 despite its intellectual and poten-
tially ubiquitous character.8 As a practical matter, however, industrial
know-how is usually secret and often the subject of restrictive licensing
agreements that prohibit its disclosure to the public at large. 9 While
know-how derives its economic value from the competitive advantages
that exclusivity confers, this exclusivity depends on actual secrecy
rather than on the grant of any proprietary rights under positive intel-
lectual property law.90
The protection of traditional forms of industrial know-how is thus
entrusted to contracts and trade secret laws, which make acquisition of
the pertinent knowledge unlawful only when obtained by means that
are excluded by private agreements or that are generally forbidden by
law or are against public policy.91 Given what Professor Troller called
its "meta-legal nature,"9 2 innovative know-how remains exempt from
free competition only so long as it is neither voluntarily revealed nor
reverse engineered. The very notion that intellectual property law
85. See, e.g., Eisenschitz, The Value of Patent Information, in PATENTS IN PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 82, at 42, 42-53; Kronz, supra note 82, at 179 (noting that the information function of
patent specification is the chief benefit of the patent system).
86. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 2-3; Troller,
supra note 81, at 151. Professor Troller wrote: "Know-how, as an intangible thing,. . . is fixed on
a tangible thing.., by physical means... In this way know-how is detached from the awareness
of the individual... and made an item of independent information comprehensible to third per-
sons." Id.; see also 3 S. LADAS, supra note 76, at 1617. Ladas states that "the tangible elements,
strictly speaking, are not the know-how. This is none other than the knowledge and experience
contained in these tangible things." Id.
87. Troller, supra note 81, at 151.
88. Owing to its intellectual nature, know-how remains potentially ubiquitous, like artistic
works, despite its embodiment in a tangible medium. Id. Magnin believes that this capacity to be
conveyed or transmitted is a key feature of know-how. F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 115-16.
89. See, e.g., Troller, supra note 81, at 151, 160-64.
90. Id. at 151-52, 156-57. Troller states that "[iun the case of know-how, .. the technical or
managerial principle as such is not a direct subject of protection." Id. at 156.
91. Id. at 156 (based on comparative surveys of 13 countries, including the United States).
Troller observes that "[t]he acquisition and utilization of the knowledge are not in themselves
unlawful," but they become unlawful when procured by breaching a confidence, inducing an em-
ployee to betray company secrets, stealing designs, "or otherwise by means ... against proper
usage, public policy or loyalty and good faith," or when used "in such a way that the confidence of
the owner is abused." Id.; see also Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Informa-
tion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 688-93, 699-701, 711-23 (1980).
92. Troller, supra note 81, at 152.
93. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note 76, at 1617. Ladas states:
The essential difference between a patent and know-how is that the one is a legal monopoly
and the other a factual one which may come to a sudden end without the consent of the
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might one day attempt to organize a positive legal regime that would
sever know-how from these moorings has aroused intense controversy."'
From this perspective, the trouble with the kinds of innovative
know-how underlying most of the important new technologies is that
they do not lend themselves to secrecy even when they represent the
fruit of enormous investment in research and development. Because a
true trade secret tends to defy reverse engineering, intellectual property
law encourages inventors to obtain patents and disclose their art when-
ever possible." But modern forms of innovative know-how associated
with the new technologies, despite a certain formal elegance and com-
plexity, are easier to duplicate, as a rule, than yesterday's typical engi-
neering products.9 6 Indeed, this vulnerability to rapid appropriation
makes such innovation behaviorally similar to works of art and
literature.9 7
The senior patent attorney for IBM, writing in 1969, was the first
to grasp the significance of this phenomenon for computer programs. In
Galbi's view, the "special nature of computer programming" arose from
owner.. .. [A]ny one who discovers the secret of another or develops [the] same by his own
efforts may use it .... Once published to the world, the economic value of the know-how as a
competitive advantage is lost to its owner.
Id. at 1621. In this sense, know-how bears affinities to trade secrets, F. DEssEMoNTET, supra note
79, at 11, 18-20, 33-48; indeed, in the traditional American legal terminology, according to Des-
semontet, "the term know-how is but the synonym of trade secrets," id. at 49 (emphasis in origi-
nal). But see F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 113-16 (stressing the importance of differentiating
know-how from trade secrets).
The line of demarcation between inventions and know-how is correspondingly obscure. Troller
suggests that an invention "is a rule for the use of natural forces" and that, so long as it remains
secret, it is also "a form of know-how that. . . exhibits the particular characteristics demanded of
an invention by patent law (technical advance, inventive level)." Troller, supra note 81, at 152-53.
94. See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 15-16. Another author recently observed:
[T]he protection of know-how tends to approach that conferred on patents. The latter serves
as a kind of reference point. Firms are trying to win recognition of an exclusive right to their
know-how that is of the same nature as a patent. Their efforts aim in effect to obtain a right
to be exercised against third parties, in general. One can therefore declare that the protection
of know-how completes and imitates that of patents.
J. JEHL, supra note 79, at 110. (J. Reichman trans.); see also id. at 27-40, 63-112 (discussing the
principle of property rights in intangible goods and the appropriation of technology through know-
how). See generally DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12 (thesis favoring direct protection of know-
how and critical responses).
95. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 91, at 699-701 (noting the "contorted incentives" of trade
secret law).
96. See Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 61 (stressing the
ease with which free riders may appropriate information once it is embodied in a product and put
on the market); supra note 78 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 101 and accompanying text; cf. Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis,
supra note 12, at 10 (by reducing the time required to make copies and by facilitating the produc-
tion of high-quality copies at low cost, modem technology has increased the need for copyright
protection even of artistic works). See generally Reichman, supra note 5, part II.
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the special vulnerability of programming know-how.9 8 While a conven-
tional manufacturer could "transfer the possession of a new machine
without transferring the know-how involved in manufacturing the ma-
chine," Galbi argued that anyone "who comes into possession of a com-
puter program has all of the manufacturing know-how involved in
creating additional identical computer programs."99 Although computer
programs produce "economic benefits in somewhat the same manner
that machines produce economic benefits," use of the relevant technol-
ogy for its intended economic purpose allowed computer programs to
"be duplicated in the same way that one creates and duplicates a liter-
ary work."'100 Thus, third parties who are able to obtain some physical
embodiment of this know-how can readily deprive its originator of any
competitive advantage that the innovation initially conferred, in much
the same way that one can make a cheap photocopy of a novel or a
photographic reproduction of a painting.1' 0
In this respect, today's technically refined forms of unpatentable
know-how enjoy a less favorable competitive position than run-of-the-
mill industrial products and processes that are unpatentable by defini-
tion. In principle, the manufacturer of any new product or process ben-
efits from that minimum amount of protection that flows naturally
from having been first on the market.02 Third parties who want to
compete effectively will have to reverse engineer the originator's prod-
uct or process, establish their own modes of production, develop their
own lines of distribution, and establish their own reputations as pro-
ducers of quality goods. 03 Because this task of catching up to the origi-
nator's head start takes time, it presumably endowed traditional
innovators with a period of natural lead time that enabled them to gain
a foothold in the market.104
98. Galbi, supra note 65, at 281.
99. Id.
100. Id. Galbi was also among the first to stress the dual nature of computer programs as
both "writings" and functioning parts of a machine. Id. The dual nature of computer programs is
now accepted even by one of the leading protagonists of maximum protection in copyright law,
who, however, sees no contradiction between this dualist premise and his maximalist conclusion.
See Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prrr. L. RE v. 1037, 1064-65 (1986); infra
notes 272-88, 297-301 and accompanying text.
101. Galbi, supra note 65, at 281; see also Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A
Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REv. 579, 580-89, 606-09 (1985) (discussing free rid-
ers and level playing fields); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 12, at 10.
102. See, e.g., H. ULLRICH, supra note 12, at 106. To the extent that an unpatented product
or process embodies know-how that competitors cannot duplicate without a lengthy period of
learning time, the originator may recover costs and gain profits even without legal protection. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1388 (1987).
The "originator will have had a head start. That is often the only advantage our system grants...
and it is often enough." Id.
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In contrast, from the moment third parties free of contractual re-
straints obtain any tangible embodiment of the relevant information,
they can rapidly reverse engineer the know-how embodied in technolo-
gies such as a new industrial design, a software design, a chip topogra-
phy, or a biotechnological product.10 5 What Galbi observed of computer
programs thus applies to most of today's new technologies in the sense
that each tends to bear its know-how on its face.1"6 Without incurring
the high costs of research and development, any would-be competitor
can appropriate the commercially valuable information these technolo-
gies embody and then offer virtually the same product at a lower price
than that of the originator. There is no period of natural lead time in
which to recoup either the originator's initial investment or his losses
from unsuccessful essays, not to mention the goal of turning a profit.
In short, today's most productive and refined technical innovations
are among the easiest of all forms of industrial know-how to duplicate.
Because each product of the new technologies tends to bear its know-
how on its face, like an artistic work, each is exposed to instant preda-
tion when successful and is likely to enjoy zero lead time after being
launched on the market.107 Paradoxically, such products obtain little or
no protection under the dominant paradigms of classical intellectual
property law'08 despite their contributions to the public welfare. This
result follows because the patent paradigm will exclude the bulk of the
new technological innovations that appear to be slight or merely incre-
mental advances over the prior art.'019 At the same time, because of
105. See, e.g., Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 33-36 (1987); Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MiNh. L. REV. 417, 437-38 (1985) (discussing the vul-
nerability of semiconductor chip designs to copying by rapid and cheap techniques); sources cited
supra notes 66, 69 (discussing the same susceptibility of biotechnology and other relevant fields);
see also supra note 96 (discussing the vulnerability of embodied information in general).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
107. See sources cited supra notes 66, 69, 96.
108. The notion of a paradigm as a particular way of thought, perception, and action associ-
ated with a vision of reality was developed by T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1967). Later references in this Article to industrial art and industrial literature as the oldest and
newest marginal cases, respectively, to challenge the dominant intellectual property paradigms are
hardly casual in this regard. See infra notes 401-03.
109. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 31 (regret-
ting that patent officers in all advanced industrialized countries, by adopting the requirement of an
"inventive step" or nonobviousness, "have turned their backs on the task of protecting incremental
innovation," which by its nature "evolves out of what is already there" and therefore "lacks the
element of surprise. . . supposed to be a characteristic of a true 'inventive step' "); see also Galbi,
supra note 65, at 281 (stating that "[t]he patent system can adequately protect inventive concepts;
however, the patent law does not have any means of protecting the investment which goes into
developing noninventive innovations"); Kronz, supra note 82, at 179-80 (stressing irrelevance of
patent system to real problem of transforming "technical knowledge into products and investment
under . . . difficult market entry conditions").
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their functional character, the new technologies are alien to the spirit of
the copyright paradigm, which historically rewards works of art and
literature without encroaching upon the domain of industrial property
law.110
The most economically significant technologies are thus likely to be
intermediate technologies that fall between the patent and copyright
paradigms."' These technologies are, in effect, legal hybrids in the
sense that their behavior deviates from the standard behavioral as-
sumptions that underlie the classical forms of legal protection for either
industrial or artistic property."2 As a result, they occupy no discrete
position of their own within the international intellectual property sys-
tem established by the Paris and Berne Conventions over a century
ago.1 3 The extent to which a new intellectual property right is needed
Professor Magnin, writing in 1974, may have been the first to perceive a direct connection
between the need to accommodate know-how within positive industrial property law and the new
technologies, especially computer programs and products of biogenetic engineering, which were
situated largely in the universities. See F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 15-16 (stressing the need to
modify the concept of patents to accommodate products of modern technology); id. at 121-26 (dis-
cussing problems arising from the nonpatentability of computer programs and biotechnological
processes). However, the full implications of this connection have become clear only in recent
years, once these same technologies gained recognition as patentable subject matter. See infra
notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGI-
CAL USES OF COPYRIGHT WORKS, FINAL REPORT 27-37 (July 31, 1978) [hereinafter CoNTU REPORT]
(Hershey, Comm'r, dissenting); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 78-85 (1986) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]
(discussing functional works and computer programs); Vandenberghe, La protection du logiciel et
des chips aux Etas Unis: Un exemple pour l'Europe?, 126 REvUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT
D'AuTuR (RIDA) 85, 110-14 (1985) (discussing impropriety and disruptive effects of allowing
copyright law to govern technology).
111. See Reichian, supra note 5, part II (subsections entitled "Why Know-How Attracts the
Copyright Modality" and "Measured Exploitation of a Possibly Fatal Attraction"); Reichman, Le-
gal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms (1986) (unpublished project document)
(submitted to and funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States); see also Piatier,
Innovation Patent, Invention Patent, or Both?, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 125, 138-
49 (discussing the marketing of intangible goods, including ideas, knowledge, and information, and
calling attention to an "intermediate phase of innovation").
These technologies are not "intermediate" in the sense this term is also used to connote tradi-
tional technologies requiring moderate levels of skill that are appropriate for developing countries
to absorb in an integrating world economy. The Author regrets this ambiguity but has not found
an acceptable alternative for the term "intermediate technologies" as used in this Article.
112. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 110, at 78. The task is to bring that much of the
copyright paradigm to bear on these intermediate technologies as will perform needed protective
services, while discarding such technical features (and all of the mystique) as are inconsistent with
the industrial nature of these same intermediate technologies. See infra text accompanying notes
404-07. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, part H.
113. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 (as revised
through July 14, 1967), reprinted in 1 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) &
UNITED INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (BIRPI), MANUAL
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS (1978); Berne Convention, supra note 73, in COPYRIGHT
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to protect interested parties against the misappropriation of unpatent-
able industrial know-how has thus become a crucial issue for world eco-
nomic development.114
4. Breakdown of the World's Intellectual Property System
The fear is that these intermediate technologies, if left to fend for
themselves in this nether world between the dominant paradigms, will
attract insufficient investment owing to the great risk of loss inherent in
the innovative enterprise and to the likelihood that imitators rather
than innovators will reap the rewards of success in the end.115 Conse-
quently, world intellectual property law has come under intense pres-
sure to alleviate this perceived risk aversion by providing modern
innovators with artificial lead time through one legal device or
another." 6
The response has varied with the technology in question. The
United States Supreme Court, for example, has recognized genetically
engineered micro-organisms as patentable subject matter.17 The patent
authorities currently read this precedent to cover all "nonnaturally oc-
curring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals.""' 8
Patent offices around the world are struggling to devise depository regu-
lations that will reconcile the public's need to use patented micro-
organisms in further experimentation with the patentees' exclusive
rights to exploit their biogenetic inventions." 9
LAWS, supra note 73. It should be pointed out that Article 4(I) of the Paris Convention, added at
the Revision Conference of Stockholm in 1967, gave limited recognition to "inventors' certificates"
for purposes of the priority rights guaranteed to industrial property owners under the Convention.
See G. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 58-60 (1968). The "inventor's certificate," used primarily in certain countries
having centrally planned economies, can be construed as extending some recognition to unpatent-
able know-how, without pretending to address or solve the larger problems discussed in the text.
See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 15-16. A discussion of the inventor's certificate is beyond
the scope of this Article.
114. See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 16; Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTEC-
TION, supra note 12, at 33-34; Kingston, Reponse, in DIRmECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 279-93;
Kronz, supra note 82, at 178-80; see also J. JEHL, supra note 79, at 110; Dreyfuss, New Information
Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming 1989).
But see, e.g., Mandeville & Macdonald, supra note 12, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12 (op-
posing creation of such a right); Mellor, supra note 66.
115. See Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12 at 4-5; Kingston,
Response, supra note 114, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 299-302; sources cited supra
note 66, 69; see also R. BENKO, supra note 12, at 22-25.
116. See, e.g., Kastemneier & Remington, supra note 105, at 465-70.
117. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 189-
90.
118. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 189-90.
119. See, e.g., R. SALWANCHiCK, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MICROBIOLOGICAL AND GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING INVENTIONS 55-77 (U.S.), 147-59 (Foreign 1982). See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL
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In contrast, computer programs ("software") were granted full
copyright protection as literary works in most countries. 120 A more lim-
ited form of tailor-made protection was granted by France,12' and it
now appears that Switzerland will follow suit. 22 Computerized data ba-
ses also qualify for copyright protection in the United States' 23 and
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION & CORNELL UNIVERSITY, SYMPOSIUM ON THE PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNO-
LOGICAL INVENTIONS (1987).
120. Software Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982)). Besides enacting the current version of § 117, Congress
added a definition of a "computer program" to the list of definitions in § 101. Id. § 10(a), 94 Stat.
at 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). The definition of "literary works" in
§ 101 of the 1976 Act also includes computer programs. See generally 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER
LAW §§ 3B.04 to 3B.06 (1988); Keplinger, Authorship in the Information Age: Protection for Com-
puter Programs under the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 21 COPYRIGHT 119 (1985).
For a recent survey of foreign law, see Kindermann, The International Copyright of Computer
Software-History, Status, and Developments, 24 COPYRIGHT 201, 204-14 (1988).
121. Law No. 85-660 (France July 3, 1985), Relative aux Droits des Auteurs et aux Droits des
Artistes Interpretes, des Producteurs de Phonogrammes et de Videogrammes et des Enterprises de
Communication Audiovisuefle, arts. 45-51 (Des Logiciels) (computer programs). This Act creates a
presumption of employer authorship; limits moral rights; protects against unauthorized use and
against unauthorized reproduction, id. at Art. 47; but limits duration to 25 years from the date of
creation, id. at Art. 481. See, e.g., R. PLAISANT, PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 14-15, 22-23
(Supp. MISE A JOUR No. 1 Aug. 1, 1985); Kindermann, supra note 120, at 206-07; Gaudrat, La
protection des logiciels par la propriete litteraire et artistique, 128 REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du
DROIT D'AuTEuR (RIDA) 180 (1986).
122. See M. Ritscher, Untitled Paper Submitted to the Conferees at the LaST Frontier Con-
ference on Software Protection, Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology, Arizona
State University College of Law (Feb. 13-14, 1989) (source on file with Author). According to this
source, the Swiss legislature had considered granting sui generis protection for both microchips
and computer programs in a neighboring rights statute allied to the new Copyright Act. But the
proposal as regards software was abandoned. See infra note 389 and accompanying text. Brazil has
apparently agreed to adopt a modified copyright approach in response to intense pressure from the
United States. See, e.g., Barbosa, Software and Copyright: A Marriage of Inconvenience, 24 Copy-
RIGHT 194-200 (1988).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "compilation" as a "work formed by the collection and
assembling ... of data ... that are selected coordinated, or arranged in such a way ... as [to]
constitute[]. . . an original work of authorship"); id. § 103 (specifically including compilations and
derivative works within the subject matter of copyright); see also West Publishing Co. v Mead
Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that defendants' computer program enabling user to analyze data vicari-
ously infringed plaintiff's copyrighted data base). See generally Denicola, supra note 43, at 531-35,
539-42; Tapper, An Aspect of Copyright in Data Bases, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 169 (1987); Note, Copy-
right and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Competition Law Adequate? 67 TEX. L. REv. 993,
994-96, 1027-28 (1987).
However, considerable judicial resistance may yet be encountered in adjudicating claims for
infringement in specific cases. Compare, e.g., West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1219 (holding that
LEXIS star pagination feature was copyrightable and infringed) and United Tel. Co. v. Johnson
Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that compilation copyright in telephone di-
rectory protects against direct copying of new and updated listings) and Rand McNally & Co. v.
Fleet Management Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that appropriation of data from
compilation of maps was infringement) with F.I.I. v. Moody, 808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986)
(finding that sweat-of-the-brow arrangement was not an original work of authorship) and Worth v.
Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "facts, like ideas are
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abroad,124 although the Nordic countries have reportedly endorsed a sui
generis solution that will soon take effect.12 5 In 1984, Congress granted
modified copyright protection to semiconductor chip designs, 2 6 and
most industrialized countries have now enacted similar measures. Com-
puter programs also became indirectly eligible for protection in patent
law as a result of a United States Supreme Court decision in 1981;127
other industrialized countries have since moved in this direction. 12S
In the period from 1985 to 1989, moreover, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has revitalized this country's design
patent law. 29 During the same period, the federal appellate courts have
collectively transformed the treatment of trade dress under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act into an unofficial design law that affords a
much broader and conceivably perpetual form of protection.130 The
United States patent authorities have just granted a number of design
patents covering the screen displays used in conjunction with certain
computer programs.' 3'
Proposals to improve the special legal regimes already available to
protect ornamental designs of useful articles in all industrialized coun-
never protected," and holding that sweat-of-the-brow rationale would no longer apply).
124. See, e.g., Gotzen, Grandes orientations du droit d'auteur dans les Etats membres de la
C.E.E. en matiere de banques de donnees, in BANQUES DE DONNEES ET DROIT D'AuTEUR 85-98
(1987) (proceedings of a Conference held at Paris, Nov. 27, 1986); see also Kerever, Ces Arrets
microfor [The Microfor Judgment], 137 REvuE INTERNATIONALE Du DRoIT D'AuTEuR (RIDA) 16
28-31, 38-41 (discussing recent decision that clarifies but perhaps weakens the scope of protection
for data bases in France).
125. According to Professor Karnell, this law would apply to databases that did not other-
wise qualify as original literary works under the copyright laws in force. It would thus signify a
general agreement among the Nordic countries to treat noncopyrightable databases and other com-
pilations as a neighboring right, subject to a very short term of protection, in keeping with the
solution previously adopted by Section 49 of the Danish Copyright Act (giving 10 years of protec-
tion to catalogues, tables, and similar items). See, e.g., A. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 31, 34-35, 180 (1978) (discussing Danish law on compilations).
126. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see, e.g., R. STERN, SEMI-
CONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION § 1.4, § 10.1 (1986); see also Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note
105; Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip
Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985).
127. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 19, § 1.03[b]
[g]-[i]; Maier, supra note 59; Note, The Patentability of Computer Programs: Merrill Lynch's
Patent for a Financial Services System, 59 IND. L.J. 633 (1984); infra notes 172-75 and accompa-
nying text.
128. See, e.g., H. HANNEMAN, THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER SoFTWARE 85-247 (1985) (dis-
cussing patentability of computer-related inventions in foreign law); Sumner & Plunkett, supra
note 64.
129. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, part I.
130. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 104, at 1357-86; see also Reichman, supra note 5, part I.
131. See, e.g., Kluth & Lundberg, Design Patents: A New Form of Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 847 (1988).
[Vol. 42:639
1989] COMPUTER PROGRAMS 665
tries except the United States are under active consideration by the
Commission of the European Communities.1 2 Measures to confer sui
generis protection on functional designs, and not merely on ornamental
designs of useful articles, recently won legislative approval in the
United Kingdom. 133 Similar measures may yet be enacted in the United
States.134 A few industrialized countries already protect novel func-
tional designs and other minor inventions under utility model laws or
so-called petty patent laws, 3 5 and there is a growing list of developing
countries that seem eager to enact such laws.3 6 Some commentators
contend that computer programs should be treated as utility models
under the Paris Convention rather than as literary works under the
Copyright Conventions.13 7
132. See generally Posner, The Legal Protection of Industrial Design-Some Community
Aspects; Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Design Protection, A System for the European Commu-
nity?, Papers Presented to the International Conference on the Protection of Industrial Design
(Convegno Internazionale Disegno Industriale e Protezione Europea), Treviso, Italy (October 12-
13, 1988) (proceedings to be published in 1989); Lahore, Harmonization of Design Laws in the
European Communities: The Copyright Dilemma, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 233, 233-68 (1983).
The trade-related aspects of these proposals are now openly acknowledged. See Posner, supra,
at 4, 9 (stating that the design of a useful article has become "a prime tool in the ability of commu-
nity enterprises to compete with the enterprises of third countries which have lower production
costs... [m]any community industries have only one advantage over competing industries from
third countries: namely their superior design"). This protectionist thrust cuts both ways, however,
because third world countries also have great potential for competing in the world's design sweep-
stakes, and they may claim national treatment under the copyright conventions.
133. See, e.g., Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 213-264 (15 Nov. 1988);
see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION (Cmd. 9712) at 18-23 (1986). Noncom-
monplace functional designs are protected under a modified copyright model for up to ten years
subject to a compulsory license after five years and to complicated "must fit" and "must match"
restrictions; foreigners are subject to reciprocity, not national treatment under the Act as adopted.
See e.g., Felner, The New U.K. Industrial Design Law, U. BALTIMORE L.J. (Symposium Issue on
Design, forthcoming 1989). Fellner, Design Protection in the UK: Copyright, Registered Designs,
Unregistered Designs... What Will They Think of Next? 1, 5-11, Paper Presented to the Inter-
national Conference on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design (Disegno Industriale e Protezione
Europea), Treviso, Italy (October 12-13, 1988).
134. See, e.g., S. 791, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Compare, e.g., Fryer, Industrial Design
Protection in the United States of America-Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 27 INDUS.
PROP. 115 (1988) (proposing extensive protection in sui generis law that would no longer require
either nonobviousness or "ornamentality" and that could protect functional designs) with Brown,
supra note 104, at 1399-1403 (criticizing this proposal). A sui generis bill to protect ornamental
designs in the United States was deleted at the last moment from the Copyright Act of 1976. See
Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1186-1200.
135. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAs, supra note 76, at 949-56 (noting that utility model laws are availa-
ble for functional designs or petty patents in leading industrialized countries such as Italy, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan).
136. See, e.g., L POLI, EL MODELO DE UTILIAD 1-9 (1982) (arguing that utility model laws are
especially appropriate for developing countries). Mexico recently enacted such a law within the
framework of its new industrial property law.
137. See, e.g., Higashima & Ushiku, A New Means of International Protection of Computer
Programs Through the Paris Convention-A New Concept of Utility Model, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 1,
15-22 (1986); Note, Petty Patents in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Solution to the Problem
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Meanwhile, Switzerland recently amended its unfair competition
law with the express aim of protecting manufacturers who invest in in-
termediate technologies that are vulnerable to easy duplication.13 Arti-
cle 5(c) of this law protects products that embody the results of
intellectual effort, labor, and investment against competitive exploita-
tion by third parties who employ "technical methods of reproduction"
to copy these products outright without repeating the steps originally
needed to manufacture them. s9 While the new law permits would-be
competitors to use an originator's ideas and know-how to recreate or
reverse engineer an identical product, it prohibits them from merely re-
producing the completed products as a whole. 140 No express limitation
is placed on the period during which this protection may last; but it
reportedly lapses when "the investment of the owner has been amor-
tized" so that "the copying of the product by a third party no longer
distorts competition.' '4 1
Echoes of this approach have also been heard in the United States,
where some state legislatures recently enacted so-called "plug mold"
statutes 14 2 forbidding duplication of the shapes of certain products by a
direct molding process. l M The Supreme Court has just determined that
of Computer Software Protection?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 888-909 (1976).
138. See Loi federale contre la concurrence deloye du 19 december 1986 [Federal Law on
Unfair Competition of December 1986], art. 5 (Switzerland) (effective March 1, 1988), reprinted in
27 INDUS. PROP. 1 (Laws & Treaties Supp. Sept. 1988); see also Probst, Protection of Integrated
Circuits in Switzerland, 4 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (EIPR) 108 (1988). In the 1970s some experts
reportedly voiced concern about new technical means of reproduction that enabled competitors to
make direct copies of common merchandise, but matters have come to a head in recent years with
demands for generalized protection against misappropriation of skilled efforts and of products
such as technical drawings, computer software, and certain diagrams. Thus, while the provision
was not drafted specifically to deal with the topographies of semiconductor chips, it could also
apply to chip designs, gate arrays, and combinations of compartments selected from cell libraries.
Id., at 109-10.
139. See Probst, supra note 138, at 109. As Probst unofficially translates the relevant provi-
sions of Article 5 ("Exploitation of products of others"), an unfair act is performed by "who-
ever. . .[c.] exploits the marketable products of others, obtained as such without [their] own
appropriate effort by applying technical methods of reproduction." Id. at 108.
140. Id. at 109-10.
141. Id. at 110. Probst interprets this to mean that "[tihe period of protection ... varies
according to the investment needed for the creation of a specific product. Results of work which,
like chip products, require intensive research and development will be protected longer than com-
mon merchandise." Id. at 110. Compare with Probst the proposals of Kingston and Kronz calling
for a variable term of protection for industrial know-how linked to the grantee's "innovative capac-
ity." Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 42, 114.
142. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17300 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 555.94 (West 1985); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.621-4 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-111 (1984); Brown,
supra note 104, at 1391-95.
143. Under these statutes, use of an object to make a mold is forbidden. "You have to model
the object itself. Then you can make a mold and compete-or rip off, depending on one's point of
view-without violating the 'plug mold' statute." Brown, supra note 104, at 1392.
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these laws unconstitutionally interfere with the federal patent and
copyright systems. 4 4 These rather crude initiatives evoke the spirit of
earlier efforts to implant the misappropriation doctrine in domestic un-
fair competition law.145 Far bolder and more refined proposals are ema-
nating from the European Community countries, where some experts
advocate sui generis protection for all forms of know-how as such, with-
out regard to the availability of patent protection or the kinds of sub-
ject-matter distinctions familiar in traditional intellectual property
law.
1 46
The end result is a patchwork quilt of protective devices, comple-
mented by an increasingly supple law of trade secrets, 14 that has
strained the classical system of intellectual property law to the breaking
point. Taken together, these makeshift devices provide some protection
to a broadening array of industrial innovations that manifest relatively
low levels of quantitative or qualitative distance from the prior art.148
In so doing, these devices reveal the extent to which applied scientific
know-how, inadequately served by the traditional patent law matrix,
now poses a serious threat to the stability of an international system
built around a static notion of "industrial property" that no longer cor-
responds to empirical reality.
1 9
C. A Maximalist Response to the Challenge of New Technologies
1. Expanding Opportunities for Legal Protection of University
Research
This expanding protective framework renders university research
into virtually any field a potential source of proprietary rights capable
144. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1987), 109 S.
Ct. 971 (1989). Compare Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding California
plug mold statute constitutional because it proscribes only one unscrupulous mode of copying and
allows reverse engineering) with Bonito Boats, 515 So. 2d 220 (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.94
(West 1985), which was held unconstitutional and preempted under Sears-Compco).
145. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 104, at 1381-86 (stressing preemptive effects of Sears-
Compco doctrine, codified at § 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act); see also Baird, Common Law Intel-
lectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 411 (1983).
146. See authorities cited supra note 94; see also F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 16.
147. UNIF. TRADE SEcRrs AcT, 14 U.LA. 537, 543 (1979); see, e.g., Bender, Protection of
Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 907, 919-24 (1986)
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of using trade secret laws to protect computer pro-
grams); Kitch, supra note 91, at 699-701 (discussing portable black box approach used for com-
puter programs and criticizing the "contorted incentives" of trade secret law, which encourages
secrecy and disfavors innovations that are necessarily revealed to competitors).
148. See, e.g., KC HODKINSON, supra note 2, at 121, 135-36.
149. See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 79, at 13-17, 65-69, 93-94, 114-16; see also authorities
cited supra note 94.
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of generating substantial revenue. The array of legal devices available
to protect new technologies blurs such traditional lines as those divid-
ing pure from applied research 50 or those separating major (hence pro-
tectable) from minor (hence unprotectable) innovation. These devices
invite university administrators to monitor a seemingly infinite spec-
trum of technologies with a view toward maximizing commercial oppor-
tunities.151 Administrators are likewise encouraged to identify
commercially exploitable projects at the earliest possible stage of re-
search and development 52 without the inhibitions that the strict re-
quirements of patent law traditionally imposed. They are tempted to
establish businesslike organizational structures capable of systemati-
cally nurturing every promising research project from the laboratory to
the industrial drawing boards.
153
The Pajaro Dunes Statement of 1982, which appealed to caution
and restraint, has thus been overtaken by an overload, if not a break-
down, of the classical intellectual property system as structured in the
nineteenth century. The resulting proliferation of atypical restraints on
trade in intellectual goods indiscriminately renders just about every-
thing a university does both protectable and commercially exploitable
provided that faculty, students, and administrators are willing to pay
the price.
Arguably, the Pajaro Dunes Statement did provide some guidance
for this new situation to the extent that it admonished faculty and ad-
ministrators to think about the price-to reflect on the costs of con-
ducting university business this way.154 Had there been more time to
digest the changes occurring in both applied science and intellectual
property law, its minimalist message might have exerted a more lasting
influence.
In reality, there was little time to ponder the ethical and philo-
150. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 190 (spreading reach of patent law into basic
research discoveries of biomedical sciences).
151. See D. BOK, supra note 21, at 149 (discussing "Bush's law"--that applied research
drives out pure research).
152. See e.g., Samuelson, Innovation and Competition: Conflicts Over Intellectual Property
Rights in New Technologies, 12 SCL, TECH. & HUM. VALUES 6, 14-16 (1987) (discussing early con-
sultations between faculty and private firms).
153. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 53.
154. See, e.g., Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 533. The Statement explained:
The translation from opportunity to reality is not simple or easy. Serious problems. . . center
on the preservation of the independence and integrity of the university and its faculty, both
faced with unprecedented financial pressures and complex commercial relationships. Univer-
sities are a repository of public trust, and, in many cases, of public funds as well, and they
have an obligation. . . to ensure that they remain devoted to their primary goals of education
and research and that their resources be properly used in their pursuit of these goals.
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sophical implications of broadly commercializing research in a promis-
cuous legal environment. Industrialists and venture capitalists were
eager to invest in the new technologies,"' and universities rushed to
make the most of these financial opportunities without looking over
their shoulders. 56 Evidence of this changing attitude emerged in the
spring of 1988 from a set of papers presented at a Conference on the
University Spin-off Corporation held at Blacksburg, Virginia."'1
2. Birth of the Spin-off Mentality
Barely six years after the celebrated Biotechnology Conference at
Pajaro Dunes, the titles of the papers presented at Blacksburg told a
different story and constituted a veritable program for future action.
For example, the Blacksburg Conference opened with papers discussing
"Technology Transfer by Spin-off Companies versus Licensing,' 1 58 and
"Promoting University Spin-off Companies through Equity Participa-
tion."159 Other contributions explored "The Process by Which Univer-
sity Research Results Become a Business"'' 0 and described the
workings of "The University of Chicago Technology Commercialization
Center."''
No constituency was overlooked. A paper advocating "A Program
to Encourage Entrepreneurship in Undergraduate Students"'62 comple-
mented a study entitled "Exploring Perceived Threats to Faculty Com-
mercialization of Research."' 63 Perhaps the most ambitious or ominous
155. See, e.g., Aaron, Tapping into University Technology, High Tech. Bus., Dec. 1988, at 26
(stating that "[t]he number of companies turning to universities for research is growing"); Eisen-
berg, supra note 11, at 196. By 1984, as much as one-quarter of all biotechnological research that
universities carried out reportedly was funded by nearly one-half of all companies that generally
fund such research. See id. at 195 n.95 (citing authority).
156. See, e.g., B. REAMS, supra note 1, at 18. Professor Reams suggested, "Cooperation be-
tween universities and industry is now rapidly becoming a significant force contributing to the
innovation process. Indeed, such joint undertakings are so new that little opportunity has existed
for the collection of. . . data or the actual comparison of contracts." Id.; see also Weiner, supra
note 14, at 59 (noting that "more and more universities are adopting aggressive patenting
policies").
157. See generally Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
158. Gregory & Sheahen, Technology Transfer by Spin-off Companies vs. Licensing, in
Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
159. Wilson & Szygenda, Promoting University Spin-offs through Equity Participation, in
Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
160. Krisst, The Process by Which Research Results Become a Business, in Blacksburg Con-
ference, supra note 24.
161. Giannisis, Willis & Maher, Technology Commercialization in Illinois, in Blacksburg
Conference, supra note 24.
162. Ellis & Petro, A Program to Encourage Entrepreneurship in Undergraduate Students,
in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
163. Allen, Norling, Jordan & Sampathkumaran, Exploring Perceived Threats to Faculty
Commercialization of Research, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
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presentation of all, depending on one's point of view, outlined "The
Role of the Research University in Creating and Sustaining the U.S.
Technopolis."'164 Its vision of the future appears in a diagram repro-
duced later in this Article.
1 6 5
While the minimalist university predominated at Pajaro Dunes, a
portrait of the university that wanted to maximize its contributions to
industry emerged from the Blacksburg Conference. 16 Such a "maximal-
ist" university will reach deep into the research and development pro-
cess to stimulate protectable ideas; it will invest heavily in developing,
incubating, and promoting these ideas; and in order to encourage tech-
nology transfer, it may be willing to impose direct or indirect controls
on the ability of its investigators to publish or disseminate research re-
sults while offering industry the most lucrative package it can
provide. 1
What seems a new and disquieting prospect for the decades ahead,
in short, is the convergence of the two trends identified above. 68 On the
one hand, intellectual property law has expanded to the point where it
affords some form of protection to virtually the entire university out-
put. On the other hand, the university has begun to make structural
and organizational decisions that will permit it to profit from these pro-
prietary rights in an efficient and systematic manner. The maxinalist
university willing to exploit the bulk of its research is thus gearing up
to make use of an increasingly protectionist intellectual property sys-
tem that is capable of providing legal devices for accomplishing its
goals.
How can responsible administrators reconcile these developments
with the pristine functions of the university's academic mission? And
what of the minimalist university, faithful to the spirit of Pajaro Dunes,
that strives to maintain its balance and integrity as an institution of
higher learning? Recent studies have begun to explore these questions
in the context of biotechnology and the biomedical sciences.6 9 The next
section of this Article examines selected problems that the exploitation
of proprietary rights in computer software poses for university profes-
sors and administrators who remain concerned about the integrity of
164. Gibson & Smilor, The Role of the Research University in Creating and Sustaining the
U.S. Technopolis, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
165. See infra notes 426-39 and accompanying text.
166. See Gibson & Smilor, supra note 164, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. The
plans of the ambitious university are likely to be seconded by local authorities who see them as an
investment in economic development. Carried to an extreme, this partnership enables the town to
reassert much of the influence over the gown that it lost in the 1950s and 1960s. Id.
167. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, 51-53; see also Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 197-205.
168. See supra notes 116-49, 155-67 and accompanying text.
169. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 177; Korn, supra note 11, at 191.
[Vol. 42:639670
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
their institutional environment.
II. BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES OF FUNCTIONAL COPYRIGHTS IN THE
RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
In considering whether to protect and how to exploit new technolo-
gies that fall in between its traditional patent and copyright policies,
even a minimalist university has to consider that such technology may
eventually become the most lucrative of all, especially when measured
by revenue gained per dollar of investment in research and develop-
ment. All universities appreciate the commercial opportunities inherent
in current biogenetic engineering projects. This type of research, how-
ever, remains relatively capital intensive; it requires lengthy periods of
gestation; and it is complicated by bureaucratic regulation. Computer
software and microelectronics, in contrast, can yield large returns from
comparatively modest levels of investment, and the development of suc-
cessful but rapidly obsolescent products of this kind in a university en-
vironment is far less complicated than the development of
biotechnology. 1 0
A university that evaluates its commercial opportunities from this
angle will discover that it probably has overlooked or undervalued the
software its faculty has been generating.1 7 1 It may also find little patent
consciousness on campus concerning software,7 largely because of the
imprudent efforts of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) in the 1970s to exclude computer programs from the broad stat-
utory classes of patentable subject matter.17 The extent to which both
the courts and the PTO have now reversed direction and are moving to
recapture lost ground, 74 at times by recognizing questionably broad
170. See, e.g., K. HODKNSON, supra note 2, at 135.
171. Operating systems research is reportedly a major field of study at leading domestic and
foreign universities. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1329, 1357 (1988).
172. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 59, at 152.
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Maier, supra note 59, at 152-53. The Supreme Court's decisions in
Benson and Flook affirmed Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decisions that had denied eligibil-
ity. The PTO's theory of unpatentability "had its origins in bureaucratic concerns over workload,
rather than in careful theoretical analysis.. . . Worry about workload and backlog motivated the
PTO to lead the fight against software patentability." Maier, supra note 59, at 152-53; see also
Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We Confused?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 533, 544-49,
565-70 (1985) (assessing the capability problem that allegedly impedes patent protection of com-
puter programs). See generally Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrw. L. REv. 959
(1986) (arguing that algorithms should be patentable subject matter and criticizing the Flook and
Benson decisions).
174. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1367, 1368 (D. Del. 1983);
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claims, is still news to much of the academic community, although some
computer scientists have begun to complain that patent protection of
computer programs is becoming too strong and counterproductive. 17 5
Most software designs, however, will lack the inventive step needed
to qualify for an enforceable patent, and originators will therefore look
to copyright law for any proprietary rights they may have.17 6 Even when
a patent issues, concurrent copyright protection may be available, with
the copyright covering at least the detailed instructions and the patent
protecting against unauthorized programs that "use the idea claimed in
the patent algorithm.' 17   Recourse to copyright law will then expose
Maier, supra note 59, at 157-59 (stating that "[s]oftware patentability is a de facto reality today,
as the PTO now commonly issues patents for software inventions"; reviews examples of these in-
ventions). Design patents on computer screen displays have also been granted. See generally Kluth
& Lundberg, supra note 131.
Failure to patent innovative software could cause serious financial losses and embarrassment
after its commercial value becomes apparent, if the opportunity to satisfy the statutory prerequi-
sites has been needlessly forfeited. Cf. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. AB Fortia, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper teaching the claimed cell culture was a
printed publication within 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), which rendered the patent obvious). A uni-
versity should, therefore, start from the assumption that ways can now be found to patent any
software that contains a big idea, even if the validity of these broad-claim patents remains un-
tested. See infra note 177. To preserve the chances that a patent will issue, investigators working
with software should be advised of standard procedures concerning predisclosure screening, in con-
formity with the university's overall intellectual property policy.
175. See, e.g., Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv.
1023, 1025-34 (1988) (responding to Chisum, supra note 173, and warning that the patenting of
algorithms could affect basic research and retard computer science); see also R. Stallman, Why
Software Ownership Is Bad for Society, Address at the University of Texas (1987) (copy on file at
the Vanderbilt Law School). Newell and Stallman are distinguished professors of computer science
at Carnegie-Mellon University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, respectively. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology will reportedly sponsor a symposium on "Software Patents:
A Horrible Mistake?" in March 1989.
176. See, e.g., Marks, Software Development as a University Enterprise, at 1 (manuscript
pagination) in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24; supra text accompanying note 65. Practi-
tioners imply that the PTO's current attitude toward patent applications having a software com-
ponent is indulgent. See generally, Sumner, supra note 64 (discussing broad claims, a wide range
of specific implementations, code concepts, and user interfaces).
177. Chisum, supra note 173, at 1015-17; see also Maier, supra note 59, at 158 (stating that
basic organization and manner of operation are in principle protectable by a patent); supra note
176. The precise scope of patent protection is still unclear, however, and could be weaker than
expected. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558
(Fed. Cir. 1986); supra note 69 and accompanying text.
As the prospects for patent protection of computer software are consolidated and the dangers
of overprotecting computer software in copyright law become better understood, the line of demar-
cation between these two regimes may become controversial over time. See, e.g., Samuelson, Re-
flections on the State of American Software Copyright Law and the Perils of Teaching It, 12
COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 1989) (recognizing this problem). The same controversy
could arise under a sui generis solution unless the problem of cumulation were carefully worked
out in advance. Cf. Hinckley, NEC v. Intel: Will Hardware be Drawn into the Black Hole of
Copyright?, 3 COMPUTER & HIGH-TEcH L. J. 23, 30, 34 (1987) (stressing difficulties of demarcation
between hardware and software).
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university administrators to an array of unfamiliar problems stemming
from the idiosyncratic behavior of functional copyrights in the research
environment.
A. Ownership and Authorship of the Software Enterprise
While courts today seem prone to regard computer programs in vir-
tually any format as copyrightable subject matter,178 universities seek-
ing to assert the proprietary rights arising from this tolerant disposition
may encounter delicate problems of ownership that require careful at-
tention. As previously noted, most universities customarily allowed
faculty members to retain copyrights in their literary and artistic works
while asserting an employer's right of ownership in patentable inven-
tions developed within the framework of departmental research.179 Ad-
ministrators will now discover that, by applying these traditional
policies to computer software, universities may have given away the
rights to valuable industrial property masquerading as literary works.'
1. Academics as Employee Authors
Some commentators believe that the Copyright Act of 1976 will
undo past generosity and restore ownership of all faculty-generated
copyrights to the universities by operation of law. These commentators
contend that, because professors must publish or perish, their publica-
While a discussion of cumulation lies beyond the scope of this Article, it should be mentioned
in passing that the task of separating patent-like protection of industrial designs from overlapping
protection of "applied art" in copyright law has proved to be one of the thorniest and most intrac-
table issues still standing in the way of a unified copyright law for the European Community. See
generally Reichman, supra note 5, part H; Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at
1167-70 (comparative view of cumulation in the context of industrial designs).
178. This copyrightable subject matter includes computer operating systems and application
programs, even if perceptible only by a machine, as well as associated text and diagrams, and even
file structures. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
Microcode also has been held copyrightable. See NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp., No. C-84-20799-
WPG (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1989); Karjala, supra note 105, at 68-69; see generally Hinckley, supra
note 177.
179. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. An example is Stanford University. See
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND OTHER RESEARCH PROPERTY: A WORKING GUIDE
FOR THE STANFORD RESEARCH COMMUNITY 7-8 (1982) [hereinafter STANFORD POLICY]. The Stanford
policy states:
In keeping with tradition the University does not claim ownership of works for which the
intended purpose is to disseminate the results of academic research or scholarly study; owner-
ship of these works vests in the creator. Similarly, the University claims no ownership of
popular nonfiction, novels, poems, musical compositions, or other works of artistic
imagination.
Id. at 8.
180. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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tions are an occupational requirement and therefore "works made for
hire" as defined in Section 101 of the 1976 Act.181 Title to these works
vests initially in the employer and not the author. 82 Because scholar-
ship affects decisions concerning tenure, promotion, salary, and other
benefits, this line of reasoning allows one to conclude that universities
already own all the literary and artistic works their faculties produce.
183
Yet this result seems rather surprising under a Copyright Act that
aimed to strengthen authors' rights, especially when the legislative his-
tory conveys no intention to disturb the "teachers' exception" to the
works-for-hire doctrine that was firmly established under the 1909
Act.184 To equate a general duty to write with a duty to produce specific
works for a university distorts the nature of academic employment and
downgrades the professorial rank to that of an ordinary staff member.
Professors are expected to advance their universities' reputations for
high-quality scholarship by publishing suitable research of their own,
largely because scientific publications enhance the ability of these same
universities to attract the kinds of funds and personnel that ensure ful-
fillment of their educational missions. That professors are attracted to
teaching because research support is provided or that they write to ob-
tain tenure and retain its full benefits hardly entitles a university to
regard itself as the author of a scholarly product over which it has exer-
cised no direct supervisory control whatsoever.'85 In ascertaining the
181. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (works made for hire); see, e.g., DuBoff, An Academic's Copy-
right: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17, 24-34 (1984); Simon, Faculty Writings: Are
They "Works Made For Hire" Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9. J.C. & U. L. 485, 502-09 (1983).
But see Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 597-600.
182. According to 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), a "work made for hire" is a work "prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment." In such cases, "the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright." Id. § 201(b). The academic work product will seldom qualify as
a "commissioned work" within the meaning of § 101.
183. Simon stresses that universities indirectly exert a form of quality control over faculty
writing, that universities are the "motivating factor" behind such writing, and that universities
bear the bulk of the pertinent costs. Simon, supra note 181, at 502-05.
184. See, e.g., Hays & MacDonald v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
failure of legislative history to mention teacher's exception); Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 597-99; see
also DuBoff, supra note 181, at 26 (noting that Congress did not consider the effect of works-for-
hire provisions on teachers and arguing that courts should engraft the old exception onto the 1976
statute).
185. For cases emphasizing a supervisory function in regard to software, see, e.g., Evans
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago System Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434
(1986); BPI System, Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981). See also Aldon Accessories
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.) (this case, unrelated to software, expands the concept
of supervisory control), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). That universities absorb the costs of
preparing scholarly works, see Simon, supra note 181, at 504, reflects on the low salaries they pay,
especially during the formative period of a young academic's career. Like medical insurance and
other benefits, this support is provided as a sine qua non to attract scholars into teaching despite
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scope of university employment for purposes of copyright ownership,
moreover, one finds no evidence to suggest that trade usage had altered
the well-established teacher exception at the time the 1976 Act was
adopted.""
The courts will probably follow the late Professor Nimmer's lead
and preserve the academic's ownership of his or her general literary and
artistic output, 87 even though the current provisions on works for hire
give rise to diverse and conflicting interpretations.8 8 This position need
not automatically dispose of ownership issues concerning new technolo-
gies such as computer software, however, because the status of these
technologies as copyrightable subject matter did not become fully es-
tablished until after the adoption of the 1976 Act.189 To the extent that
trade usage affects the way courts view the scope of employment for
determining copyright ownership of new technologies, it might well es-
tablish an emerging exception to the "teacher exception" rule as under-
the salary level, not as a quid pro quo for a grant of proprietary rights in specific scholarly
products.
186. The "teacher exception" would thus form part of the standard bargain-in-fact as it ex-
isted in 1976. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3,223 (1981). Because custom was
clearly a major factor in the pre-1976 disposition, see Simon, supra note 181, at 485-86, there is no
reason to displace custom by an overly harsh reading of the statute not bolstered by any evidence
of legislative intent to change the previous situation.
If scholarly works are not employee works as defined by § 101 of the 1976 Act, the validity of
contractual provisions that seek to reverse this status by characterizing the academic output as a
"work made for hire" seems doubtful. Congress mandated that a copyright "vests initially in the
author or authors of the work," 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982), and the statute appears to restrict the
role of contract to the transfer of rights comprised in the copyright after it has vested in the
"author." Id. § 201(b); see, e.g., W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 120 (6th ed. 1986). By
the same token, the scholar's work product could not normally qualify as a commissioned work
falling within the nine specific categories mentioned in § 101 (works made for hire), and the statu-
tory language should invalidate contractual provisions that attempt to characterize works outside
these categories as commissioned works made for hire. Id. §§ 101, 201(a), 201(b); see, e.g., Commu-
nity for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362
(1989); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 815 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988). But see Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). See generally W. PATRY, supra, at
118-25. An exception exists for "instructional texts," however, which do fall within the nine catego-
ries of possible commissioned works set out in 17 U.S.C. § 101. Such a work would be considered a
work made for hire if the university and the academic originator so agreed in writing.
187. See, e.g., Hays & MacDonald v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (indi-
cating in dictum that the court was prepared to hold that the teacher exception survived the 1976
Revision of Copyright Law on the theory that such works are not prepared for the employer);
Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987); 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra
note 42, § 5.03[B][1][b][i], at 5-17 & n.31.
188. See generally Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Re-
ally Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 210 (1988). According to Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 603,
"[it is hard to think of a setting in which employer authorship is more of a legal fiction." She adds
that "new claims for copyright ownership could substantially alter the creative environment for a
large segment of the university community." Id. at 592.
189. See supra note 120.
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stood at the time the General Revision was drafted. 190
If a faculty member's output does not become a work made for hire
by operation of law, some universities concerned about software and
other intermediate technologies may break with tradition altogether
and oblige instructors to relinquish copyright ownership of research re-
sults as a condition of their employment contracts. These provisions
may attempt to characterize all academic output as university owned by
virtue of a professor's status as employee-author;191 or they may impose
a transfer to the university of any proprietary rights in written works
that vest in the instructor during that instructor's period of employ-
ment.192 Whether such clauses will survive attack under either copy-
right law or the requirement of mutual assent in contracts law remains
to be seen.193 At the very least, a transfer of all the professor's rights, if
otherwise valid, should remain subject to the author's termination right
after a period of thirty-five years."9
Other universities go to the opposite extreme by continuing to treat
software as a literary work like other literary works, which are exempt
from university ownership under the traditional dispensation. 95 This
treatment may result more from confusion or uncertainty than from a
deliberate policy decision.' 96 It nonetheless exposes a university to
nasty disputes about ownership if faculty-developed software later dis-
plays great commercial value, as reportedly occurred at the California
Institute of Technology. There the creator of a successful program in-
voked the "teacher exception" for literary works while the university
argued that software possessed a dual nature that made it more like
"'hard' inventions. "197 In the end, the professor left the university, and
190. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 186 (questioning the validity of this approach).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982); see, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 627, n. 126. An example
of the second approach is the University of Florida Contract.
193. See, e.g., supra note 186. For a spirited attack on involuntary transfers abroad that
might cast a domestic shadow as well, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1982).
194. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). But if the work is deemed a work made for hire, the em-
ployee-author obtains no termination right. Id. § 203(a).
195. See, e.g., Harvard Statement, supra note 27, at 4 (listing software among copyright-
able works to be controlled by faculty creators). It is not clear whether this provision has survived
the most recent policy formulation.
196. See Who Owns the Idea, OMNI, March 1985, at 35 [hereinafter Idea] (elaborating on
the confusion at several leading universities). Columbia University expressly excluded software
from its STATEMENT OF POLICY ON PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN THE INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS OF FACULTY
ACTIvrrY (1984). Other universities had simply remained silent on the problem as of this writing.
See, e.g., INDIANA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, supra note 41.
197. See Idea supra note 196 (discussing the Symbolic Manipulation Program, authored in
part by Professor Stephen Wolfram, who abandoned the project and the university in the wake of
disputed claims to ownership). For the dual nature of software, see: Galbi, supra note 65, at 281;
Davidson, supra note 100, at 1037; and Davidson, Protecting Software: A Comprehensive Analy-
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the program was never fully perfected.
A more sensible policy is for universities to recognize the hybrid
nature of computer software and other intermediate technologies and
then to formulate their own sui generis positions concerning proprietary
rights-positions that deviate from their standard, and one hopes more
liberal, provisions on copyrights in general. Stanford University's guide-
lines, for example, start by acknowledging software as copyrightable
subject matter. The guidelines, however, go on to characterize software
as a special case that is normally either a work for hire, a work con-
tracted for by the university, or a work made with significant use of
university resources, all of which serve to render copyright protection
"inadequate."' 98
Whether accurate or not, this evaluation further serves to rational-
ize the grouping of software with computer data bases and firmware
produced at Stanford, which are all assimilated to a subcategory known
as "tangible research property."'19 This subcategory includes additional
items such as biological materials, circuit diagrams, engineering draw-
ings, integrated circuit chips, and prototype devices and equipment. 00
While this classificatory scheme makes mincemeat of the world's estab-
lished intellectual property framework, it nonetheless achieves the de-
sired result by virtue of a special policy applicable to all "tangible
research property." This property is "normally . ..either owned by
Stanford or . . .subject to the ownership and other provisions of con-
tracts and grants."20
Fashioning special agreements of this kind remains a tricky busi-
ness at best. For example, policy statements in faculty manuals or the
like are not usually signed by faculty members. If the manual deviates
from what the Copyright Act provides and the Copyright Act requires a
signature to validate the deviation, either the author or the university,
absent timely remedial measures, may be denied the benefits of a policy
thought to apply but never embodied in a signed instrument.2 02
sis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 375 (1983) [hereinafter Davidson, Protecting Software].
198. STANFORD POLICY, supra note 179, at 8.
199. Id. at 8, 9. The parallel with tangible embodiments of know-how is clear. See supra
notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
200. STANFORD POLICY, supra note 179, at 9.
201. Id. at 9. Restrictions on distribution are then applied. Especially stringent are the re-
strictions on commercial distribution, which must be arranged with the coordination of an Office of
Technology Licensing. Id. at 9-10. Under the Stanford scheme, the University thus assumes owner-
ship of software but shares the royalties with the creator, his department, and his school, as nor-
mally occurs with patents. School officials claim this policy satisfies the faculty, but there are
published assertions to the contrary. See Idea, supra note 196. Vanderbilt University also classifies
software as "Tangible Research Property," and the University "reserves its financial rights." VAN-
DERBILT UNIVERSITY FACULTY MANUAL, supra note 41, at 60.
202. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) ("work made for hire"); id. § 201(b) (1982) (ownership
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A decision to exempt software and other intermediate technology
from the standard ownership provisions of a university's copyright pol-
icy, moreover, leads too conveniently to a further decision to draw on
the university's standard ownership provisions concerning patentable
industrial property. Yet, it is widely believed that neither the "em-
ployed to invent" and "shop right" doctrines of patent law2 °0 nor the
work-for-hire provisions of copyright law adequately respond to the exi-
gencies of software producers,0 4 and there is still no agreement on how
a truly fair deal should be structured.20 5 Meanwhile, a university that
of works made for hire); Marks, supra note 176, at 4, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24;
supra note 186.
203. Although the basic rules of ownership theoretically favor the inventor who conceives or
reduces an invention to practice during the course of employment, these rules are offset in practice
by the power of the employer to obtain title contractually or specifically to hire the employee to
exercise "inventive faculties" on the employer's behalf. Even without these exceptions, the em-
ployer may enjoy a "non-exclusive and nontransferable royalty-free license ('shop right') to use the
employee's patented invention." 5 D. CHISUM, supra note 19, § 22.03, at 22-9.
The shop right, however, is an uncertain right. See id. § 22.03[3]. For the shop right in the
research setting, compare State Board of Education v. Bourne, 150 Fla. 323, 7 So. 2d 838 (1942)
(concerning a plant pathologist who was assigned to work on the breeding of sugar cane hybrids
and who retained all rights in hybrids of sugar cane as against employer) with State v. Neal, 152
Fla. 582, 12 So. 2d 590 (1943) (concerning a researcher hired to study the digestibility of citrus
waste and to make animal feed from it; holding that the employment was specific enough to give
patent rights to the employer).
204. For example, see Articles 45-46 of the French Copyright Law of 1985, supra note 121,
which drastically alter the ownership provisions flowing from copyright law in a quasi-copyright or
neighboring rights milieu without expressly preserving moral rights and without importing the
safeguards of patent law.
205. For example, the policy adopted at Carnegie-Mellon University in 1985 reportedly al-
lows the university an option on both patentable and copyrightable property for a period of 120
days. Copyrights in educational materials, such as textbooks and instructional software, are then
normally returned to creators, while commercial software (defined as software that performs a
function for the user) will be copyrighted by the University if a market for the item is anticipated.
See Memo from Vanderbilt Development Office (Jan. 27, 1986) (on file at the Vanderbilt Law
School).
Another possibility is for a university to exact royalties consistent with its support by contrac-
tual arrangement while continuing to recognize copyright ownership of the academics who create
computer programs as a research product. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 640-41 n.179. This
approach has the advantage of ensuring the parent university of a share in the proceeds even if the
creator moves to another university and takes his copyright with him. Id. But the terms of such
contracts are difficult to evaluate prior to the creation of the work, when the level of direct univer-
sity support may have been minimal. Experience demonstrates that attempts to negotiate profit-
sharing agreements on the basis of quasi-ownership claims after the true value of a copyrighted
work has become known are risky and may not be conducive to good relations with an instructor-
author who has become more marketable.
Even if it turns out that academic ownership of copyrighted works is, on the whole, a more
efficient basis for the dissemination of research, as Professor Dreyfuss's study suggests, see gener-
ally id., it remains to be seen whether the exploitation of university-generated software, viewed as
industrial property in disguise, would be equally efficient under the normal ownership rules of
literary and artistic property law, see, e.g., infra notes 363-68 and accompanying text (growing
resort of universities to spin-off companies in order to attract venture capital and develop new
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refashions its copyright policy with a view to claiming ownership of
software will also feel tempted to claim title to all copyrightable subject
matter authored by its faculty members, and the latter may lack the
bargaining power to resist this tactic.
2. Pitfalls of the Collective Endeavor
Plenty of practical difficulties remain even after the university for-
mulates an appropriate ownership policy. For example, any official pol-
icy can govern only software developed within the scope of a professor's
or staff member's employment or with the use of university equipment
and resources.20 6 This restriction posed fewer problems in the days
when industrial and scientific innovation typically required shopwork
that occurred during working hours and was difficult to hide. Today's
software development, however, need not require visible use of the em-
ployer's facilities, or at least not the same degree of use. Many profes-
sors claim to have created their software at home, outside regular office
hours and beyond the scope of employment. These claims pose delicate
evidentiary questions that can taint the university's relations with a key
faculty member even if a court holds for university ownership in the
end.207
When software is developed within the scope of university employ-
ment, copyright ownership may still be in doubt because of questions
about who the real authors were, especially when a team of principal
investigators and graduate students collaborated on the work.208 A high-
level source code produced within a university department is often a
collective endeavor of this kind. If the finished product becomes a
"joint work,"20 9 for example, each contributor automatically acquires an
undivided estate in the entire work along with the power to license it as
the contributor deems fit.210 Joint authors merely owe one another a
duty to account for proceeds earned by their work, which must be
technologies). See also Memo from University of Colorado Foundation, at 2 (copy on file with
Author) (suggesting that faculty often prefer that the Foundation play an active role in protecting
and developing disclosures with longer range commercial potential, which are patented by the
Foundation).
206. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b)(1982); supra note 203.
207. See, e.g., In re Simplified Information Sys., Inc. (Simplified Information Sys. v. Can-
non), 89 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); see also Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software,
793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.) (stressing supervisory control in determining work-for-hire status), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 602 (stressing evidentiary problems).
208. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 3, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (stating that "[a] 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole").
210. Id. § 201(a) (stating that "[t]he authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work"); see 1 M. NiMMER & D. NnmmER, supra note 42, § 6.06[A], at 6-14.
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shared, and none of them may license the work in a manner that de-
stroys its value to the others.211
The statutory definition of a "joint work" requires the authors' in-
tent to merge "their contributions ... into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole. ' 212 The legislative history emphasized a
need to clarify the nature of these intentions at the time of creation.
The case law, however, continues to allow room for manipulation after
the fact213 based on allegations that the end product partook of a "com-
mon design. 214
Recent controversies involving the joint efforts of university per-
sonnel are hardly reassuring in this regard. In one case, the joint au-
thorship doctrine foiled the efforts of a junior scholar in nuclear
medicine to prevent her former mentor, a senior scholar in the same
field, from distributing a syllabus that resulted from their previous col-
laboration. 5 In another case, one of several authors of an article on
clinical education in hospital pharmacology sued his fellow investigators
and the university because they had failed to credit him as lead author
in the published version of the work. Despite university funding of the
project, the court treated the article as a joint work rather than a work
made for hire and held that the defendants were entitled to revise the
article and to change the order in which the authors were listed. 1 '
The broad doctrine of joint authorship applied in these cases could
easily extend to the development of major source codes. If it did, each
co-owner of copyright would obtain the right to make and publish his
own derivative works from programs originally developed in a univer-
sity department.21 7 Because of the practical and commercial importance
of the improved programs that normally are derived from an initial
breakthrough, the ability of a university to maximize profits from its
ownership of program copyrights could turn on its ability to limit the
211. See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 165, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); see generally 1 M.
NIMMEpR & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, §§ 6.11, 6.12[A]. Termination of transfers would require a
majority vote under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (1982).
212. See supra note 209.
213. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1989); W. PATRY, supra note 186, at 115-16 (citing authorities).
214. See, e.g., Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1260 (declining to reject the common design doc-
trine in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944) (12th
Street Rag doctrine)). But see 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 6.03 (criticizing this
doctrine).
215. Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1248.
216. Weinstein v. University of IlM., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Community for
Creative Non-violence, 846 F.2d at 1485.
217. See, e.g., Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1091; 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 106(2) (1982) (derivative
works).
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number of joint owners and to control the pace at which derivative
products are marketed.218 Even though close cooperation between the
university and faculty members who create a computer program seems
indispensable to maximizing profits, the interests of the parties will not
always converge and conflicts between them could threaten the success
of any commercial undertaking.219
To reduce the risk that graduate students might later assert propri-
etary rights, the university could require a waiver in advance; some ad-
ministrations already seem to be implementing this procedure.2 2 0 The
validity of such a waiver, however, is not altogether free from doubt, at
least when the student pays his own way (a situation that occurs less
frequently in the graduate environment). Even if a waiver were initially
valid, the student who later made a demonstrably significant contribu-
tion to the project might still have grounds for asserting a proprietary
claim221 on the theory that the Copyright Act of 1976 vests initial own-
ership of copyright in the author.222 Under the termination provisions
of the same Act, moreover, even a valid transfer of copyright by stu-
dents to the university could fail to obviate posterior ownership dis-
putes over longer lived software innovations.2 3
B. Eligibility and the Scope of Protection for Industrial Literature
Beyond these threshold problems of authorship and ownership,
generally troublesome questions about the proper scope of protection
for copyrighted computer software 224 become even more perplexing in a
research environment. These questions are, of course, mostly obviated
whenever university software qualifies for patent protection. Any
programmer who satisfies the hard prerequisites of patent law earns the
218. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 640 (noting that when group research projects are
conceived, departmental interest in simplifying dissemination may require university ownership).
219. See, e.g., id. at 624-26.
220. Universities that appear to claim rights in student works, at least when the student
receives financial aid, include the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), see MASSACHU-
sErS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY COPYRIGHT POLICY D, E, F, (1979) [hereinafter MIT POLICY]
and Indiana University, see INDIANA UNivRsrrY FOUNDATION, supra note 41.
221. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 188, at 257-58 (stating that graduate students are not work-
ers for hire in the usual sense of the term).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
223. See id. § 203.
224. See, e.g., Nimmer, Bernacchi & Frischling, A Structured Approach to Analyzing the
Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J.
625, 628-34 (1988); Nimmer & Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology Infringement: De-
fining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13, 60-62 (1986); see also Karjala, supra note
105, at 34-36, 62-96; Menell, supra note 171, at 1329, 1346-72; Wharton, Use and Expression: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 433, 467-68 (1985). For
additional and insightful economic analysis, see Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1989).
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hard protection it provides in the form of exclusive rights to make, use,
and sell the patented software invention.225 Such a patent would rarely
cover the coded instructions, which are unlikely to satisfy the nonobvi-
ousness requirement and would thus continue to depend on copyright
law; but the patent should protect exceptionally innovative design fea-
tures pertaining to organization, structure, and methods of operation.226
A patent might also prevent third parties from introducing certain pro-
grams that achieve comparable results with differing code structures,
and in this case independent creation would provide no defense to an
action for infringement.22 7
The tough form of protection afforded by a software patent does
raise tensions with basic academic values, 228 but these tensions are no
different in principle from those encountered in working with other in-
termediate technologies, notably biotechnology.229 Because the distinc-
tion between pure and applied research is not well defined in either
field, the exclusive rights a patent confers can extend farther into the
laboratory than is possible in the more conventional applications of sci-
ence to industry.28 0 More aggressive judicial development of an "experi-
mental use" exception to patentability could offset some of these
tensions and help to reconcile the goals of scientific progress with those
of patenting new technological research.23'
When a university relies on copyright law to protect computer pro-
225. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982); see also Maier, supra note 59, at 158.
226. See Maier, supra note 59, at 158. Exceptionally innovative screen displays would also
qualify for design patents. See, e.g., Kluth & Lundberg, supra note 131. The standards of patenta-
bility, of course, must be met in each case. Maier suggests that coded instructions would benefit
indirectly from protection of the key functional elements, Maier, supra note 59, at 158, but this
conclusion may assume a too favorable reading of the doctrine of equivalents.
227. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 59, at 158-59 (noting that this result contrasts with the soft
protection of copyright law). But see Texas Instrument cases, cited supra note 69; Becker, supra
note 69, at 47-50 (warning that broad claims may be narrowly construed for infringement
purposes).
228. See, e.g., R. Stallman, supra note 175, at 5-6. Along with some constraints on the com-
puter scientist's freedom to publish, a degree of secrecy in the laboratory will probably be needed.
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 190-95, 197-200, 206-17.
230. See, e.g., Newell, supra note 175, at 1026, 1033. Newell stated that "[a]ll of computer
science is directly related to use. There is essentially no gap, no matter how pure or basic the
science is." Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 195, 217-20. Eisenberg notes: "In this field
[biotechnology], the traditional dividing line between basic and applied research is blurred. Not
only has the historical time lag between the two collapsed, but it has become difficult to character-
ize given research problems as belonging in one category or the other." Id. at 195.
231. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 173, at 1019 (noting that the absence of a well-defined
exemption to the novelty requirement for research and experimentation in patent law is trouble-
some for computer technology and fields such as chemistry and biotechnology); Eisenberg, supra
note 11, 219-26 (discussing ambiguities of case law concerning experimental use doctrine). But see
supra note 175 (discussing views of those who fear that patent protection of computer software
inhibits scientific progress).
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
grams, in contrast, the tensions with academic principles and values be-
come far more subtle and complex.
1. "Originality" and the Burdens of Overlapping Claims
On the bright side, copyright protection arises automatically from
the act of creation, without cost to or extra effort by the authors, and it
is not compromised by premature publication or disclosure.3 2 Because
the copyright paradigm affords soft protection on soft conditions for a
long period of time and does not require either novelty or nonobvious-
ness, every academic programmer can, in principle, protect the original
expression of his or her program provided that it has not been copied
from another's work.2 3 Programmers cannot, however, copyright the
ideas, methods, discoveries, or principles embodied in their work, 34 and
the fair-use defense builds an exemption for scholarly and scientific
pursuits into the basic protective framework of the copyright system.35
While this doctrinal apparatus works tolerably well in the realm of
traditional literary and artistic works for which it was devised," 6 it can
produce mischievous results when applied to computer programs, espe-
cially in the university environment. For example, because there is no
requirement of objective novelty to distance one work from another or
from the prior art and because all programmers can copyright their own
original expressions, independently created contributions may cluster
about unprotectable core ideas, each of which overlaps the others.3 7 All
232. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (stating that "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression"); id. § 101 (defining "fixed" and
"created"); id. § 408(a) (making registration permissive, not mandatory). For works created be-
tween January 1, 1978 and March 1, 1989, the copyright can be invalidated after five years if the
work is distributed publicly without notice. See id. §§ 401, 405. For works created after March 1,
1989, even publication without notice will not invalidate the copyright. See Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853 (eliminating technical forfeiture
because of public distribution without copyright notice).
233. See, e.g., Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1119, 1120 (1986). Independent creation thus constitutes a perfect defense to every claim of
infringement, even though a second comer achieves comparable results by similar or different
means. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMmER, supra note 42, § 201[A]. This follows because copy-
right law protects only the mode of expression in "original work[s] of authorship" and not the
underlying ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1982).
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); infra note 288.
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see also W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVLEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw 361-65, 385-408 (1985); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 253 (1983). See gener-
ally Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 1131, 1175-82 (1986).
236. See Brown, supra note 101, at 580-89, 606-09.
237. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Q-Co. Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.
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these contributions can then support individual claims to protection
that are subject to no prior specification or examination, nor to disqual-
ification for prior use or disclosure.
As applied to literary and artistic works this approach results in
many protectable versions of a common plot, theme, situation, or land-
scape, each of which reflects its creator's unique personality and subjec-
tive imagination. ss As applied to utilitarian works, however, the
Holmesian premise of diversification through subjective novelty2 9
breaks down2 40 because the motives underlying the act of independent
creation have little or nothing to do with expressing the human person-
ality as such.2 4 On the contrary, subjective personalization in the utili-
tarian milieu tends to produce white elephants that are either
dysfunctional or readily undersold by products built around more
streamlined or standardized solutions.4 2
When minimally creative designs of utilitarian objects attract copy-
1985).
238. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1978).
239. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographying Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)(holding inde-
pendently created literary and artistic works are innately differentiated by the unique personalities
of their authors); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
240. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-92 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (requiring
quantitative creativity for reproductions of commercial designs already in the public domain and
denying eligibility to products of "physical skills"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.); infra notes 254-58 and
accompanying text. See generally Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 297-321
("Quantitative Creativity in the Second Circuit").
241. That expression of the human personality constitutes an essential feature of the Holme-
sian analysis is routinely and conveniently overlooked in the modern context. See Bleistein, 188
U.S. at 239, 250. The court stated:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in hand-writing, and a very modest grade
of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may
copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.
Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1123 (stating that the "premise of patent law is that
high standards and a high level of protection reward investment in substantial technological im-
provements"; premise of copyrights is that, given low standards and a low level of protection,
authors "will direct their efforts and be free to direct their efforts towards expressively different
works"); Reichman, After The Copyright Act, supra note 61, 276-83 (discussing the distinction
between creative works and products of skilled efforts in comparative legal theory).
242. See, e.g., Conference Report, LaST Frontier Conference on Software Protection, Ari-
zona State University College of Law, Science and Technology, February 13-14, 1989, at 4 (first
full Committee Draft, February 28, 1989), to be reprinted in JUuaMETRics J. (1989) [hereinafter
Conference Report] (noting that "the predominant, if not exclusive, goal in the design of computer
programs is the achievement of functional objectives, such as speed of computing, efficient use of
memory, optimization of input/output functioning, and ease of testing, maintenance, and enhance-
ment"). The Conference Report is a proposed consensus statement about the application of tradi-
tional copyright principles to computer programs, to be signed by 10 law professors; citations are
only to those portions of the text that had obtained full consensus at the time of writing.
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right protection in the form of two-dimensional graphic or verbal repre-
sentations, and these designs are subsequently embodied in three-
dimensional utilitarian objects, 43 a copyright paradigm devised to regu-
late the market for literary and artistic works can become a tool for
restraining trade on the general products market.2 4 Uncritical applica-
tion of the pure theory of copyright law to works having an industrial
character 24 5 will oblige courts to validate miniscule variations on the
prior art as "original works of authorship" that other authors copy at
their peril, 246 even though the range of marketable variations in utilita-
rian products is limited by functional exigencies and by market expec-
tations of performance.247 Given both the lack of any predetermined
metes and bounds around the copyrightable estate and the existence of
a judicial bias against close imitation, any grant of exclusive reproduc-
tion rights may extend beyond the modest quantum of originality used
to qualify for protection and invest first comers with colorable claims to
nonprotectable matter,248 including functionally efficient solutions that
243. Although the "dual nature" of computer programs is now clear and conceded even by
those who favor strong protection for computer software, see supra note 100, the Copyright Act of
1976 insisted on a technical definition of "useful articles" that exempted industrial literature from
the separability test otherwise employed to restrict the copyrightability of industrial art. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "useful articles" as "article[s] having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of an article or to convey information" (emphasis
added); id. (defining "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" (codifying separability tests for
designs of useful articles)); id. (defining "literary works" (including "computer programs," as de-
fined, but containing no test of separability)); see also infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text
(comparing "unity of art" doctrine in France with "unity of literature" approach in the United
States); infra note 288 (reinterpreting Baker v. Selden).
244. See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 55 (1966) (noting "dangers of
injecting copyright into complex, going market mechanisms"); Reichman, Before the Copyright
Act, supra note 61, at 1197 (discussing the "two-market conundrum" of commercial designs); see
also Reichman, supra note 5, part II.
245. For the conventionally broadest application of the originality doctrine to artistic works,
see Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d 99. For the broadest applications to commercial designs, viewed as
"works of applied art" under the 1909 Act, see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 61,
at 298-303 ("Excesses of the Copyright Approach"). For the broadest applications to literary works
in the period since passage of the 1976 Act, see West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,
799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987) and NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No.
C-84-2079-WPG, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (originality of microcode).
246. See, e.g., Laurie & Keefauver, Protection of Computer Software (American Group of
A.I.P.P.I Report Q57, 1989), reprinted in Arizona State University College of Law, Cases & Mater-
ials for LaST Frontier Conference on Software Protection 230, 233 (Feb. 13-14, 1989) [hereinafter
LaST Frontier Conference] (stating that function task and programming language narrow the
available range of implementing expression); id. at 234 (stating that independent creation is a
chimerical defense in the area of compatible software); see also NEC Corp., No. C-84-2079-WPG
(recognizing the problem in regard to microcode, but applying the lowest standard of originality).
247. See Conference Report, supra note 242, at 3-4; see also discussion supra note 247.
248. See, e.g., Nimmer, Bernacchi, & Frischling, supra note 224, at 628 (noting "numerous
common programming techniques found in a wide variety of programs"); id. at 642-43 (advising
courts that program elements dictated by external considerations are tainted by "[lack of
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prudent second comers will feel obliged to work around in order to fore-
stall actions for infringement.2" 9
Unlike patent law, in short, which allows second comers to use
freely all unpatentable innovations, the amorphous nature of copyright
protection dictates that when any programmer's modest quantum of
protectable originality overlaps the protectable quantums of other pro-
grammers working in the same field, complaints about "copying" be-
come feasible.250 In this and other ways, the copyright paradigm
extends its protective mantle deeper into the application phases of
computer science than is possible when only patent law applies." 1 Be-
cause it is difficult to separate basic from applied research in this
field,252 the exercise of overly broad and exclusive reproduction rights at
[o]riginality"); id. at 643-49 (including hardware standards, software standards, computer manu-
facturers' design standards, "target industry practices," and computer industry programming prac-
tices in the list of nonoriginal program elements).
249. See, e.g., NEC Corp., No. C-84-2079-WPC; Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elec. Inc., 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Hinckley, supra note 177, at 38, 50-55 (discussing implica-
tions of copyright protection for microcode as presented in NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp.
590 (W.D. Ga. 1986) (opinion withdrawn)); see also Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softkone
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,
648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985); E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
Taken one by one, arguments can be advanced to justify the results in each of these cases.
Taken all together, the degree of copyright protection potentially available to minor functional
variations on core or standard technical ideas appears alarming. See, e.g., Karjala, United States
Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection of Information-Based Technolo-
gies, 28 JURImETRIcS J. 147, 149-50 (1988); Menell, supra note 171, at 1339-46 (noting the dangers
of legal protection for product standards); supra note 248; see also Samuelson, Why the "Look
and Feel" of Software Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law (unpublished paper), reprinted
in LaST Frontier Conference, supra note 246, at 443-54 (stating that "[i]f 'unoriginal' material is
not protectable by copyright, then it should not be inadvertently swept back in by application of a
'look and feel' test").
250. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 249, at 149 (noting that advances in software design are
always similar to prior works); Nimmer, Bernacchi & Frischling, supra note 224, at 628-34 (dis-
cussing technical difficulties in determining substantial similarity of computer programs); Confer-
ence Report, supra note 242, at 4 (warning courts not to extend protection to functional or
utilitarian features); see also Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1122 (stating that "copyright [law],
designed to promote the arts, casts too low and wide a net properly to promote technology").
251. See Newell, supra note 175, at 1026 (stating that "[a]ll of computer science is directly
related to use"); id. at 1032-33 (refuting the "black box" thesis of Davidson, supra note 100).
Newell states:
As anyone in computer science knows, the boundary between data and program-that is,
what is data and what is procedure-is very fluid. In fact .... there is no principle distinction
in terms of form or representation of which is which. What counts is the total body of knowl-
edge represented somehow in the assembled symbolic expressions. This totality determines
the ultimate behavior of the machine.. . . Because of this, what is outside his [Davidson's]
black box and what is inside it is open to great manipulation, either to avoid or to create
copyright problems, as the case may be.
Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).
252. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (view of Newell).
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the application phase can then fuel claims of infringement having seri-
ous repercussions at a more theoretical level. 5 '
Aware of these contradictions, some courts have sought to modify
the standard doctrine of originality as applied to both utilitarian and
factual works under the 1976 Act. In particular, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has sporadically developed a "substantial crea-
tivity" requirement for works of applied art;2 54 for derivative works in
general; 255 and, more recently, for so-called factual compilations of a
utilitarian nature.256 An insistence on "substantial creativity" rather
than just independent creation in this line of cases aims to preserve
elbow room for competitors and to reduce the possibilities for harass-
ment inherent in grants of exclusive rights to miniscule variations on
the prior art. 57 The Ninth Circuit has tried to reach comparable results
by means of a deliberately expansive reading of the subject-matter ex-
clusions under Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act in cases dealing with fac-
tual and functional works of a utilitarian character. 58
253. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); see also supra
notes 175, 230, 251 (views of Newell and Stallman, computer scientists).
254. See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stating that "most belt buckles would not meet the basic requirements of originality and creativ-
ity"); L. Batlin & Son, Inc., v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976); see also John Muller v. New York Arrows, 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding logo not
copyrightable for lack of creative contribution); Kuddle Toy, Inc. v. Pussycat-Toy Co., 183
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F.
Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at
271-75, 303-08, 312-21, 329-30.
255. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909-11 (2d. Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that the Batlin standards of originality and creativity, initially applied to works copied from
the public domain, would now extend to works derived from other works still in copyright, for
which "the originality requirement imposed by the Constitution and the Copyright Act has partic-
ular significance"); see also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarments Co., 697 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d
Cir. 1982); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 920 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982)
(copyright office applying the Batlin standard of originality but not adjudicating the issue), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 342-43 (discuss-
ing this aspect of Durham); id. at 320 n.281, 342 n.430 (suggesting the desirability of limiting
Batlin to cases of commercial design, a suggestion that this Article disavows).
256. See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08
(2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the arrangement of information on bond redemption cards was not an
original work of authorship).
257. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d 905; L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d 486; see also Toro Co. v. R
& R Prod. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a parts numbering system was not an
original work of authorship).
258. See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding a sweat-
of-the-brow selection not copyrightable), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1271 (1988); Cooling Sys. & Flex-
ibles, Inc., v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985) (stressing the narrow range of
protectable expression in factual works); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). The Ninth Circuit's approach, however, can
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The extension of a quantitative creativity doctrine to computer
programs as "works of applied literature" is both logical and appropri-
ate. It would, indeed, simply build upon an early opinion of the Second
Circuit, in which Judge Jerome Frank applied a substantial creativity
criterion to limit the eligibility of a set of rules for playing a game.259 It
would also enable courts to avoid the logical paradox that arises when
they imply that close or slavish imitation can produce a finding of in-
fringement even when only noncopyrightable elements have been
taken.260 Recently, the Register of Copyrights managed to convince one
federal district court that a videogame should be denied copyright pro-
tection for lack of sufficient creativity.2 61 The Ninth Circuit has also
found no protectable subject matter in a videogame.262 Whether courts
in this country will further develop threshold barriers to limit the pro-
tectability of computer programs that rely on solutions that are stan-
dard or commonplace in the trade, as has occurred in the Federal
Republic of Germany,263 remains to be seen.264
convert noncopyrightable subject matter into copyrightable matter in cases of close imitation. See
infra note 260.
259. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.) (requiring
"substantial originality," which can only mean substantial creativity). Judge Frank authored the
famous opinion in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), which
lowered the doctrine of originality to its least exigent level for works of art; his opinion in
Chamberlin was cited with approval by the Second Circuit en banc in Batlin. For the view that the
extension of the Alfred Bell doctrine from an artistic to an industrial milieu works mischief, see
Kuddle Toy, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642 (Dooling, J.).
260. For example, see the Cooling Systems and Landsberg opinions in the Ninth Circuit,
supra note 258, and even the Frybarger opinion, infra note 262. The logical paradox mentioned in
the text was rightly rejected by the Second Circuit in Batlin v. Snyder and its progeny, supra
notes 254-55, which recognized that minimally creative commercial designs do not necessarily sat-
isfy the Bleistein postulate. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. For signs that the
Ninth Circuit is inching toward a more restrictive view of the eligibility requirement, as applied to
borderline subject matter, see infra note 262 and accompanying text (Frybarger and Worth
opinions).
261. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 695 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying a videogame
copyrightability for lack of creativity, and holding that it was not an original work of authorship
within 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
262. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); see Frybarger v. Interna-
tional Business Mach. Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that each of the similar features
in question was a basic idea of videogames; indispensable expression of basic ideas was not identi-
cal and therefore was unprotectable). It follows that there was no "original work of authorship"
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See also Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827
F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that sweat-of-the-brow selection was not copyrightable), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1271 (1988); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the idea and expression of jewelry design were inseparable; protecting
the expression would confer a monopoly on the idea).
263. See Sudwestdeutsche Inkasso Kb. v. Bappert und Burker Computer GMBH, 1 ZR 62/83
(Federal Supreme Court [BGH], 9 May 1985), 1985 GRUR 1041, 17 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 681 (1986); "Baustatikprogramm" Decision (Federal Supreme Court, 26 June
1986), 1985 GRUR 1049, 1052; see also "Wergeplaene" Decision, 1 ZR 160/84 (Federal Supreme
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Meanwhile, in a field in which innovation occurs through sequen-
tial and cumulative improvements,6 5 every researcher making use of
another researcher's prior art can expose himself to potential liability
for infringement, or at least to litigation, absent explicit authorization
for use.2"" This exposure prompts university lawyers to consider ob-
taining defensive permission from researchers already working in a
given area,267 but this practice can cause the very litigation that it seeks
to avoid. Once a university routinely decides to exploit its software
commercially, moreover, there is no guarantee that it will honor re-
quests for permission from other universities' departments that later
may become competitors. In addition, there is a built-in temptation to
demand substantial fees from other universities even for research
purposes.2
68
2. Uncertain Efficacy of the Traditional Defenses
To be sure, independent creation remains a perfect defense to any
action for infringement of copyrighted computer programs. 2' 9 But how
often does independent creation accurately characterize a university re-
search environment in which "innovation occurs through sequential and
cumulative improvements"? °7 0 Computer scientists always borrow from
Court, 20 Nov. 1988) and "Topographische Land Karten" decision, 1 ZR 23285 (Federal Supreme
Court, 2 July 1987). While the Inkasso decision limited copyright protection to programs demon-
strating an "obviously above-average creative achievement," the lower courts have reportedly been
less strict regarding the creative level. In practice, "it is sufficient that an expert versed in com-
puter programs confirms the existence of a certain novelty that could not be achieved by an 'aver-
age computer programmer."' Lehman, The Legal Protection of Computer Programs in Germany:
A Summary of the Present Situation, 19 INT'L RE V. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (HQC) 473, 474-76
(1988). But see Kindermann, supra note 120, at 206 (suggesting that some BGH decisions have
relaxed the standard of eligibility for borderline utilitarian works and downplaying the importance
of the Inkasso decision). In these and earlier cases, the Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany has attempted to align the standard of eligibility for computer programs with the higher
standard of creativity previously applied to industrial designs (applied art) and engineering dia-
grams. See, e.g., Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 333-40 ("Partial Cumula-
tion in the German Manner"). This alignment goes too far. In contrast, the Batlin standard of
substantial creativity, recommended in the text, remains a soft and workable standard that avoids
the rigidity of the Inkasso standard in the Federal Republic.
264. The first decision on microcode, arising in the Ninth Circuit, has insisted on applying
the lowest possible standards of originality and creativity, devised for works of art, to the least
creative and most standardized form of computer program. See NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp., No.
C-84-20799-WPG, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1989).
265. See infra note 270.
266. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 3, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24 (empha-
sizing the need for permissions).
268. See id.
269. See Conference Report, supra note 242, at 8-10 ("Guidelines for Program
Development").
270. Karjala, supra note 105, at 39; see also, Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 224, at 30, 61;
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one another; indeed, they must do so to remain scientifically valid.271
a. Aberrations of the "Unity of Literature" Approach
When a second researcher analyzes previously copyrighted
software, the knowledge he gains enables the aggrieved owner of copy-
right to establish that the second comer had "access" to the pro-
gram-that is, a legal opportunity to copy it.272 Proof of access can lead
to heightened judicial scrutiny of program similarities and, at least in
courts that apply the strong-arm tactics some commentators recom-
mend,273 to a presumption of copying even when mostly unprotectable
similarities are detected. 4 In short, if expert witnesses detect similari-
ties in a second program, its academic originators may have difficulty
proving independent creation despite the paper trail that they are likely
to leave behind.275
If the second programmer or his university invokes the fair use de-
fense, this doctrine should, of course, provide a refuge so long as a dis-
pute over proprietary rights remains in a purely academic setting.
Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similar-
ity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264, 1291 (1984).
271. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 249, at 149 (observing that "advances necessarily include
much that is taken from the existing base"); Samuelson, supra note 177 (stressing that the nature
of technologies, which are built upon each other, requires technicians to look at prior work); see
also Menell, supra note 171, at 1357 & n.163 (remarking on the extent to which university research
has contributed to the development of operating systems programs during the period in which
universities were relatively indifferent to the availability of legal protection; querying effects of
new-found interest in commercialization of university research). See generally Stallman, supra
note 175 (discussing the spirit of scientific cooperation and the disincentives of hoarding
information).
272. Once ownership of a protected work is established, a successful action for infringement
typically requires proof of access plus substantial similarity. Direct proof of infringement is seldom
available. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01[B].
273. See Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software
Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1985); Davidson, supra note 100, at 1080-604, 1115 (discuss-
ing black box model); see also Note, supra note 270, at 1294-1302 (iterative test). But see Gold-
stein, supra note 233, at 1124-26 (arguing that only thin protection is available for computer
programs).
274. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn.
1985); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985). But see Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831
F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the theory that strong proof of access diminishes the level of
substantial similarity required to establish infringement); Conference Report, supra note 242, at 8,
10 (stating that access does not show infringement until and unless some protected elements are
demonstrably taken).
275. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 249, at 149 (stating that substantial similarity between
"current advance and some prior work is the rule and not the exception"); see also Goldstein,
supra note 233, at 1126 n.29 (noting that infringement requires unlawful appropriation, not proof
of copying alone; criticizing M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1988) in this
regard).
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These disputes, however, are more likely to arise after a software pro-
ject is exploited commercially, with or without the support of the origi-
nator's university, in which case the question of who copied what will
surface in a business context. Conflicting claims over technical revi-
sions, improvements, and adaptations are of primary concern here, be-
cause these efforts will result in the commercial payoff and determine
who controls any software packages that are derived from the original
project and geared to different market segments. At this point the
bottom falls out of the fair use defense because the Supreme Court has
fashioned a nearly conclusive presumption that unauthorized use of an-
other's work for commercial gain is unfair by definition if the elements
of infringement have been established. 7
This leaves the idea-expression defense and a body of precedents
affording functional works relatively "thin" protection in copyright
law.278 These two notions traditionally worked hand in hand. The func-
tionality of a work would induce the courts to narrow the quantum of
actionable expression; to perceive infringement only in the presence of
close imitation;2 79 and to override the exclusive rights of reproduction if
they indirectly prevented third parties from using functional features
embodied in or conveyed by otherwise copyrightable works of art and
literature."' No matter which of these solutions courts have adopted in
276. See, e.g., Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cases cited
supra note 274; see also Maier, supra note 59, at 158; Menell, supra note 171, at 1336 (noting
greatly increased demand for general purpose application packages); Stallman, supra note 175, at
4.
277. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). But see Raskind, supra
note 235, at 1175-82 ("Toward a Proper Application of Fair Use to Software"); infra note 288.
278. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel
Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1189 (2d Cir. 1975); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253
F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1945); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (thin
copyrights); Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1121-22.
279. See supra note 278; Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1124 (discussing judicial tendencies to
protect a narrow range of "equivalents" in such cases so that underlying function is not monopo-
lized). The Conference Report states:
[T]he quantum of protectable expression.., varies with the nature of the work. Courts have
treated artistic works ... as predominantly expressive ... Works in which functional ele-
ments predominate, such as rulebooks, architectural plans, and business forms, generally ex-
hibit only limited expressive elements and have correspondingly received less protection
under copyright law.
Conference Report, supra note 242, at 3 (quoting tentative draft).
280. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103. The Court stated:
The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it
may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described. . . . The fact that
the art [is] described in the book by illustrations of lines and figures which are reproduced in
practice in the application of the art, makes no difference. Those illustrations are the mere
language employed by the author to convey his ideas more clearly. Had he used words of
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particular cases, their reasoning uniformly has stressed the need to en-
sure that manufacturers of borderline utilitarian works could not em-
ploy the copyright law, with its low threshold of eligibility, to
monopolize functional features that failed to meet the much stricter cri-
teria for patent protection."sl
Notwithstanding this robust tradition derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in Baker v. Selden,282 the promoters of strong copy-
right protection for computer software2 8 have so far managed to con-
vince influential courts that software deserves a better deal and that
more aggressive standards of infringement should apply.2 4 These courts
believe that copyright protection for the coded instructions alone is too
weak; and that the concept of "copyrightable expression" may embrace
even functional and standardized features of user interfaces 285 or ele-
description instead of diagrams (which merely stand in the place of words), there could not be
the slightest doubt that others, applying the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the
lines and diagrams which were in the author's mind, and which he thus described by words
in his book.
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive
right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs
to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the
world the useful knowledge which it contains.
Id. (emphasis added); see also H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LTERARY PROPERTY 126, 274-
77, 281, 391-95 (1944)(citing cases); A. WEIL, AmERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 191, 209, 411-12 (1917);
infra note 288 and accompanying text.
281. See cases cited supra note 278. The Court in Baker v. Selden stated: "To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its
novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters-patent, not of copyright." Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102.
It should be stressed that the Supreme Court expressly exempted true literary and artistic
works from the sweep of its opinion:
Of course, these observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial
illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their essence,
and their object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation. This is their final end.
They are as much the product of genius and the result of composition, as are the lines of the
poet or the historian's periods. On the other hand, the teachings of science and the rules and
methods of useful art have their final end in application and use; and this application and use
are what the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches them.
Id. at 103-04.
282. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
283. See supra note 273; see also Clapes, Lynch, & Steinberg, Silicon Epics and Binary
Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA
L. R.v. 1493 (1987); Davidson, Protecting Software, supra note 197; Hauptman, A Perspective on
"Look and Feel" and "SSO", Paper Presented to the LaST Frontier Conference on Software Pro-
tection, Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology, Arizona State College of Law (Feb-
ruary 13-14, 1989).
284. Despite disagreement among commentators and "a variety of analytical styles[,] the
cases indicate a widespread and highly protectionist attitude toward intellectual creations involv-
ing computer software." Karjala, supra note 105, at 35; see cases cited infra note 286.
285. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softkone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
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ments of structure, sequence, and organization.2 86 These courts are also
persuaded that the old idea-expression doctrine assimilates all posterior
judicial limitations on the exclusive rights to reproduce utilitarian
works.287 In reality, doctrines overriding the reproduction rights were
functionally and historically distinct until a leading commentator's
strained reading of Baker v. Selden began to narrow the issues from the
1950s on. ss
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Hauptman, supra note 283.
286. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Pearl Sys,, Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (problem of functional compatibility), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1987).
287. See Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d 1222; supra notes 285-86.
288. See 1 M. NiMMzR & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 2.18[A], [B] (carrying forward an
interpretation of Baker v. Selden that was launched in the earliest editions of Professor Nimmer's
celebrated treatise). Following the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden, a few courts
perverted its teaching about infringement into a de facto substantive prerequisite of eligibility
that disqualified works "intended for use." See id § 2.18[B][1]. But a "purpose test" or "end use
test" of this kind confuses the concept of a work of authorship with its material support (see 17
U.S.C. § 202 (1982)) and is rejected by all developed copyright systems. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra
note 75, at 238-42. This end-use test of eligibility properly was rejected by the United States Su-
preme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); and it was Professor Melville Nimmer's efforts
to justify and explain this decision that led him to reinterpret the larger tradition derived from
Baker v. Selden. See 1 M. NImR & D. NiMMER, supra note 42, §§ 2.18[C][2], 2.18[D].
Unfortunately, Professor Nimmer's efforts to dispatch Baker v. Selden as a false barrier to
eligibility led him to introduce an even greater fallacy than the purpose test by assimilating the
entire Baker v. Selden tradition at the infringement stage to the much earlier idea-expression
dichotomy. See id. § 2.18[D] (stating that Mazer's emphasis on the idea-expression distinction
constitutes "The Proper Limits of Baker v. Selden"). Based on this interpretation, Baker v. Sel-
den would have been superfluous at the time it was handed down, because the idea-expression
doctrine dates back to the earliest origins of both domestic and foreign copyright law, and it was
readily available to the Court if that was the point it had wanted to make. See, e.g., E. DRONE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES 93 (1879) (reprint ed. 1972) (restricting literary property to "the intellectual crea-
tion. . . embodied in ... language" and recognizing "no property in thoughts, conceptions, ideas,
sentiments ... apart from their association"); F. PERRLEr, supra note 75, at 134-58 (reviewing idea-
expression distinction in comparative copyright law).
In reality, the historical role of Baker v. Selden was to override the exclusive reproduction
rights as applied to utilitarian works in a very particular set of circumstances. These were cases in
which the standard defenses (including idea-expression) appeared insufficient to guarantee a third
party's right to use functional features embodied in the work because that use seemed to entail an
unauthorized reproduction of the protected work, including its actionable subject matter. The de-
cision in Baker v. Selden authorized the reproduction in the event of such a conflict in order to
facilitate use of the unprotectable utilitarian features as such. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at
103. The Court stated:
The fact that the art [is] described in the book by illustrations of lines and figures which are
reproduced in the application of the art, makes no difference . . . Had he used words of
description instead of diagrams. . . there could not be the slightest doubt that others, apply-
ing the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams. which he [the
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How this curious state of affairs came about and whether it will
author] thus described by words in his book . . . The copyright of a work on mathematical
science cannot give . . . an exclusive right to the methods of operation . . . or to the dia-
grams he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever
occasion requires.
Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 280 (quoting the passage in full); see also H. BALL, supra
note 280, at 124 (discussing idea-expression); id. at 125-26 (discussing cases in which the reproduc-
tion right was overridden to permit use of nonprotectable matter); id. at 274-82 (illustrating over-
ride of reproduction right as a special instance of fair use derived from Baker v. Selden); id. at
396-98 (noninfringement of technical drawings, citing Baker v. Selden, among others); A. WElL,
supra note 280, at 191, 411-12 (emphasizing the role of Baker v. Selden as a limitation on the
reproduction right and not as a test of copyrightability).
To the extent that Baker v. Selden limited the reproduction right in this way, it subordinated
copyright protection of functional works to the predominance of the patent paradigm. See supra
note 281 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103-04); see also 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1982) (codify-
ing one branch of this same tradition). From the modern perspective, the role of Baker v. Selden
was simply to prevent the reproduction right from operating as a de facto droit de destination, or
right to control end use, in the borderline zone of utilitarian works. Such a right of end use is,
perhaps, justifiable for artistic works. Compare, e.g., F. GOTZEN, HET BESTEMMINGSRECHT VAN DE
AUTEUR (French summary 1975) (describing and supporting the right to control end use) and Des-
urmont, The Author's Right to Control the Destination of Copies Reproducing His Work, 12
CoLuM.-VLA JL. & ARTS 481, 502-04 (1988) with 1 M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, §
2.18[A (noting: "Thus, the mere fact that rights granted under the Copyright Act may indirectly
result in a monopoly of use of the copyrighted work will not prevent the enforcement of such
rights, notwithstanding the absence of an expressly granted 'right of use' "). See generally Annual
Study Session of the Association Litteraire et Artistque Internationale (ALAI), On "Issues Involv-
ing the Distribution of Exemplars of Protected Works." Munich (Oct. 5-8, 1988) (proceedings
forthcoming 1989) (dealing with the droit de destination). But such a right becomes pernicious
when it enables the copyright owner to control the end use of functional features embodied in or
conveyed by a utilitarian work.
The pristine application of Baker v. Selden, in other words, was as a species of "fair use"
devised for utilitarian works and understood as such by Nimmer's immediate predecessors. See,
e.g., H. BALL, supra note 280, at 274-78 (routinely citing Baker v. Selden in context of fair use of
"Books on Science or the Useful Arts"); cf. Conference Report, supra note 242, at 9-10 (tentative
draft) (suggesting enlarged role for fair use doctrine to permit reverse engineering of computer
programs). In this sense Baker v. Selden expressed a general limiting principle, applicable to the
reproduction rights in utilitarian works of both art and literature, from which the more specific
rules pertaining to designs of useful articles were derived and codified in the bizarre language of 17
U.S.C. § 113(b) (1982). See Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1201-08 (ex-
plaining the evolution of § 113(b) as codified in the 1976 Act).
That Baker v. Selden meant something different from the Nimmer interpretation was still
clear to Professor Kaplan of Harvard in the mid-1960s. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 244, at 63-66
(stating that "the privilege extends to exact copies," criticizing the "regrettable backsliding" to
idea-expression in Continental Casualty, and approving that "buildings. . . may. . . be copied
down to the last square foot of glass-front" despite the existence of copyrighted blueprints); see
also id. at 49, 57 (disapproving any notion of a right to control end use). It was partly the insis-
tence of Kaplan (and of his ally at the time, Professor Arthur Miller) on the need to clarify the
application of Baker v. Selden to computer programs that delayed further action on the General
Revision Bills as they stood in 1967. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 579-81 (1967) [hereinafter CLR Senate Hearings], reprinted in 9 OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REvIsION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (statement by B.
Kaplan, Co-chairman, Legal Task Force, Interuniversity Communications Council (EDUCOM));
CLR Senate Hearings, supra, at 570-78, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra (Statement by
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last long are topics beyond the scope of this Article.28 9 Professor Karjala
suggests that courts are worried that the software industry is the last
EDUCOM Board of Trustees and Legal Task Force, opposing protection for computer programs
partly because third parties "must be given the accompanying privilege to replicate the program in
order to carry out the process or practice the art" under Baker v. Selden; id. at 572-73, reprinted
in LEGISLATIWE HISTORY, supra (Testimony and Statement of Arthur Miller, Co-chairman,
EDUCOM Legal Task Force, opposing copyright protection of computer programs partly because
it would extend "patentlike protection under the guise of copyright" to the functional process and
because no provision prevents the copyright from "incorporat[ing] the art, process or scheme...
fixed in the program"). For a critical view of Miller's later conversion to the maxiprotectionist
camp, see Samuelson, supra note 126, at 506 n.182.
However, the clarification put forward by the Copyright Office and eventually enacted by Con-
gress simply restated the subject-matter exclusions built around the idea-expression doctrine that
now appear in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). In other words, Congress codified only that much of
Baker v. Selden as overlapped the idea-expression approach elaborated by Professor Nimmer. See
1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 2.18[D] (stating that "lIthe present Copyright Act
properly codifies this more limited reading of Baker v. Selden"). Congress also deliberately ex-
empted works that "convey information" from the definition of useful articles in § 101 and from
the limitations of § 113(b), in keeping with the Copyright Office's "unity of literature" approach to
computer programs enunciated in the early 1960s. See Cary, Copyright Registration and Com-
puter Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 362 (1964) (Cary was Deputy Register of Copyrights);
Copyright Office of the United States, Copyright Registration for Computer Programs-Announce-
ment from the Copyright Office, reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 361 (1964); supra note
243.
Because Professor Nimmer was the only leading American academic to embrace the French
"unity of art" thesis with regard to industrial art, see Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra
note 61, at 1211 n.347, he could hardly object to a "unity of literature" approach to industrial
literature. See infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text. On the contrary, Nimmer was consistent,
even if the schizoid law that he helped to shape was not. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to exclude industrial art on the basis of a separability
criterion and dualist principles) and id. § 113(b) (expressly permitting use or reverse engineering
of useful articles portrayed in two-dimensional form, notwithstanding the making of an unautho-
rized reproduction) with id. § 101 (defining literary works to include industrial literature without
reservation or reference to separability from utilitarian functions) and id. § 101 (defining "useful
articles" to exclude articles that "convey information") and id. § 113(b) (no express limitation on
the reproduction right with regard to verbal or symbolic portraits of mechanical or utilitarian arti-
cles). For further discussion, see also supra note 242; and Wharton, supra note 224, at 454-55
(recognizing problem of computer programs as verbal "blueprints for machines" and the operation
of machines).
That Baker v. Selden itself squarely rejected any distinction between the treatment of verbal
blueprints and the limitations on graphic blueprints is a point that cannot be overemphasized:
Had he used words of description instead of diagrams (which merely stand in the place of
words), there could not be the slightest doubt that others, applying the art to practical use,
might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams...
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103. Moreover, Professor Nimmer expressly conceded that Congress,
in enacting § 102(b) without reference to Baker v. Selden, did not intend to exhaust or reject the
larger tradition epitomized by this case. See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 42, § 2.18[B]
n.15 (stating that "[tihe full Baker v. Selden doctrine, discussed in this subsection, is neither ac-
cepted nor rejected by the Act . . ." and its "application is rather left to the courts"). What is
sorely needed at the present juncture is for the courts to develop a clearer and more aggressive
application of this larger tradition.
289. See generally Samuelson, supra note 59 (explaining and criticizing the CONTU REPORT,
supra note 110); Samuelson, supra note 126 (suggesting that the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 indicates the direction that software protection should take in the future).
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bastion of American technological superiority and that the current pro-
tectionist zeal is motivated by an implicit view of appropriate interna-
tional trade policy. 90 If this view is correct, a close parallel exists
between this situation and the aberrations that occurred toward the
end of the nineteenth century, when France pressed the Berne Union
countries to absorb industrial designs into their domestic copyright laws
under the banner of a "unity of art" rationale.29'
The tenacious opposition of the United States eventually halted
this movement and led to the reconfirmation of industrial designs as
subject matter within the ambit of the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property.292 Ironically, the decision of the French
Government in 1985 to assimilate computer programs to the treatment
of applied art under the Berne Convention293 could similarly impede
the "unity of literature" doctrine launched by the United States Copy-
right Office in 1964.294 France's decision could also pave the way for sui
generis protection of industrial literature in the medium or long term,295
as attested by the draft law on computer programs that Switzerland
nearly adopted.296
b. Too Much Protection for Too Many Software Designs
Meanwhile, it seems undeniable that the structure, sequence, and
organization of a computer program is precisely the kind of subject
matter that patent law ought to have embraced in the 1970s, but failed
290. Karjala, supra note 105, at 35 (Professor Karjala thinks overprotection of this kind is
counterproductive). For an express view of international trade policy, couched in these terms, that
has exerted considerable influence, see J. Gorlin, A Trade-Based Approach for the International
Copyright Protection for Computer Software (Sept. 1, 1985) (unpublished paper) (copy on file at
the Vanderbilt Law School). At least one author predicts that the protectionist wave in copyright
law will recede once patent law more fully exercises its new role in the field of software. Maier,
supra note 59, at 161. But this scenario is doubtful if nonobviousness retains its traditional force.
See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
291. See Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1153-58; supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
292. Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1159 n.85, 1161 n.91, 1165.
293. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (cases of France and Switzerland).
294. See, e.g., J. Gorlin, supra note 290, at 41 n.42 (observing that if a GATT Code on Intel-
lectual Property "[h]ad been in effect, the United States could have used the GATT as a forum for
consultations with France on the present draft bill granting 25 year copyright protection for
software"). For the position of the Copyright Office in 1964, see supra note 288.
295. Much depends on whether computer programs are seen as necessarily falling within the
Berne categories of literary or scientific works and whether the French attempt to draw a parallel
between computer programs and the subcategory of applied art will stick. If it does, unauthorized
copies of software made in France after 25 years might become freely exportable to other Euro-
pean Economic Community countries under cover of the Treaty of Rome. But see Kindermann,
supra note 120, at 220 (suggesting that the French provisions may boomerang against domestic
authors of computer programs).
296. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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to do so;297 and that the drafters of Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act had
precisely this kind of subject matter in mind when they denied protec-
tion to methods of operation, procedures, and processes."" Neverthe-
less, because some courts (but not others) have acquiesced in
protectionist deviations from traditional copyright principles,2 9
software producers in certain jurisdictions stand to obtain a relatively
hard form of protection for a long period of time on the softest possible
terms."' 0 As far as use of another's innovative research results is con-
cerned, this protection can make the software copyright more broadly
restrictive and intrusive than if the first comer had actually obtained a
patent.30 1
If a sui generis law were enacted, its drafters would have tried to
297. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. For an excellent analysis, see Ghidini, I
Programmi per computers fra brevetto e diritto d'autore, 1984 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 251,
256-69. Professor Ghidini accurately foresaw most of the problems posed by the Whelan decision
before it arrived on the scene.
298. See Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1125. "To use the jargon of the patent lawyers, section
102's statement of what copyright does not protect virtually 'reads on' section 101's statement of
what computer programs are." Id. See generally supra note 288 (discussing testimony at Senate
Hearings in 1967).
299. Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986) (protecting structure, sequence, and organization), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1987) with
Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining
to do likewise) and Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 426 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding structure not copyrightable). For other limiting principles, see: Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (copying of plaintiff's program in memory for
purposes of analyzing its manner of operation held privileged under the archival exemption of §
117(2); the court found no per se infringement of reproduction rights under § 106 merely because
the program was put to unintended uses); Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing use of idea despite some evidence of reproduction); and E.F. Johnson
Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (conceding legitimacy of reverse engineer-
ing in principle, though iterative test of infringement applied).
300. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 242, at 6 (criticizing this result); see also Gold-
stein, supra note 233, at 1123, 1126. Goldstein stated that "in the copyright lexicon, 'idea' is no
more than a metaphor for elements generally belonging in the public domain. The functions that
Whelan was disposed to characterize as protectable expression are more accurately characterized
as unprotectable ideas." Id.; see also Karjala, supra note 249, at 159-60 (discussing the protection
of technological efficiencies in copyright law).
301. See, e.g., Karjala, The First Case on Protection of Operating Systems and Reverse En-
gineering of Programs in Japan, 10 Eun. INTELL. PRop. REV. (EIPR) 172, 174 (1988) [hereinafter
Karjala, First Case] (stating that "[t]o protect operating system programs even where copying or
near-copying is necessary to achieve compatibility... can result in a long-term monopoly for the
first to achieve de facto standard status" (emphasis in original)); Karjala, supra note 249, at 149
(discussing the overprotective effects of the substantial similarity test). That copyright protection
of computer programs could block the progress of the art was predicted by a high-level commission
of experts reporting to the French government in 1983. See Working Group, National Institute of
Industrial Property (INPI), Toward the Protection of Computer Software: Present Situation and
Proposals [Vers une protection des logiciels informatiques: Situation actuelle et propositions],
Extracts of the Report of the Working Group Established under the Auspices of INPI (France)
[hereinafter INPI REPORT], reprinted in 23 INDUS. PROP. 348, 353 (1984).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:639
balance public and private interests in a deal that reflects the econom-
ics of software innovation rather than the standard economic assump-
tions underlying the patent and copyright models. 2  In the absence of
such a law, university investigators and administrators, like their coun-
terparts in the private sector, face a bewildering and contradictory mix
of legal devices that tend innately to foster conditions of overprotection
or underprotection.3 0 3 Arguably, the full patent approach confers too
much protection on too few software designs;30 4 the traditional copy-
right approach gives too little protection to too many software de-
signs;30 5 and the rough-and-tumble copyright approach of this brave
new era affords far too much protection to far too many software
designs.306
As a result, university personnel working with computer technolo-
gies find themselves in a quandary. When their own program is at
stake, they and their universities will want strong protection in order to
preserve their commercial advantages. When someone else's program is
in question, they will want soft protection in order to borrow as freely
as possible and to conduct research without legal interference.307 They
will also demand the right to make improvements and even to commer-
cialize the end product of these improvements,308 while claiming they
have not violated the first comer's exclusive rights to make reproduc-
302. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 126, at 501-31. See generally Menell, supra note 171, at
1359-72; Menell, supra note 224 (discussing economics of software).
303. See, e.g., Hoffman & Karny, Can Justice Keep Pace with Science?, 10 EuR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. (EIPR) 355-58 (1988). For a discussion of parallel cycles in the realm of industrial art
and their deeper implications for world intellectual property law, see Reichman, supra note 5, part
II.
304. See, e.g., Kidwell, supra note 173, at 544-49; supra note 176 and accompanying text.
305. See Conference Report, supra note 242, at 3-4; supra note 278 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 242, at 6 (criticizing broad protection of com-
puter programs). But see Clapes, Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 283, at 1576-84 (declaring broad
copyright protection to be appropriate and critical for the development of computer programs).
For a contrasting viewpoint, see Latman, Fifteen Years After Mazer v. Stein: A Brief Perspective,
16 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 278, 285-86 (1969) (claiming that the doctrine of separability, without a
sui generis design law, gives too much protection to too few industrial designs).
307. Cf., e.g., Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 12, at 16. Landes and Posner
noted the same point:
[t]o the extent that a later author is free to borrow material from an earlier one, the later
author's cost of expression is reduced; and from an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an
earlier author from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later author
himself. In his former role, he desires maximum copyright protection for works he creates; in
his latter role he prefers minimum protection for works created earlier by others. In principle,
there is some level of copyright protection that balances these two competing interests opti-
mally...
Id.
308. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985); Stallman, supra note 175.
698
1989] COMPUTER PROGRAMS
tions and to prepare derivative works.309
How these tensions will work out in specific cases remains to be
seen, but the proliferation of docketed infringement actions suggests a
growing propensity among commercial software producers to sue and be
sued.31 0 In the long run, the software industry itself may well demand a
different, more tailor-made form of protection that is closer to the ap-
proach that France began to develop in 1985,311 especially if foreign
technology begins to make bigger inroads on the world market and do-
mestic firms find themselves hoisted on their own protectionist pe-
tards3 12 Meanwhile, if the aggressive mentality fashionable in the
309. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(l)-(2), 117 (1982). Another problem on the horizon is the use of "tool"
programs that interact with data stored in other programs to produce a new work. See, e.g., Marks,
supra note 176, at 3, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24; see also Telerate Sys. Inc. v. Caro, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
310. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Mosaic Software, Inc., No. 87-0074-K (D. Mass. Jan. 12,
1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, No. 87-0076-K (D. Mass. Jan. 12, 1987),
noted in Goldberg, Copyright Protection for Computer Software, Paper Presented to the LaST
Frontier Conference on Computer Software, Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology,
Arizona State University College of Law (February 13-14, 1989); Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp. No. C-88-20149-RPA (N.D., Cal. Mar. 17, 1987); Ashton-Tate v. Fox Software, Inc., No. 88-
6837-TJH (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1988); see also Dvorak, Sue You, Sue Me, PC MAG., Apr. 28, 1987, at
65; Schwartz, Software Industry Stalled by Suits, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1987, at 3; Apple's Copy-
right Lawsuit Is Seen As Effort to Lock In Technical Lead, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1988, § 2, at 21,
col. 4.
311. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text; see also Conference Report, supra note
242, at 21, which notes that experts are divided regarding the optimal level of protection for com-
puter programs. The Conference Report then states:
If, over time the current regime of intellectual property protection for software is found to be
unsatisfactory, the possibility that some tailor-made statute might provide a better system of
protection will have to be faced, perhaps in conjunction with. . . similar problems posed by
other new technologies.
Id. at 21. But see generally Clapes, Lynch, & Steinberg, supra note 283; Gorlin, supra note 290;
Kindermann, supra note 120 (all of whom endorse the broadest forms of copyright protection). For
the record, Clapes, Lynch, Steinberg, and Kindermann are all senior patent attorneys in different
branches of IBM, the world's leading supplier of business machines; Gorlin and Hauptman are
consultants to the same corporation. For the different views of a senior patent attorney employed
at that same corporation in 1969, see Galbi, supra note 65.
312. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY-COPYRIGHT ISSUES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ACTION, COM (88) 172/
final, at 170, 175 (Brussels June 7, 1988) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER] (advocating suitable legal
environment to enable "[c]ommunity industry to catch up with its competitors"). While the Com-
mission blandly assumes copyright law to be the appropriate vehicle, it also blandly assumes: that
reverse engineering is consistent with this modality, id. at 183; that protocols and user interfaces
could be specifically excluded from protection, id. at 184; that copyright law should not interfere
with the legitimate development of compatible systems, id. at 184; and that copyright protection,
by requiring different implementations of basic structural solutions, will have no impact on stand-
ardization or efficiency, id. at 185. In short, the Commission's working vision of copyright protec-
tion for computer programs diverges so significantly from that promoted by maxiprotectionists in
the United States that it goes a long way toward meeting the concerns of those favoring a sui
generis approach! It also glosses over the deeper significance of the French decision to treat com-
puter programs as a sort of neighboring right, on a parallel with works of applied art. See supra
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private sector is transferred to the university environment, administra-
tors relying on copyright law to commercialize computer software could
expose themselves to the risk of considerable litigation, which could
cause the pace of software research and development to slacken over
time.313
C. Distribution Without Dissemination
If Congress decided to protect intermediate technologies with a sui
generis regime, it could provide universities with a marketable certifi-
cate of title to a discrete body of innovative know-how that would be no
harder to police than existing forms of industrial property.3 14 A univer-
sity that qualified for such a title might then be in a position to license
these technologies, including computer software, for commercial distri-
bution without undue constraints on the freedom of faculty and stu-
dents to publish or otherwise disclose their contributions. Instead,
because Congress chose to protect computer programs in copyright law,
universities face all the legal uncertainties described above plus the
practical difficulties of enforcement that make trade secret law, and the
practice of actual secrecy, a routine part of current software
protection.3 15
1. Dual Protection of Source Codes as Trade Secrets
Third parties seeking to compete with the vendor of an innovative
and successful computer program labor under considerable disadvan-
tages when denied access to the creator's original source code. The com-
plete source code normally is composed in high-level (i.e., human-
readable) language. It explains why the originator devised the various
sets of solutions in particular ways and why he or she combined them
into an overall configuration that differs from other design solutions
that may appear plausible to a second comer." 6
note 121 and accompanying text. However, a Directive on Computer Programs issued by the Com-
mission reportedly takes a hard-line, full copyright approach.
313. At least one computer scientist believes that the pace of development has already
slowed down as scientists "hoard information" in order to maximize profits from proprietary
rights. See Stailman, supra note 175, at 2, 4-5.
314. See, e.g., Galbi, supra note 65; Samuelson, supra note 126, at 472-76, 519-31. See gener-
ally Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, supra note 82, in PATENTS IN PERSPEcTIVE,
supra note 82, at 68, 79-80.
315. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 147, at 919-31, 939-54, 958; Samuelson, supra note 126, at
518-19.
316. See, e.g., G. DAVIS, SOFTWARE PROTECTION 15-19 (1985); H. HANNEMAN, THE PATENTABIL-
ITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 23-25 (1985); Davidson, supra note 100, at 1080-1100.
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a. Nondisclosure as a Business Imperative
A would-be competitor who is denied access to the originator's
source code may nonetheless reconstruct a skeletal version of it by us-
ing special computer programs to decompile and reverse engineer the
object code contained in any copy of the program that the competitor
happens to obtain. The reconstructed source code, though imperfect
and perhaps distorted, can reveal the structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion of the original design. Lacking the explanations contained in the
originator's source code, however, a second comer still has to master its
internal logic on his own in order to equal its efficiency without dupli-
cating its copyrightable components. 17
Acquiring this knowledge costs money and takes time. The ulti-
mate technical success and consumer appeal of the competitor's sub-
stantially different design also remain to be demonstrated. To some
extent, reverse engineering obliges a second comer to reinvent parts of a
wheel that worked well in the past but that may not work equally well
in their reinvented form.3 18
To minimize these risks, competitors seeking to capitalize on a first
comer's successful program are prone to shorten the originator's lead
time by duplicating crucial segments of a complex program as revealed
through decompilation. This strategy ensures rapid functional success
at a relatively low cost, and it reduces the risk of ultimate technical
failure. The cruder forms of appropriation by these means are the most
likely to trigger liability for copyright infringement under the emerging
judicial decisions. 1 9 Artful infringers can make it difficult and expen-
sive for a plaintiff to demonstrate actionable copying to the satisfaction
of a court or jury.320
317. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 100, at 1094-1099; Karjala, First Case, supra note 301, at
174-77. The right to make such a version from a licensed copy, however, would often be restricted
in the license agreement. Once made, the reconstructed source code lacks the deeper underlying
concepts of the originator and the commentary to explain it. The second comer who has to spend a
lot of time figuring out why the originator did what he did and then how to do it differently may
find a license cheaper than reverse engineering. The legal significance of working from a recon-
structed source code is not yet settled. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
318. See Davidson, supra note 100, at 1080-81, 1090-94 (noting that "[tihis black box ap-
proach does require the wheel to be continually reinvented. . . [as] the price to be paid for prop-
erly rewarding innovation").
319. See id. at 1095-97. "Thus, decompilation puts would-be copiers in a bind: if they decom-
pile, their development will be faster, but they may have left 'smoking guns' in their code: if they
do not decompile, they are cleansed from copyright infringement but they may have extreme diffi-
culty in achieving compatibility." Id. at 1096; see also Clapes, Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 283,
at 1506-10.
320. Clapes, Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 283, at 1575-78; see also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
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Copyright infringement is not, however, a necessary consequence of
reverse engineering merely because it serves to shorten the originator's
lead time.2 ' A third party with knowledge of the source code, for exam-
ple, can freely use the ideas and other unprotectable matter it contains
in order to enhance functional efficiency and to accelerate market en-
try.322 While implementing such a scheme may require considerable ef-
fort (which reinforces the originator's own competitive advantages) 23
careful avoidance of clearly protectable matter should, in principle, suf-
fice to derail an originator's action for infringement.324 Even if some
321. See Conference Report, supra note 242, at 9-10 (treating reverse engineering as a form
of fair use); supra note 288 (implications of pristine version of Baker v. Selden); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989) (stressing the role that reverse
engineering of unpatented technology plays in fulfilling the goals of the patent system).
322. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Servs., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1987); Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Conference Report,
supra note 242, at 4-5. The end product may so improve upon the original that its incremental
efficiencies will increase its marketability at the expense of the first comer's own product. In an
environment of sane and healthy competition, this result would be regarded as optimal. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 270, at 1291-94; see also Raskind, supra note 235, at 385-403 (discussing § 906(a)
of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984).
323. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 100, at 1096-98.
324. Conference Report, supra note 242, at 4-5; see also Karjala, First Case, supra note 301,
at 175-77 (noting that the inability to reverse engineer unprotected ideas and methods would be
inconsistent with copyright law and the treatment of traditional technology); Laurie & Everett,
Protection of Trade Secrets in Object Form Software: The Case for Reverse Engineering, 1 CoM-
PUTER L. 4-8 (1984); sources cited supra note 322.
If the competitor obtains useful knowledge by reverse engineering the object-code version of a
program otherwise legally obtained, but uses only noncopyrightable matter in the competing prod-
uct, he nonetheless may have executed an unauthorized reproduction along the way. The extent to
which a reproduction for analytical purposes that leads to little or no demonstrable use of protect-
able expression in the final product could trigger a finding of infringement remains controversial.
Compare, e.g., Davidson, supra note 100, at 1093-99 (denying that such reverse engineering can be
fair use or otherwise exempt from infringement) with Conference Report, supra note 242, at 9-10
and Karjala, supra note 105, at 78-88, 90-92 and Laurie & Everett, supra (expressing belief that
reverse engineering of unprotectable matter is either not infringement under § 102(b) or is fair use
under § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act) and Note, supra note 270, at 1264.
The ability to make copies for reverse engineering purposes under the shelter of 17 U.S.C. §
117 (1982) was arguably strengthened by Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988), which reinforces the notion that § 117 need not and should not conflict with § 102(b). For
the view that the fair use doctrine codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 further buttresses the case for
reverse engineering, see Raskind, supra note 235, at 1175-82; and supra note 288. But see W.
PATRY, supra note 235, at 399-402.
If the subject-matter exclusions of § 102(b) mean what they say and if Baker v. Selden, means
what it meant before recent obfuscations, see supra note 288, then reverse engineering of the ob-
ject code embodied in or near the mechanically functioning components should not constitute ac-
tionable infringement unless a significant quantum of protectable matter is carried over to the
competing product. Otherwise, the reproduction right of §106 will enable some copyright owners to
control indirectly the end use of the utility features embodied in utilitarian works, contrary to the
pristine teaching of Baker v. Selden. See supra note 288 (elaborating on the historical role of
Baker v. Selden); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (statute derived from the larger principles of Baker v.
Selden, which serves to legitimate copies of buildings and useful articles made from any three-
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actionable matter is borrowed, a third party who takes the trouble to
vary significantly the formal aspects of a program may have done all
that is necessary to avoid the substantial similarity test of copyright
infringement 25 that traditionally is applied to utilitarian works.2 8
It follows that licensors seeking to maximize the commercial yield
from innovative software are well advised not to disclose the underlying
source code whenever possible. 27 Because physical possession of the
program enables a licensee to reconstruct a simplified version of the
source code through reverse compilation, the licensor must surround his
innovative know-how with a bevy of contractual provisions that will
later enable him to depend on state trade-secret laws in addition to the
federal copyright law.32 8 Whether appeals to dual protection will ulti-
mately surv ive attacks based on federal preemption of state intellectual
property law remains to be seen. 2' For the moment, the raw of trade
secrets is reportedly relied upon to protect more software than either
patent or copyright law acting alone.330
dimensional embodiments of them for purposes of reverse engineering; Reichtnan, Before the
Copyright Act, supra note 61, at 1201-08 (discussing the evolution of the present version of §
113(b) in context of proposed design legislation).
325. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1987); Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Whelan As-
soc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
326. See cases cited supra note 278 (addressing "thin" copyright doctrine); see also Confer-
ence Report, supra note 242, at 3-4; Goldstein, supra note 233, at 1123-24 (supporting narrow
range of equivalents lest function be monopolized); Karjala, supra note 105, at 94-96.
327. See, e.g., Karjala, First Case, supra note 301, at 176 (arguing that the prevention of
source code distribution helps to maintain monopoly over both copyrightable and nonprotectable
components of computer program).
328. See Laurie & Keefauver, supra note 246, reprinted in LaST Frontier Conference, supra
note 246, at 234-35 (arguing for the validity of such provisions). See generally 1 D. BENDER, supra
note 120, § 4A.01 to § 4A.03 (Chapter 4A entitled "Tradesecret, Contractual and Extralegal Pro-
tection of Software"); Bender, supra note 147, at 958.
329. Compare, e.g., Bender, supra note 147, at 934-39, 953-58 (asserting that trade secret
rights in copyrighted matter are not against copyright policy, will not invalidate the copyright, and
are not generally preempted under 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), even though computer programs would
be a logical candidate for preemption if other prerequisites were met) with Samuelson, supra note
126, at 518-19 (labeling dual protection in copyright and trade secret law as "highly
questionable").
330. 1 D. BENDER, supra note 120, 4A.01, at 4A-2.1 to 4A-3. For illustrative cases in which
trade secret law played a crucial role, see Telerate System, Inc. v. Caro, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1740
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)(plaintiff showed likelihood of proving that its "protocol" governing communica-
tions between its computer and remote terminals was trade secret that defendants had misappro-
priated); and Q-Co. Industries, 625 F. Supp. 608 (while use of plaintiff's ideas did not constitute
copyright infringement, means of obtaining them amounted to misappropriation under liberal
reading of state trade secret law). But see Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d 1256 (use of ideas was neither
copyright infringement nor misappropriation under strict reading of state trade secret law.)
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b. Ethics of Nondisclosure in the Business of Blab
Even a minimalist university that seriously wants to protect
software must resort to trade secret laws (and actual secrecy) to pre-
serve the confidentiality of its source code, or it may soon have little
left to exploit. It must also defend its trade secret with a battery of
contractual restrictions on the use and disclosure of the materials made
available to outsiders.""' It will then have to combine these provisions
with any copyright or patent protection that it can obtain;3 32 and it
should not overlook the possibility of reinforcing its bundle of rights
with trademark protection as well.33
Suddenly, faculty and administrators caught in this situation will
find themselves dealing with a host of new technical problems that are
unfamiliar and operationally burdensome. They are also certain to face
conflicts with their academic mission 3 4 and other possible conflicts of
interest 3 5 that minimalist universities have always vowed to avoid. For
example, as occurred in the California Institute of Technology dispute
mentioned above,33 6 a university that claims ownership of the copyright
in computer software can try to suppress publication of the program
even when the instructor who created it opts for free and unfettered
dissemination. Whether or not a portent of the future, this incident il-
lustrates the tensions liable to arise when universities invoke trade se-
cret law to buttress any proprietary interests that they may acquire in a
faculty member's copyrightable know-how.
At bottom, a university's mission is to teach and disseminate
knowledge, while trade secret law requires a regime of absolute secrecy.
Under such a regime, neither the professor nor his graduate students
331. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 5, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. For a
comparable view, see Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 216, which discusses the need for secrecy in
biotechnology.
332. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 147, at 939-58 (discussing dual protection).
333. A university that owns patentable software may require ancillary measures of this kind
to buttress the effectiveness of its patent, while the nonpatentable elements of the program could
depend entirely on such measures. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 59, at 161 (describing the mesh of
copyright and patent protection that will provide a "unique continuum of intellectual property
protection in the software environment"); see also Marks, supra note 176, at 5, in Blacksburg
Conference, supra note 24. But see Samuelson, supra note 126, at 517-19 (arguing that the overlap
between patent law, copyright law, and trade secret law in software is undesirable from a policy
perspective).
334. See, e.g., Stallman, supra note 175.
335. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 5, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
336. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 601; supra note 197 and accompanying text. When
the creator of the program took steps to disseminate it to other physicists, the university report-
edly invoked a posterior claim of copyright ownership to prevent the distribution of copies that
threatened its financial interest. In the end, the instructor left the university and the program was
never perfected. See Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 616 (citing Kolata, Caltech Torn by Dispute over
Software, 220 SCmENCE 932, 933-34 (1983)).
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can publish,"2 7 and the former may even refrain from teaching the latter
the latest developments in the field. Unless faculty members take these
steps, the law will not defend their secrets from misappropriation by
commercially immoral means that serve to facilitate or avoid the task of
reverse engineering.35s On the contrary, trade secret law protects only
secrets that are kept from the public by all reasonable means at the
proprietor's disposal." ' Once these secrets are out, there is no further
need to reward innovators with unlimited exemptions from the normal
workings of the competitive marketplace.34 0
In effect, a regime of actual or legal secrecy imposed upon the aca-
demician in order to promote his and the university's proprietary rights
in computer software is tantamount to what happens when the national
security organs arrive on campus and inform the scientific community
that they can no longer reveal the nature of the important work they
are carrying out.34 ' Academics can live with this sort of regime, but not
very well. 42 Their reputations wax with publications and wane without
them, 43 while the attainment of commercial success from marketing
computer programs is never surefire.3 " Meanwhile, if the legal regime
requires professors to refrain from teaching and discussing the program
with graduate students not privy to a secrecy agreement,3 45 these stu-
dents may not want to study in that department anymore.
Nor can faculty members in this position console themselves with
the thought that their proprietary rights will at least help to organize
the development of computer science in the most efficient manner,3"4 as
337. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, § 1 comment, 14 U.LA 537, 543 (1979).
338. Trade secret law does not protect against reverse engineering. See id. § 1, 14 U.L.A. at
542; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
339. UNIF. TRADE SECRErs Acr § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. at 542 (1979) (now adopted in 20 states);
Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc., 85 IMI. App. 2d 350, 355, 228 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1967); see supra note 93.
340. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653 (1969); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989).
341. In the past, the pattern had been for the government to set up a separate shop just
outside the campus for delicate research. Muller, supra note 41, at 146-47.
342. See generally D. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 1-23, 71-90.
343. See Merton, supra note 14, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE, supra note 14, at 293, 336-37.
344. See Marks, supra note 176, at 5, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. Marks
stated:
In a software distribution system that places minimal emphasis on enforcing copyright re-
strictions, participating faculty cannot routinely expect to reap great economic rewards. Con-
sequently, college and university policies are likely to emphasize scholarly credit for
participating in development of computer software, and consideration of work in software
development will inevitably become routine in tenure evaluations and other assessments of
scholarly achievement.
Id.
345. See id. "Arrangements with the principal investigator's colleagues and graduate stu-
dents require special care." Id.
346. D. BoK, supra note 21, at 150 (noting that "[s]ecrecy, of course, is anathema to scientific
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arguably occurs with the patenting of more traditional research re-
sults. 34 7 Thus far, software has developed rapidly in a free-exchange en-
vironment; the optimum level of incentive remains undetermined;
3 48
and the current mix of patent, copyright, and trade secret laws may
actually harm, rather than advance, the cause of innovation both here
and abroad.349
Whatever the optimum level of protection turns out to be, reliance
on trade secret law arguably retards scientific progress by inhibiting
disclosure of the art or a releasing of it to the public domain.3 50 It also
conditions this progress on the practice of reverse engineering that
characterizes industrial competition 351-hardly a reassuring prospect in
the university environment. Add to this the chilling effect on software
innovation that may result from the current penchant for copyright liti-
gation 52 and from the failure of such litigation to yield doctrinal solu-
tions solid enough to ward off future litigation, and there is a lot to
trouble the conscientious university with a minimalist bent.
2. Licensing, Servicing, and the Spin-Off Corporations
Should administrators at the minimalist university nonetheless de-
cide that the game of software protection is worth the candle-a point
of view that makes a lot of sense-they must prepare to cope with other
problems that are certain to complicate their lives. To begin with, they
must locate potential buyers for commercially unproven software de-
signs, a task for which regular university personnel are singularly ill
progress").
347. See supra notes 12, 13-17 and accompanying text.
348. Conference Report, supra note 242, at 19-20.
349. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 249, at 149 (stating that application of copyright protec-
tion to computer programs "may well stifle rather than stimulate further advances"); Menell,
supra note 224 (forthcoming article will present more economic evidence to show risk of counter-
productive overprotection in copyright law). See generally Stallman, supra note 175. Nor is it
certain that any short-term trade advantages accruing to an exporting country that overprotects in
copyright law will not boomerang in the medium or long term when that country's domestic indus-
try must compete with advanced foreign technology invoking the same measure of overprotection
in the name of national treatment. See, e.g., Reichman, Intellectual Property in International
Trade: Opportunities and Risks of the GATT Connection, Paper delivered at the Vanderbilt Sym-
posium on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville, Ten-
nessee, March 23-24, 1989, 22 VAND. J. TRANSN'L. L. (forthcoming 1989) [hereinafter Reichman,
GATT Connection].
350. See, e.g., Karjala, First Case, supra note 301, at 176 (stating that "[c]omputer programs
are the technology for using computers, and limitations on source code distribution can seriously
impede the flow of technological knowledge concerning their development and use").
351. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate,
72 VA. L. REv. 677, 736-39 (1986).
352. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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equipped.353 In this endeavor, universities need to help each other by
networking and trading information about software users, distributors,
and investors. They might also devise a data bank for member universi-
ties that have technology to market, which could operate like the On-
line Computer Library Center (OCLC) does for library collections. 4
Even under the best of circumstances, marketing sophisticated technol-
ogy requires a professional staff in the development office, skilled attor-
neys in the legal counsel's office, highly specialized outside attorneys,
plus considerable time, effort, and expense.3 55 Marketing also demands
the close cooperation of program originators who must explain and
demonstrate their products in coordination with other university of-
ficers while still keeping a regular academic schedule.
Once a buyer is found, one can sometimes license software on a
nonexclusive basis while retaining all other rights to the innovation.
Universities prefer this route because it encourages diffusion of research
results.5 6 One drawback, however, is that this approach multiplies the
possibilities of exposing any trade secrets that the program may harbor.
It also weakens copyright protection by multiplying opportunities for
authorized access to the program, which could support competitors'
later claims of independent creation, and by devaluing the ideas em-
bodied in the program, which copyright law cannot protect. Nonexclu-
sive licenses are perhaps suitable for experimental applications by
trustworthy users, but their consistency with strong protection for a
commercially valuable program in the university context remains
undemonstrated. 57
An exclusive license with the originator retaining all rights to the
source code reduces insecurity, but it often presupposes the establish-
ment of a close relationship between the university and the firm chosen
to exploit the innovation.35 8 Computer programs are inherently unstable
and always in need of further adaptation. 59 The private corporation
353. See, e.g., Cawood, supra note 24, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
354. Such an effort called I-TEC, is being attempted in Illinois. See Giannisis, Willis &
Maher, supra note 161, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
355. See Gibson & Smilor, supra note 164, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
356. See Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13, at 536.
357. Exclusivity will restrict the grantor's own rights, especially the right to compete. See,
e.g., Hansen, Software Distribution, Remarketing and Publishing Agreements, 4 CompuTER L.J.
625, 635-36, 647 (1984).
358. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 5, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. An
institutional role in marketing may also be necessary to ensure that the university and faculty
members have opportunities to exploit and control follow-up projects derived from or related to
the original project.
359. See, e.g., Stalnan, supra note 175, at 4-5; see also Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted
Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 JuMaMTricS J. 179,
206-08 (1988).
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needs the computer scientist to adapt, explain, and debug, even if it
manages to obtain direct access to the source code."'0 Thus, when a uni-
versity retains the source code in order to enhance protection, it may
need to provide consultation and technical servicing (often on an emer-
gency basis) to the company that further develops and exploits the orig-
inal software innovation. Faculty and selected students may then need
to enter an ongoing business relationship with the purchasing firm. Un-
less the university demonstrates a willingness to provide the kind of
servicing that a potential investor needs, the university department
may lose the professor who created the software and some of his stu-
dents to boot, because they are now sorely needed by the exploiting
company. 61
There are different ways to cope with this problem. The university
can enter into a joint venture. It can purchase equity in the licensee or
in a new corporation in which the licensee is the primary participant. 62
It can also set up its own spin-off company to manage the source code
and service the licensee. 6 In general, the bigger the software innova-
tion, the more desirable it is for the university to possess some kind of
equity or participatory interest in the exploiting company that will re-
inforce bare proprietary rights under intellectual property law as well as
any contractual rights that define the university's overall objectives. 6 '
Participation in a spin-off company further ensures that the uni-
versity will continue to receive royalties from any programs that are
substantially derived from its initial project over time.6 5 The right to
these royalties is important because software development resembles
360. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 357, at 635, 636-39.
361. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 5-6, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. Stan-
ford's software distribution policy is a noble effort to balance all needs and demands. Stanford sets
up three tiers of distribution intensity. At the first tier, software is provided on a cost-recovery
basis under a nonexclusive license to academics and government agencies. At the second tier, a
nonexclusive license is granted for internal use by industrial firms for an annual royalty, but no
maintenance services are offered. Only at the third tier can a purchaser obtain maintenance ser-
vices. At that stage, Stanford grants a license to a private firm that develops and markets the
software to end users. This system allows an end user of a commercially valuable program to keep
the software in peak condition, while allowing Stanford to keep its faculty at work on traditional
tasks. STANFORD UNrWasrry, SoFTWARE DISTREUTION (1987). See generally Hansen, supra note
357.
362. See Wilson & Szygenda, supra note 159, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
363. See Gregory & Sheahan, supra note 158, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
364. Id. "A spin-off company is defined as a company producing a product or service which
originated from research at a university .... Spin-off firms form only a tiny fraction of the ap-
proximately 600,000 new companies being formed annually in the U.S. However, with many ...
states. ., expecting universities to be a greater force in economic development. . ., spin-off com-
panies can be catalyst[s] for regional economic development." Preliminary Announcement, Second
Conference on the University Spin-off Corporation, to be held at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia (May 16-17, 1989).
365. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 176, at 5-6, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
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certain daughter sciences that produce an array of commercially valua-
ble applications from an initial breakthrough.366 In addition, the exter-
nal corporation may be subdivided into a bewildering array of
nontransparent compartments, each keeping secrets from the other;
this makes it hard for the faculty creator or the university administra-
tor to keep tabs on the source code once an exclusive license is signed.
Equity participation, though not a panacea, provides the university
with greater control over all income-generating opportunities.367
None of these problems is insoluble, nor are they necessarily more
daunting than other legal problems that universities must routinely
face. The point is that, in resolving the peculiar problems that attend
the protection and exploitation of computer software, the university as
a whole and the originating department in particular are likely to be-
come enmeshed in the affairs of the private firms that assume the task
of commercial exploitation. The needs of the corporation may then be-
gin to influence future work undertaken in the department by faculty
366. See, e.g., Evenson, supra note 56, at 333-34; infra note 378. Of course, licensing con-
tracts should provide for future participation, while the Copyright Act of 1976 will vest the "au-
thor" with the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2), 201(a) (1982).
Retention of the complete source code will also make the exploiting company more dependent on
the originator for a period of time. But this dependence will not last indefinitely, and the more
expertise the licensee acquires through various means, both legal and illegal, the more eager he will
become to move off on his own without the encumbrances imposed by the licensor. The licensee is
aided in this effort by the policies of trade secret law, which encourage reverse engineering, and by
the limits of copyright law, which certainly permit reverse engineering by laborious or "clean
room" techniques and arguably by the less laborious forms of reverse compilation discussed in the
text. See supra notes 317-26 and accompanying text. Copyright law also encourages courts to rec-
ognize the point at which the second corner's work ceases to be a derivation and becomes a new
work in its own right. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NiMMER, supra note 42, at § 3.01; see also
Conference Report, supra note 242, at 8-10.
367. By keeping the source code, by providing technical services, and by obtaining an owner-
ship interest in the exploiting company, the university will, however, expand its potential liabilities
even as it solidifies its legal protection. Commercial software applications of any complexity are
apparently never fully delivered as warranted, never fully operational, and never free of bugs and
defects. See generally Rodau, Computer Software Contracts: A Review of the Caselaw, 2
SOrWARE L.J. 77 (1987); see also Hansen, supra note 357, at 636-39. Concomitantly, the commer-
cial lore that regulates these matters, perhaps infected by the same virus, grows increasingly com-
plex without ever clearly establishing what constitutes defective delivery of a computer program,
when a breach of warranty will lie, and what measure of damages is appropriate. Universities and
academics, as software providers, will inevitably make and break similar promises and warranties
concerning their own technical contributions; they must accordingly limit their liability to the ex-
tent the law permits and adequately insure against losses that cannot be avoided.
Universities must also be on guard lest their own academics borrow too freely from their pred-
ecessors, as academics are wont to do. Otherwise, even the university that has negotiated a suitable
indemnification clause may find itself liable for copyright infringement and the misappropriation
of trade secrets. See, e.g., S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst,, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn.
1983); Marks, supra note 176, at 4-5, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24 (noting that aca-
demics' impatience with literary property rights in software makes it necessary for the university
to monitor and enforce legal restrictions on use).
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members who now wear two hats.3 68
IV. TECHNOPOLIS AND THE IMPENDING CONSECRATION OF MAXIMALIST
LooIC
A. Temptations of the Minimalist Holdouts
Recall that the minimalist university set out to preserve the integ-
rity of its academic role and, in keeping with the spirit of Pajaro Dunes,
preferred to rely on patenting for the bulk of its research applica-
tions69 Suddenly, current concern for the protection of computer
software (i.e., for an elusive bundle of rights in tangible manifestations
of applied scientific know-how) threatens to take the university very far
down the road toward direct involvement in commercialized research.
All aspects of this undertaking-selling the idea, finding venture capi-
tal, negotiating the license or other legal arrangements, servicing appli-
cations and refinements of the original idea, controlling what the
university delivers in relation to what it has promised and war-
ranted-constitute a big job for any committee of academics who meet
once a month to evaluate the elegance of their colleague's work.370 The
efforts a university must make to produce and exploit winning software,
in other words, require an organization and a structure capable of sys-
tematically protecting and exploiting this particular form of know-how
in a professional manner and with a commitment to achieving commer-
cial success.37
1. Indirect Benefits of Gearing Up
Similar demands make it burdensome for universities to exploit
other valuable intermediate technologies in addition to software. To
make the most of the opportunities available to them, university ad-
ministrators must reach deep into the laboratories to identify and pro-
368. See N. WADE, supra note 20, at 60-62.
369. See Pajaro Dunes Statement, supra note 13; supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., Cawood, supra note 24, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. The peculiar
nature of software (and of kindred intermediate technologies) impinges on the magnitude of the
university's involvement in still other ways that are worth noting. For example, predicting the
commercial success of any given software venture is even harder than deciding which patented
inventions of a more traditional character are the most likely to succeed. As with industrial de-
signs, in other words, there is a capricious element in the public's acceptance of particular software
packages that no demonstration of superior functional capabilities can entirely eliminate. Produc-
ers able to launch a stream of innovations onto a given market segment thus seem more likely to
succeed in the end than those who confine their promotional efforts to a few programs thought to
be the most promising at any given point in time. Cf. Reichman, Before the Copyright Act, supra
note 61, at 1235-36 (discussing the case of industrial designs).
371. See, e.g., Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 561-62 (stressing the reasons
universities generally need "an active and well organized patent and licensing policy").
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tect promising innovations from the start. They must reach deep into
the business world to ensure that some of the targeted projects actually
realize their commercial potential. And they must maintain a sizable
infrastructure to coordinate relations between the laboratory and indus-
try over a fairly long period of time.3 72
Outside the universities, of course, the commercial exploitation of
know-how is hardly a new phenomenon. Some component of know-how
inheres in the development of most patented technology, and industries
often license the patent in order to acquire the know-how. 73 At other
times, the patent functions as the centerpiece of a larger technology
transfer that integrates patent rights with contractual rights to the per-
tinent know-how. 74 What distinguishes the present situation is that
proprietary rights are increasingly asserted in valuable applications of
scientific know-how that are developed in a university environment and
that do not benefit sufficiently from the practices and procedures or-
ganized around the patent system. 5
Once minimalist universities gear up to deal with the additional
burdens of protecting and exploiting know-how, whether embodied in
computer software, industrial designs, or products of genetic engineer-
ing, they are apt to perceive the many traditional innovations that they
failed to exploit in the past because of insufficient nurturing. That pat-
entable inventions do not develop themselves commercially may come
as a surprise to administrators who have preferred to follow a hands-off
policy. 78 They now discover that such inventions do not walk out of the
laboratory and into the university review committee or out of the com-
mittee and into refinements, prototypes, and models; that the pertinent
business plans do not write themselves; and that venture capital is not
always parked outside the door. In other words, by waiting for patenta-
ble projects to come along and then attempting to license a select few,
the minimalist university has probably ignored what the true patenting
potential of its own laboratories could have been had it taken greater
pains to close the gap between the laboratory and private industry.3 77
Now these same universities are increasingly tempted to close this gap
in the fields of software, biogenetic engineering, and certain other inter-
mediate technologies.
372. See generally id. at 561-64.
373. See, e.g., Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, supra note 82, in PATENTS IN
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 82, at 79-80.
374. Id.; see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 94-114, 148-53, 162-63, 175-77 and accompanying text.
376. See Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562 (declaring that "this approach
has not been successful in practice").
377. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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What universities must do in order to profit from computer
software, in other words, is what universities would do to profit from all
legally protectable subject matter at their disposal if they were inclined
to accept the maximalist view of the university's role in this regard and
became truly determined to commercialize their research output.3 78 In
contrast, a maximalist university that had aggressively geared up to ex-
ploit its patentable subject matter will already have invested in the
kind of infrastructure that should enable it to take the exploitation of
software in its stride.3 79 By the same token, a minimalist university that
now gears up to deal with software on a more than passing basis gains
the option of adapting any organization it sets in place to a more ener-
getic pursuit of both traditional patents and modern forms of commer-
cially exploitable know-how. While the point of departure for this
Article was that a minimalist university was not very interested in
availing itself of such opportunities,"' one may well begin to question
whether any major university still retains much choice in this matter.
2. The Hidden Costs of High-Mindedness
Suppose, for example, that a high-minded university decides to ig-
nore the potential profits in its laboratories. Sooner or later, an innova-
tion that got away will make millions for somebody else, perhaps
through commercial ventures with that university's own faculty mem-
bers. Meanwhile, the university will have its begging bowl
out-pleading for funds and donations, raising tuition, and seeking to
enlarge its endowment. In the end, it may have to beseech the govern-
ment and the foundations for the privilege of doing research of impor-
tance to the government and the foundations, which is hardly an
improvement in terms of freely determining the university's own re-
search agenda.3 ' Moreover, all those who are importuned for contribu-
tions will not cease to remind the purist university that it could have
helped itself if it had only taken sensible steps to land the big one that
378. The external commercial process must enter the laboratory early in order to shape the
flow of know-how and research toward patentable applications, or increasingly, toward a whole
series of applications. See, e.g., Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 562. Indeed, the
big money today often resides in so-called daughter sciences, which require a lot of nurturing from
the earliest stage in order to reap proportionally large rewards. See, e.g., Evenson, supra note 56,
at 334 (discussing daughter sciences). Once the innovation begins to acquire a potentially patenta-
ble physiognomy, the professor needs both early and capable legal advice to know when to stop
talking and start filing.
379. See generally MIT COPYRIGHT POLICY, supra note 220. MIT appears to fit this
description.
380. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 152, at 14 (stressing the distorting effect of the "entire
granting process" involving public or private grants to faculty members).
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got away.
The laggards must also contend with the risk that foreigners will
appropriate the very innovations that they have let go.3 2 Unprotected
research in scientific journals has always been fair game,88 but foreign
entrepreneurs are unlikely to wait that long. They now stalk the halls of
academia and entice professors with offers of financial support in return
for grants of exclusive rights to their firms or to some foreign funding
agency.38 4 These blandishments place the investigator in a possible con-
flict with his own mission, with the policies of his university, and with
an increasingly insistent view of the national interest. They require the
university to formulate a policy, like it or not, lest it become an invol-
untary cog in a foreign conglomerate out of reluctance to become an
involuntary cog in a domestic conglomerate.
Meanwhile, knowledge of the commercial bonanzas obtained by
some universities makes it harder for others to resist these tempta-
tions.3 85 Certain universities that took steps to exploit patents, copy-
rights, trade secrets, and everything else that came along have grown
from small research institutions to giant organizations. These institu-
tions thrive; they have money to fund all the research that interests
them, and they boast of an ever more potent administrative capacity for
exploiting the fruits of the human intellect.
As these universities become more professional, they grow more
successful at commercializing research and they make more money.
Stanford University, for example, reportedly collects more than 9.17
million dollars in annual licensing fees; the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology collects more than 3 million dollars annually. Even an Ivy
League institution such as Cornell, which has achieved no major break-
throughs, has secured annual revenue from royalties of about 850,000
dollars through this process, with rosier prospects just ahead.388 In
short, once entered in the account books, maximalist revenues become
an acquired taste that can turn the heads of even the staunchest de-
fenders of the minimalist tradition.
382. See, e.g., Schade, University Technology Transfer Policy and U.S. Competitiveness in
International Markets, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24. This fear gives rise to big scare
tactics regarding computer software. See, e.g., Karjala, First Case, supra note 301, at 150-51.
383. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 54 (discussing the case of Japan). Brooks suggests
that Japan may now be moving toward greater dependence on its own university system for public
research.
384. See, e.g., Schade, supra note 382, at 9, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24 (fearing
research "give aways" to both U.S. and foreign companies by professors, sponsored by federal
grants, who consult with these companies).
385. See generally Lesser, supra note 15.
386. See Gosselin, Harvard to Invest in Its Faculty's Work, Boston Globe, Sept. 14, 1988, at
43, col. 1; see also Lesser, supra note 15, at 369.
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B. Redefining the Public Interest
There is little doubt that a minimalist university could better ex-
ploit its intermediate technologies with less violence to its overall aca-
demic mission if it could protect applied scientific know-how under a
sui generis legal regime that was not preoccupied with "inventions" or
"artistic works. 3 87 Unfortunately, despite growing interest in such an
approach both here and abroad,3 88 no industrialized country has yet de-
cided s 9 to enact a full-fledged sui generis regime even for the protec-
tion of computer software.39 0
Although the French Copyright Law of 1985 established a rudi-
mentary framework for such an initiative 91 and the United States
387. See supra notes 41-62, 95-114 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 121-22 and accompanying text. For early supporters of such a regime in
the United States, see, e.g.: CONTU REPORT, supra note 110, at 27-37 (dissent of Hersey); Galbi,
supra note 65, at 282-96; Samuelson, supra note 126, at 507-31; and Stem, The Bundle of Rights
Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1229 (1986). For more recent supporters, see gener-
ally Karjala, supra note 105; and Menell, supra note 171. Foreign supporters of a sui generis ap-
proach include: Dietz, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Trojan Horse or Stimulus
for the Future Copyright System?, Paper Delivered at the Conference on the International Legal
Protection of Computer Software: Past Practice and Future Policy, Stanford Law School, Palo
Alto, Calif. (July 24-26, 1986); see also Cornish, Legal Protection of Computer Programs in the
United Kingdom and Parts of the British Commonwealth, Paper Delivered to the Conference on
the International Legal Protection of Computer Software, supra; Hart, High Technology "Reverse
Engineering": The Dual Standard, 14 N. Ky. L. REv. 237 (1987); Vandenberghe, supra note 110, at
128-31. But see GREEN PAPER, supra note 312, 272-338.
For the broad spectrum of opinion in the German-speaking countries, notwithstanding the
ostensible triumph of the "unity of literature" thesis, see R6ttinger, Rechtchutz von computer-
programmen (pts 1-3), 1 INFORMATIK UND REcHT (IUR) 293-300 (1986), 2 INFORMATIK UND RECHT
(IUR) 93-102 (1987), 2 INFORMATIK uND RECHT (IUR) 139-49 (1987). But see Ulmer & Kolie, Copy-
right Protection of Computer Programs, 14 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 159
(1983) (reaffirming the validity of full copyright protection for computer programs, notwithstand-
ing traditionally "thin" protection of utilitarian works, and without noting contradiction between
this position and the sui generis treatment of industrial art); Ulmer, Copyright Protection of Sci-
entific Works with Special Reference to Computer Programs, 1 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT L. (IIC) 56, 64-70 (1971) (early, authoritative, and more cautious affirmation of
copyrightability that stresses "thin" protection for scientific works).
In evaluating the pro-copyright optimism that still reigns in certain circles abroad, one must
recall that foreign law lags several years behind United States law in this type of litigation, so that
United States decisions exaggerating the scope of protection, such as Whelan v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1986), have yet to appear abroad. It is safe to predict that when such decisions do
begin to crop up in foreign law, the critical reaction will be even stormier than in the United
States. This prediction follows from the historical resistance to the "unity of art" excesses in most
of those same countries. See supra notes 74-75, 291-92 and accompanying text. For evidence that
this reaction is already starting to develop, see Gaudrat, La Protection des logiliels [Copyright
Protection of Computer Software], 138 REvUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AuTEUR (RIDA) 76,
170-81 (1988).
389. Switzerland had moved toward such a decision. See Ritscher, supra note 122. But the
Swiss authorities have reportedly settled for a short-term copyright solution on the French model.
390. See generally Kindermann, supra note 120, at 204-14.
391. See Kindermann, supra note 120, at 206-07; supra notes 293-95, 389 and accompanying
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Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 introduced a model that
might be adapted to this end, 92 the difficulties of elaborating an inter-
nationally acceptable solution for computer programs and of accommo-
dating it within the established framework of world intellectual
property law should not be underestimated. 93 The long and still un-
resolved quest for a harmonized regime to protect industrial designs un-
derscores these difficulties. The legal history of industrial design further
illustrates the balkanization likely to occur when the excesses of copy-
right protection for utilitarian works finally induce alarmed states to
renounce overprotection in favor of unilateral legal constructs that em-
body purely domestic conceptions of the public interest.9 '
There is no escaping the fact that the very intermediate technolo-
gies that universities now wish to commercialize have confronted intel-
lectual property law with the many legal hybrids that challenge its
established universe of discourse.9 5 Efforts to incorporate these tech-
nologies within existing legal frameworks have undermined basic prem-
ises about the workings of the free market economy,$96 reopened old
controversies surrounding the desirability of the intellectual property
system itself,3 97 and called into question once again the extent to which
this body of law actually promotes the public interest.398
text. Observe that this law meets few of the criteria for an ideal law set forth in the text. See infra
notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
392. See generally Samuelson, supra note 126.
393. See, e.g., Kindermann, supra note 120, at 204; see also Keplinger, supra note 120, at
126-280. The inability to reach a negotiated settlement in view of North-South tensions is some-
times cited as a primary obstacle. See, e.g., J. Gorlin, supra note 290; see also O'Brien & Helleiner,
The Political Economy of Information in a Changing International Economic Order, 34 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 445 (1980). But see Dreyfuss, New Information Products, supra note 114, at 16-22
(more optimistic about the possibility of negotiating such treaties); Reichman, GATT Connection,
supra note 349, at 29-30 (stating that an emergency treaty is feasible in context of Uruguay
Round).
394. See Reichman, supra note 5, part I1 (discussing the "Cyclical Nature of the Design Phe-
nomenon in All Legal Environments" and "Breaking the Cycle of Under- and Over-Protection");
see also INPI Report, supra note 301, reprinted in INDUS. PROP., supra note 301, at 350 (noting the
"latent risk of very heterogeneous national solutions"); Reichman, Before the Copyright Act,
supra note 61, at 1170-74.
395. See, e.g., Hoffman & Karny, supra note 303; supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 101, at 606-09.
397. See, e.g., R. BENKO, supra note 12, at 19-25; Breyer, supra note 12. Professor Kingston
notes that "[a]ccording to the thinkers in the Machlup tradition ... intellectual property can now
do little to encourage innovation, and may even retard it ... [because] modern products and
services contain so much more information than earlier ones." Kingston, Response, supra note 82,
in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 278. Kingston, however, rejects this thesis.
398. See, e.g., R. BENKO, supra note 12, at 35-46; Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric
Models, and Proprietary Rights to Information, 27 McGML L.J. 47, 49-56, 68-72 (1981). Pendleton,
Intellectual Property, Information-based Society and a New International Economic Order-the
Policy Options, 7 Eun. INTELL. PROP. REV. (EIPR) 31 (1988). Compare Mandeville & Macdonald,
supra note 12, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 159 (providing strong protection for inno-
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The resulting crisis in world intellectual property laws" has kin-
dled unprecedented interest in resolving the puzzle of know-how-a
puzzle that seems to link all the disparate legal hybrids in need of regu-
latory attention.400 Any quest for a solution to the problems of a given
legal subcategory, such as computer software, seems unlikely to produce
lasting results unless it is self-consciously integrated into this broader
inquiry. For example, the parallels between industrial art and industrial
literature, respectively the oldest and newest marginal cases under the
dominant intellectual property paradigms, are too marked to be ig-
nored.401 Empirical evidence derived from the study of "applied art"
suggests, indeed, that a modified copyright model may prove to be the
most suitable vehicle for balancing incentives to invest in technological
know-how against a redefined conception of the public interest in a
global economic environment.40 2
Further exploration of these matters would carry the present study
too far afield. Here it suffices to emphasize that any legal regime capa-
ble of satisfactorily resolving the common problems posed by applied
art and applied literature would go a long way toward resolving the
problems posed by other intermediate technologies as well. Conversely,
any attempt to address specific technologies with ad hoc legal responses
that would fail to alleviate the problems posed by industrial art and
industrial literature, if applied to these fields, could lead to sterile and
perhaps dangerous results in the end.403
vation by the grant of strictly enforceable property rights in technological information could stifle
overall innovative process) with Kingston, supra note 82, in DIRECT PROTECTION, supra note 12, at
287-88 (noting that the principle of patenting is highly conducive to innovation in a dynamic infor-
mation economy).
399. See, e.g., H. STALSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN
TRADE 47-50 (1987); Ladd, To Cope With the World Upheaval in Copyright Law, 19 COPYRIGHT
289, 289-91, 293 (1983). This crisis casts a large shadow over the current round of GATT negotia-
tions dealing with trade-related aspects of intellectual property. See, e.g., GREEN PAPER, supra note
312, at 218-36 (External Relations). See generally H. STALSON, supra, at 62-90; Reichman, GATT
Connection, supra note 349.
400. See supra notes 70-114 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 109, 121-22, 291-96, 311-12 and accompanying text; Reichman, supra
note 5, part I ("Premises for International Action to Harness a Disruptive Legal Hybrid").
402. See generally id. part II ("Lessons of the American Experience for the European Com-
munity"); see also Ladd, supra note 399, at 293 (arguing that international organizations should
develop "new kinds of copyright-like protection outside copyright itself" rather than extending
traditional copyright law to "technology-containing works"). In the absence of such a model, the
same evidence suggests that cycles of over- and under-protection are a behavioral characteristic of
all the legal hybrids that fit imperfectly within either the patent or the copyright mold. See gener-
ally Reichman, supra note 5, part H.
403. In a recent study of industrial design this writer observed:
As the oldest and most disruptive marginal case in the history of intellectual property law,
industrial design has left a long record of failed solutions that is eminently worthy of study.
While any solution to the puzzle of [applied scientific] know-how will undoubtedly affect in-
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Ideally, a legal regime adapted to the needs of computer software
and other intermediate technologies would protect the creators' applied
innovative ideas without requiring the level of invention needed for pat-
ents.4 0 4 Such a regime would thus leave a broad area of routine im-
provements free for the public to use while establishing a middle range
of protectable innovation in which quantitatively creative contributions
to know-how might be sheltered for a relatively short period of time.0 5
It would permit disclosure prior to filing and would legitimate some
form of reverse engineering to enable researchers to study each other's
work while still preserving their proprietary rights.40 6 It would also pro-
vide a marketable certificate of title to a discrete body of innovative
know-how that could be sold and policed, in contrast to the amorphous
sweep of copyright law, which supports vague claims to any matter judi-
cially characterized as "expression" once an infringement action has
been plausibly lodged.0 7
Absent such a regime, university administrators cannot indulge in
the assumption that their exploitation of proprietary rights to computer
software automatically serves the public interest.40 8 If legal hybrids fall-
ing between the patent and copyright paradigms tend inherently to
trigger alternating currents of underprotection and overprotection, as
occurs in the case of industrial designs, 0 9 the resulting "social bargain"
remains unbalanced and, perhaps, counterproductive.4 10 This follows re-
gardless of whether universities or private enterprise assert the proprie-
tary rights in question. Moreover, ongoing efforts to redefine the larger
public interest in the context of new technologies inevitably raise fresh
concerns about the ability of universities to reconcile their increasing
dustrial design, investigators could approach the new problems common to all the intermedi-
ate technologies with a good deal more self-confidence if progress were made in reducing the
disruptive effects of the one intermediate technology that has been around for the longest
[period of] time.
Reichman, supra note 5, part H (discussing ways of breaking the cycle of under- and over-
protection).
404. See supra notes 107-14.
405. See supra notes 79-114, 250-64 and accompanying text; see also Stern, supra note 388,
at 1258-67.
406. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 242, at 9-10; Hart, High Technology "Reverse
Engineering:" The Dual Standard, 2 N. Ky. L. REv. 237, 246-48; supra notes 316-26 and accompa-
nying text. But see Kindermann, supra note 120, at 219-20.
407. See supra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 12-25, 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing the built-in assump-
tions that patents and copyrights promote the public interest).
409. See supra notes 107-14, 402 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 105, at 95 (stating that the "simple call for more incentives
for software creation does not provide an adequate foundation for estimating the optimal level of
protection"); Samuelson, supra note 126, at 511-14 (indicating a need for a different social bargain
from that which copyright provides).
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use of proprietary rights with the traditional functions of the academic
mission-namely, to teach and disseminate the thoughts, ideas, and
findings of their faculty members.411
C. The University of Technopolis
Even if Congress enacted a sui generis regime for computer
software or approved measures to relieve the pressure on other interme-
diate technologies, this action would not free the modern university
from the kinds of entangling technical and commercial relationships
that software development currently engenders. A regime of this type
would presumably simplify licensing, make it less essential to retain ab-
solute dominion over the programmer's original source code, and reduce
the need for dual protection in trade secret law. Under a tailor-made
legal regime, however, effective exploitation of computer software-or
of other forms of applied scientific know-how, for that matter-would
still require originators to contribute expertise and to participate in the
further refinement and adaptation of their discoveries.412
Like private industry, therefore, universities that systematically
commercialize the new technologies are, to some still unknown extent,
serving their own interests and not necessarily those of the public at
large. There is nothing intrinsically unworthy in this pursuit, given an
age in which the tax collector limits private philanthropy and even pub-
lic universities are obliged to seek private funding for essential activi-
ties. But the pursuit of enlightened self-interest surely must presuppose
a sense of self-respect and some vision of the future role of the univer-
sity as an institution for higher learning.
The problem is not just that universities are collaborating with in-
dustry or that they are seeking to profit from their own research activi-
ties. It is that they are behaving more and more like corporations.1 "
New possibilities to exploit nearly every form of research have tempted
more and more universities to do just that.414 A maximalist university,
having decided that its future lies in commercialized research and de-
velopment, may now take unprecedented steps to achieve its goals in
the manner of any large business enterprise.
411. See, e.g., Lesser, supra note 15, at 370 (noting that such tensions become acute in the
field of biotechnology, in which universities and business are partners in basic research; the univer-
sity trains "business scientists . . . as peers and colleagues," and much "basic" research leads to
the discovery of patentable inventions); see also Evenson, supra note 56, at 330, 332-34 (1983);
Note, Ties That Bind: Conflicts of Interest in University-Industry Links, 17 U.C. DAvIs L. REV.
895 (1984).
412. See supra notes 358-61 and accompanying text.
413. See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 155, at 27; Brooks, supra note 10, at 54.
414. See, e.g., Lesser, supra note 15, at 360-61, 363, 366-70.
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At the University of New Hampshire, for example, where the ad-
ministration wants faculty to be entrepreneurs and actively encourages
their commercial endeavors, there is an elaborate support system for
faculty "inventors/entrepreneurs" built around the following elements:
1. A university administration that encourages faculty entrepreneurship and uni-
versity policies that facilitate it.
2. A university Center for Industrial Research and Consulting that provides access
to university facilities and services and acts as a conflict of interest buffer and a
source of advice and encouragement.
3. An innovation incubator, a physical facility where those in the process of busi-
ness development can maintain an office and a prototype development area in an
environment where such activity is the main enterprise.
4. A network of not-for-profit and for-profit advisory services.
5. A not-for-profit Venture Capital Network. . .(or) "dating service" that seeks to
bring together inventors/entrepreneurs and informal investors who are sources of
first stage venture capital ....415
One could argue that a university so equipped tends in practice to
operate as the think tank or creative branch of a corporate conglomer-
ate; that it marshals students and professors for the overriding task of
turning ideas into commercial products.416 The problems with this ar-
rangement need only be suggested. Maximum emphasis on exploiting
proprietary rights in the academic work product can divert attention
away from the teaching function and retard the free and open exchange
of knowledge that is a tenet of scientific progress.417 Faculty may in-
creasingly experience conflicts of interest between their institutional
roles and their entrepreneurial roles, which in turn influence the choice
of research direction for the professor, students, and the department.418
These conflicts pose the further risk that a department may saddle
itself with the unprofitable aspects of a given research project while pri-
vate corporations in which faculty are involved siphon off the profitable
yields.41 9 Some gifted but nonentrepreneurial scientists may be driven
415. Morrison & Wetzel, supra note 24, at 2.
416. For example, the GMI Engineering & Management Institute of Flint, Michigan offers a
four-year degree program that makes a conscious effort to "assist fledgling entrepreneurs and
evolving firms in developing, adapting, or expanding.... Ties, of course, with General Motors
remain strong." Kowaiski, Ramifications of Operating a Business & Industry Development Center
as an Auxiliary Enterprise, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24.
417. See, e.g., D. NELKIN, supra note 1, at 25; Lesser, supra note 15, at 369-70; see also
Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1363,
1371-78 (1988) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Sponsored Research].
418. Eisenberg, Sponsored Research, supra note 417, at 1363, 1371-74, 1376-78; see also D.
NELKIN, supra note 1, at 25. Eisenberg stresses the following evils: (1) secrecy of research results;
(2) distortions of viewpoints and claims by academic researchers "in order to please their research
sponsors"; and (3) distortion of the academic research agenda. Eisenberg, Sponsored Research,
supra note 417, at 1374-78.
419. See, e.g., Eisenburg, Sponsored Research, supra note 417, at 1373 (noting that given the
tripartite relation between universities, faculty members, and sponsors, it "is simply not practical
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out of teaching, although others may be drawn into teaching because of
more competitive salaries. 42 0 There is also a risk that outside venture
capitalists may become controllers inside the university and that uni-
versity administrators may operate as the de facto employees of outside
financiers.421 From there it seems but a short step to emphasizing com-
mercial success in the tenure process;422 to the formation of revenue-
generating departments that act like rainmakers in law firms; and fi-
nally, to the recruiting of academics who show promise of en-
trepreneurial skills, not just scholarship.423
In short, if carried too far the organization needed to maximize
commercial exploitation of research will pervade every aspect of the
university's activities and gradually dictate its physiognomy. The insti-
tution that results from this process remains a university in name, but
it operates like a business enterprise.424 Moreover, this enterprising uni-
versity will naturally seek to integrate itself into the larger business
community, as would any other ambitious corporate citizen. To the ex-
tent it succeeds, it may resemble the University of Technopolis, de-
picted below in a diagram 425 that was distributed at the Blacksburg
Conference in 1988.426 This diagram of the "Technopolis Wheel" epito-
mizes both the maximalist's lust for empire and the minimalist's fears
...for universities to stand back and let faculty members do as they please," when it enables
them "to command scarce university resources for projects of their choice").
420. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 152, at 14. Brooks believes that "the present environ-
ment of the research university may be selecting against a certain type of scholarly individ-
ual-one with a truly long-range agenda and vision but a relatively non-aggressive personality and
a distaste for 'self-promotion.'" Brooks, supra note 10, at 52. This attitude results from the need
to make faculty appointments like "hunting licenses" that authorize the appointees "to sally forth
and persuade some potential external sponsor in government, industry or a private foundation that
they have a worthwhile research program in mind." Id. As some authors stress, past dependence on
government funding was hardly less corrupting of academic values than cooperation with industry.
See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 31, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 37; Eisenberg,
Sponsored Research, supra note 417, at 1371-72.
421. See, e.g., D. DICKSON, supra note 14, at 78-79 (noting that the research direction of
faculty and of their students can be governed by their sponsors' needs).
422. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 609-10.
423. See, e.g., Lesser, supra note 15, at 369 (noting that percentage return to the inventor is
a point of competition when universities compete for top academics); supra note 420 (view of
Brooks). Brooks finds the position of academic researchers who depend on different kinds of
outside funding generally inferior to that of industry research workers, who have greater freedom
to work on novel programs and new lines of investigation that are funded internally. Brooks, supra
note 10, at 52.
424. See id. at 54.
425. See Gibson & Smilor, supra note 164, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24, at 2.
The plans of the ambitious university are likely to be supported by local authorities who see them
as an investment in economic development. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Sponsored Research, supra note
417, at 1371-72. Carried to an extreme, this view enables the town to reassert much of the influence
over gown that it lost in the 1950s and 1960s.
426. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
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of what the future holds in store.
TECHNOPOLIS WHEEL
Source: David Gibson & Raymond Smilor, "The Role of the Research
University in Creating and Sustaining the U.S. Technopolis," Black-
sburg Conference, 1988.
Proponents of the "Technopolis Wheel" laud its efficiency. They
see competition and cooperation between its participating entities as es-
sential for a Technopolis to develop and survive over time.42 7 They en-
vision a central role for the research university, namely, to "educate
427. Gibson & Smifor, supra note 164, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24, at 3.
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* . . and stimulate ... the scientists and engineers necessary for...
research activities on leading-edge technologies."4 28
Critics tend to dismiss the corporate University of Technopolis as a
caricature of what a university is supposed to be.2 9 In this vein, Saul
Bellow described today's university as "a major source of the indispen-
sable jargons that flow into public life," a place where "[v]ast powers
stream. . . into government," and where "a power base in biotechnol-
ogy, energy production, electronics" exists.30 In this environment, as
one intellectual property expert recently warned, "the mix of work...
may begin to change as universities subtly redirect their efforts toward
works whose financial benefits are more easily captured.' ' 3 1 If faculty
members then become reluctant to produce works that are less likely to
advance mundane goals, it would compound the long-term effects of
such a change and hasten the eclipse of the "scholarly individual" who
combines vision with "distaste for 'self-promotion.' ',432
Yet, all universities must now engage in the commercial exploita-
tion of research results if only to maintain their standing in the aca-
demic world. There is no turning back to some antediluvian state in
which researchers were unpreoccupied by such concerns.43 3 Nor is it
easy to devise a satisfactory model that fits between the minimalist and
maximalist extremes expressed, respectively, at Pajaro Dunes in 1982
and Blacksburg in 1988.434
Harvard University, for example, some eight years after it publicly
denounced entrepreneurial initiatives, recently organized a multimillion
dollar fund to invest in companies that commercialize the work of its
faculty members. 438 The Johns Hopkins University already possesses a
similar fund.481 Even the august University of Chicago is tentatively
committed to commercial endeavors on a case-by-case basis, with no
clear conception of the future but without necessarily succumbing to
428. Id. at 1. Examples given are Silicon Valley, California, a mature technopolis; Austin,
Texas, a developing technopolis; and Phoenix, Arizona, an "emerging techopolis." Id.
429. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 53-54; Weiner, supra note 14, at 59-60.
430. S. BELLOW, MORE DIE OF HEARTBREAK 10-11 (1987). He adds: "Academics polarize light
for copying machines, they get venture capital from Honeywell, General Mills, GT & E, they are
corporate entrepreneurs on the grand scale-consultants, big-time pundits, technical witnesses
before congressional committees ... Even I [the fictional narrator], as a Russian expert, occasion-
ally get into the act." Id. at 11.
431. Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 630.
432. See supra note 420 (quoting Brooks).
433. See, e.g., Beier, Government Promotion, supra note 12, at 561-64; Lesser, supra note 15,
at 360, 369-70.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38, 157-67.
435. Grosselin, In '80, Harvard Dropped Plan for Genetic Engineering Firm, Boston Globe,
Sept. 11, 1988, at 43, col. 1.
436. Id.
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the maximalist heresy. 3
What seems most disquieting about this vision of Technopolis and
its University is the extent to which it takes for granted the enduring
contributions of universities that are more than corporate entities in
spirit. It promotes a dangerous assumption that great theoretical break-
throughs will continue to occur in such an environment and that they
will provide the maximalist university with an unending stream of inno-
vation to develop efficiently and exploit. s It is quite conceivable, how-
ever, that the more perfectly the Technopolises of the future integrate
their universities, the less these universities will attract and nurture the
kind of thinkers whose research is not exploitable in the cash-and-carry
manner of a corporate balance sheet.3 9 Will such an environment lead
to more innovation and a better future for all, or is it just a prelude to
intellectual sterility and decay?
Whatever the answer, it seems fair to ask which institution will as-
sume the role of a true university of higher learning once existing uni-
versities are transformed into hybrid business organizations that
develop and manage intermediate technologies with the help of hybrid
forms of intellectual property law. In this connection, one suspects that
the truly great universities of the twenty-first century will not be those
that develop and exploit the most lucrative innovations, but rather
those that most successfully combine programs facilitating the exploita-
tion of applied scientific know-how with an abiding commitment to ba-
sic research, teaching, and the dissemination of knowledge.
437. Giannisis, Willis & Maher, supra note 161, in Blacksburg Conference, supra note 24; see
also Fusfeld, supra note 54, in PARTNERS IN RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 18.
438. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 54 (stating that "the universities have few advan-
tages in the conduct of proprietary research, and if they did they would cease to be universities as
we have known them").
439. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
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